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Abstract 
This study focuses on one element of corporate governance, Executive Stock Options 
(ESOs) in Germany. The fact that ESOs are purely an Anglo-American innovation, and 
are now getting adopted in Germany; a country whose corporate governance system is 
so much different from that of the UKlUSA, makes this study more interesting. 
Several studies on executive compensation have used agency theory as a theoretical 
lens. On the contrary, this study employs neo-institutional theory, a theoretical lens that 
embraces socio-economic factors within the firm's institutional and market 
environment. 
In general, early institutional theory was associated with path dependence and inertia. In 
international corporate governance, it has been used as an explanation for the continued 
divergence of national systems in certain contexts. However, recent developments in 
neo-institutional theory, under a combination of the New Institutional Sociology strand 
and the Old Institutional Economics strand identify the circumstances in which change 
is likely to occur, and this theory is developed to produce hypotheses in relation to 
governance changes. 
The adoption in Germany of the US practice of rewarding executives with stock options 
is chosen as a governance institution suitable for empirical testing. Results show 
significant hypothesized associations between firms' ESO adoption and institutional 
variables such as the presence of US investors, declared shareholder value 
commitments, dispersed share ownership and large block-holdings. Profits seem to act 
as an enabling resource for ESO adoption, rather than low profits creating a crisis and a 
greater willingness to adopt ESO changes. 
This study adds theoretical development in the study of corporate governance, 
especially to the debate on governance convergence. Indeed, German corporate 
governance is far from converging on the American system, and as shown in this study, 
changes in the German system suggest a 'hybrid' of firm corporate governance. 
With a lot of institutional changes taking place in transition economies (e.g. China and 
Eastern Europe), the European Union, and developing countries, this study has great 
relevance for policy makers and firm-level strategy. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Laying the Foundation 
1.1 Introduction 
This thesis focuses on one element of Gennan corporate governance - executive pay, 
specifically executive stock options (ESOs) - as an American pay innovation dating 
from around 1960 (Lewellen, 1968). ESOs have been transplanted into many countries, 
even in Gennany, where a distinctive institutional context exists. However, institutional 
theory has predicted conformism, isomorphism, path dependency and resistance to this 
kind of potentially illegitimate transplant (Tuschke and Sanders, 2003). Perhaps this 
could explain why ESOs took over thirty years to penetrate Gennan finns. 
Nevertheless, neo-institutional theory does consider the circumstances In which 
institutional change can occur, and this thesis represents one of the first attempts (see 
also D' Aunno, Succi and Alexander, 2000; Buck and Shahrim, 2005) to extend neo-
institutional theory as a theoretical framework all the way to empirical testing. In this 
context, it must be recognized that institutional theory has not yet fulfilled the promise 
of its early years. While early papers referred to its "adolescence" (Scott, 1987; 1991), 
this has recently shifted to notions of "adulthood" and "maturity" (Scott, 2006), where 
this implies a gradual loss of vigour. Nevertheless, we feel that neo-institutional theory 
can still offer insights into the prediction of institutional change. 
The analysis of the topic is important in the context of the alleged "Americanization" 
(Dj elic , 1998) of corporate governance, i.e. the means by which the behaviour of senior 
executives is constrained. Americanization represents convergence on the American 
model of "Stock Market Capitalism" based on dispersed shareholders, laws that protect 
the rights of such minority shareholders, open infonnation disclosure, liquid stock 
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markets, hostile takeovers, stock-based executive pay, and single-tier boards including 
independent directors (Dore, 2000). The collapse of alternative economic systems in 
centrally-planned economies and the problems faced by relational governance in, for 
example, Japan, Korea and Germany has led to an element of triumphalism in some 
quarters in relation to convergence. For example, Hansmann and Kraakman (2001) 
foresee the end of comparative corporate law as the world converges on the Anglo-
American model. 
This triumphalism may prove to have been premature in what has been called an 
international "clash of capitalisms" (Ahmadjian and Robbins, 2005). China is 
developing its own very successful variety of relational or Welfare State Capitalism 
(Dore, 2000) and countries like Germany and Japan still manage to produce 
corporations that are world-leaders. 
This thesis, therefore, addresses one crucial element of corporate governance, executive 
pay, in Germany, a country well-known for its own variant of Welfare State Capitalism 
and its resistance to governance change (Vitols, 2004). This chapter introduces and lays 
the foundations for the thesis. Section 1.2 provides the research background, outlining 
the broad field of study and leading to the research questions (Section 1.3). Section 1.4 
briefly describes the research methodology and Section 1.5 outlines the structure of the 
thesis, chapter by chapter. 
1.2 Research Background 
The typical components of Anglo-American Stock Market Capitalism are different from 
the German version of Welfare State Capitalism which characterises a world where 
executives are mainly influenced not by share price movements, but by the voice of 
various stakeholders (Noteboom, 1999). In Germany, this voice is exercised by family 
owners, banks and other block-holders and by employees, usually supported by 
incumbent managers, on the upper tier of a two-board system (Vitols, 2004). 
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The level of ownership concentration in Gennany is very high. Gorton and Schmid 
(1996) reported that 80% of listed companies had a non-financial owner holding at least 
25% of shares. In addition, banks have been known to have a significant control of 
major corporations through proxy voting, a system which allows banks to cast votes on 
behalf of other shareholders, mainly individuals who deposit their shares with banks 
(Edwards and Fischer, 1994). In this way, banks have been able to obtain a significant 
degree of control, even over widely-held companies especially those with significant 
cross-holdings between finns (Franks and Mayer, 2001). 
The presence of cross-holdings shields companies against hostile takeovers (Wenger 
and Kaserer, 1998). As a result, hostile takeovers have been rare, and there has only 
been a voluntary takeover code (Baumann, 1998; Bernhardt, 2000). 
Employee representation on boards also acts as a barrier to takeover, particularly when 
jobs are threatened. The management board in Gennan corporations is not selected 
directly by shareholders but by the supervisory board (Hopt, 1998). In corporations with 
at least 2,000 employees, 50% of the seats on the supervisory board is reserved for 
employees, while in smaller finns this share is a third (Mtilbert, 1998). The power of 
employees, commonly known as co-determination, is further extended by the role of 
works councils and trade unions. 
Thus, the stock market plays a minor role in the governance of Gennan companies 
through takeover. In addition, there is low market capitalisation, but this situation has 
been changing (Van der Elst, 2000). The weakness of the stock market is further 
compounded by poor disclosure requirements and auditing standards (Fox, 1998; Nobes 
and Parker, 2000; Schmidt, 1998). 
However, in the 1980s, much research aimed to explain the comparative advantages of 
the Japanese and Gennan finns, which appeared to be different but in some cases out-
competed Anglo-American finns. Anglo-American corporate governance was criticised 
for its short-tenn orientation, whereas finns in Japan and Gennany were able to develop 
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and implement long term-strategy. In Germany, for example, long-term strategy 
conferred the comparative advantages of incremental innovations in industrial 
production that enabled industry to focus on high quality and high value-added market 
niches that rationalized high wages and investment in skill formation. 
However, these benefits came at an increasingly steep price during the 1990s, as export 
markets became increasingly unstable, international competition became fiercer, bank 
profits declined as domestic market for corporate finance became increasingly saturated 
and German reunification required more rapid and thorough restructuring of the national 
economy. Germany entered long periods of crisis, suffering increased unemployment 
and slowed growth under these conditions. 
Meanwhile, the virtues of the Anglo-American model were rediscovered in the light of 
excellent macroeconomic performance, attracting foreign direct investment and 
lowering unemployment. 
Thus, despite the past success, Germany has recently faced strong pressures to change 
her corporate governance system. First, internationalisation has created pressures to 
move toward a more market-based, Anglo-American or shareholder-oriented model of 
corporate governance. International finance and investors have become increasingly 
important, and hence an increase in foreign ownership and major international mergers 
and acquisitions. Germany's finance minister, Hans Eichel was quoted in the press as 
saying " ... German as a closed system ... that is over ... " and "German firms have to be 
competitive or lose out ... " (Roth, 2000). 
Second, German firms are relying less on bank finance as they rely more on internal 
finance and funds from investors through stock markets. Banks, themselves, have 
undergone strategic reorientation toward new business models (Beyer, 2002), shifting 
away from industrial loans, deposits and shareholding (Deeg, 1999). For example 
Deutsche Bank has turned its eyes to investment banking instead of monitoring German 
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firms, and this shows that the role of private banks In corporate governance IS 
diminishing (Hackethal, Schimidt, and Tyrell, 2005). 
Banks and insurance compames (e.g. Deutsche Bank and Allianz) have also been 
relaxing the system of cross-holdings and interlocking directorates. Jackson and Hapner 
(2001), report that the share of bank representative as chairmen of supervisory board 
fell from 44 to 23 percent in Germany's 40 largest companies between 1992 and 1999. 
As bank ownership has declined, foreign ownership has increased. In 1998, the 
proportion of dispersed ownership averaged only 26 percent among the 100 largest 
German companies, 18 percent was held by families, 14 percent by the state, 17 percent 
by foreign investors, and 14 percent by other companies and banks (Jackson and 
Hapner, 2002). Given the volume of these foreign holdings, the decisions of foreign 
investors on whether to buy or sale shares have a huge impact on share prices. Foreign 
investors also influence management through voice, particularly informal dialogue. 
Recent studies by Ahmadjian (2005) in Japan have shown a strong relationship between 
the percentage of shares owned by foreigners and corporate behaviour. 
These changes in the composition of shareholding and the attitudes of investors may 
increase the prospect of a market for corporate control. Foreign investors are much 
more likely to support hostile bids that bring share price premia, as seen in the case of 
Mannesmann in Germany (Hapner and Jackson, 2001). 
Additionally, German corporations' policies towards employees have been observed to 
be changing. The fact that employees have a strong voice in German corporate 
governance has not, in itself, prevented US-style corporate governance reform. 
The adoption of ESOs has been seen as a sort of "litmus test" in relation to the overall 
issue of Americanisation and corporate governance (Cheffins, 2003). ESOs were 
virtually non-existent in Germany until 1996, when Daimler Benz AG and Deutsche 
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Bank AG introduced the first major ESO schemes. Since then, all other DAX 30 firms 
have followed in isomorphic fashion. 
While performance-linked executive pay in the form of stock options is relatively new 
in Germany, they are very popular in the USA and UK where investors typically urge 
companies to link managerial remuneration with share price performance (Heard, 1995; 
Marino, 1999; Flynn and Naik, 2000). Managers have to be attentive to shareholders' 
interests and pay levels fluctuate in accordance with the returns being delivered to those 
owning equity (Cheffins, 1999; Allen and Gale, 2000) and thus stock options arguably 
align their interests with owners. Shareholders in the USA and UK have accepted 
dramatic increases in executive pay, as long as good results for investors are being 
delivered (Heard, 1995). By choosing not to implement US-style performance linked 
pay, German companies stand to lose out in the competition for international capital or 
find their own domestic cost of capital increasing. Similarly, German companies not 
implementing such remuneration schemes would fail to retain nor attract managerial 
talent due to a global executive labour market. In 2000, the US subsidiary of SAP AG (a 
German firm) had to approve a plan to start offering stock options to senior executives, 
just like other American firms, as a way to stop the brain drain that had started to affect 
it (Stedman, 2000). 
In 1996, large German corporations such as DaimlerChrysler, Deutsche Telekom and 
SGL Carbon started to introduce US-style executive pay, by granting compensation in 
the form of bonds, which could be converted into shares (convertible bonds), or had 
warrants attached which granted the rights to acquire shares upon its exercise (warrant 
bonds) and stock appreciation rights (SARs). In 1998, the German government decided 
to end the prohibition of US-style stock option schemes and amended the German Stock 
Corporation Act (AktG) to allow German corporations to freely issue straightforward 
stock option schemes, by either issuing new shares or repurchasing outstanding equity 
to meet obligations. Following the passing of the AktG, most large German 
corporations started to adopt some form of US-style executive pay and introduce ESOs. 
By 2005 all DAX 30 firms had ESOs, with the single exception of BMW. 
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The combination of these developments indicates that large Gennan corporations are 
faced with a changing corporate governance system. What is not certain, however, is 
whether these changes represent convergence on the Anglo-American model, or 
represent a hybrid of two "varieties of capitalism" (Hall and Gingerich, 2001). 
Thus, despite alleged convergence (Hansmann and Kraakman, 2001), in 2005 fifty-six 
out of a hundred and twenty large Gennan listed finns still did not prepare accounts to 
lAS or US GAAP standards, still relying on the local HGB standard (authors' own 
database). Of DAX 30 finns in 2005, nine had still only disclosed executive pay data for 
the board as a whole; not individual directors, and another three identified only the 
individual pay of the CEO. Thus, criticisms of Gennan corporate governance refonn are 
related to standards of disclosure in general and on executive pay in particular, and in 
this respect Gennany certainly has not achieved the Stock Market Capitalism that 
convergence theorists predict. 
Besides slow progress with US-style executive pay and poor standards of disclosure, 
Gennan law offers only weak US-style protection for minority shareholders (La Porta et 
aI., 1999), and managers (in collusion with employees) are able to resist hostile 
takeovers through poison pills and other devices, even where raiders have secured over 
60% of the issued capital of a target finn (Franks and Meyer, 2001). 
Nevertheless, Gennan, voice-based, relational governance does continue to "work" in a 
Gennan context in the sense that global leaders have emerged, and Kaplan (1994) 
reports similar relations between share price movements and discipline over executives, 
measured by CEO dismissal, in Gennany, Japan and the USA. 
One implication of these multi-faceted elements of Gennan governance institutions, 
bound together by regulative, nonnative and cognitive forces (Scott, 1987), is that they 
have helped to produce an economic system that does not resemble Stock Market 
Capitalism, and that has changed very little in governance tenns over many decades 
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(Buck and Shahrim, 2005). From the perspective of the "varieties-of-capitalism" 
literature (Hall and Gingerich, 2001), German corporate governance institutions 
represent a web of mutually-supporting institutions. For example, takeovers could not 
be resisted without weak minority shareholder protection, strong employee 
representation and low stock liquidity, but these elements at the same time do facilitate 
stakeholder voice as a locally effective alternative to Stock Market Capitalism. Vitols 
(2004) concludes that the distinctive pattern of German governance persists because any 
Americanization must be "negotiated" with stakeholders. 
The ESO is a key component of American governance systems because it makes 
managers' rewards (and penalties, in the context of accrued ESO values) depend 
automatically upon share price. A foreign innovation such as the ESO therefore faces 
institutional resistance, dependent as it is upon liquid stock markets and main board 
support, unlikely with the high degree of employee control in German firms. ESOs as 
an innovation may be expected to be rejected or at least "translated" by German firms, 
to preserve their legitimacy, i.e. suit the interests of salient stakeholders (Buck and 
Shahrim, 2005). 
At the same time however, German firms have certainly adopted ESOs in large 
numbers, and a theoretical framework is needed to analyze this recent phenomenon. 
Traditional institutional theory, with its emphasis on path dependency, is clearly 
unsuitable for the purpose, and agency theory, such a frequently used paradigm in the 
study of executive pay (Gomez-Mejia, Wiseman and Johnson, 2005) is "under-
socialized" in this context (Lubatkin, Lane, Collin and Very, 2001; Aguilera and 
Jackson, 2002; 2003). Nevertheless, it is proposed that neo-institutional theory may be 
exploited to examine closely recently adopted ESOs. 
1.3 Research Questions 
Organizations often arrange their core activities according to accepted models, or 
templates. These templates are patterns for arranging organizational behaviour that 
8 
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specify organizational structure and goals and reflect a distinct set of beliefs and values. 
Accounting and law firms, for example, have traditionally used templates that 
emphasized individual autonomy and equality among peers, that Greenwood and 
Rinings (1988, 1996) termed a professional partnership model. Some templates are so 
repetitive and enduring across the national economy that actors take it for granted that 
this pattern is the right way to organize (Oliver, 1992). 
Nevertheless, there is a possibility that organizations may abandon such templates, 
diverging from accepted models. What causes them to abandon an institutionalised 
template for arranging their core activities and replace this template for arranging 
their core activities with a substantially different one? Put in other words: In what 
circumstances may change be predicted, in contrast with the path dependency of 
traditional institutional theory? This question is posed in the context of adopting a 
potentially illegitimate executive pay innovation (the ESO) by German's largest 
corporations, a practice transplanted from Anglo-American capitalism. Additionally, 
this thesis seeks to answer two other questions: Which firms may be predicted to adopt 
institutional change? What factors determine early or later adoption of ESOs in 
German's largest corporations? 
Understanding the causes of such divergent organizational change (in this case adoption 
of ESOs) is important both for understanding the change itself and for advancing neo-
institutional theory into the field of corporate governance. 
1.4 Research Methodology 
One of the greatest impediments to explaining trend in executive compensation in 
Germany has been the lack of reliable and comprehensive data (Buck and Shahrim, 
2005; Tuschke and Sanders, 2003; Bradley and Sundaram, 2004; W6jcik, 2004). 
Detailed information on executive stock-based incentive plans is difficult to obtain for 
many German firms because disclosure requirements are appreciably weaker than those 
in the United States or UK (Tuschke and Sanders, 2003). 
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Information disclosure relating to options in Germany has however improved recently. 
The trend for German companies to list on American stock exchanges (NYSE, AMEX, 
and NASDAQ) has resulted in a source of previously undisclosed information in the 
form of proxy statements filed with the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC). There 
has also been an adoption of US GAAP or lAS (accounting standards which, by 
comparison, are more transparent than the local HGB) by a number of German firms. 
This trend has meant that these firms' annual reports contain more information on 
executive pay compared to those found to be still using only German HGB accounts. 
However, many international studies involving German executive pay including ESOs 
still incur the problem of obtaining the actual amounts paid to individual directors. 
However, this thesis is merely concerned with the timing, adoption or non-adoption of 
ESOs as a governance innovation, and such information is easier to get from the 
companies' websites. Thus, sourcing data on adoption and non adoption of ESOs (taken 
in this thesis as a dichotomous dependent variable) and a number of independent 
variables, event history analysis of logistic regression was used to estimate models on 
early and later adoption of ESOs. 
1.5 The Structure of the Thesis 
Following the introduction above, the chapters in this thesis are organised and presented 
in the following way. Every chapter, with the exception of this chapter and the 
concluding chapter, begins with an introduction that outlines the main areas of 
consideration, and ends with a chapter summary that highlights concluding remarks and 
sets out links with the following chapter. 
Chapter 2 starts by providing a clear understanding of the issues underlying this thesis 
by focusing on the meaning of corporate governance, providing a literature review of 
comparative corporate governance systems, but mainly focused on the dichotomous 
varieties of capitalism, involving the German and USIUK models. The second part of 
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this chapter unveils the typical structure of executive compensation, paymg special 
attention to ESOs from a corporate governance perspective i.e. the fact that 
management compensation may be aligned to shareholders' interests. The remainder of 
the chapter assesses the relative importance of ESOs within executive compensation 
packages awarded in the USA, UK, and Germany. 
Chapter 3 develops the conceptual framework by arguing that recent research has 
shown the possibility of breaking away from organisational embeddededness by 
employing neo-institutional theory. This chapter calls for the importance of both 
exogenous factors from both the institutional and market contexts and endogenous 
(within-firm) factors drawn from intra-organisational dynamics. Thus, Chapter 3 
considers the recent developments in neo-institutional theory which seeks to understand 
change by progressing beyond the ideas of inertia and concentrating on induced 
changes, and embraces the speed of template adjustment. 
The purpose of Chapter 4 is to develop a set of hypotheses from neo-institutional theory 
(discussed in Chapter 3) in the context of the adoption of German ESOs. The chapter 
first summarises the findings of the literature review conducted in Chapters 2, and 3 
and restates the research questions which were first introduced in Chapter 1. 
The aim of Chapter 5 is to discuss the process of data collection, identifying sources, 
proposing and discussing the research design and statistical tests which best addresses 
the hypotheses generated in Chapter 4. The chapter proposes the use of the discrete 
event history analysis feature of logistic regression as a means to analyse the adoption 
of ESOs in Germany. 
Chapter 6 presents the results of the tests carried out in Chapter 5. The chapter uses 
descriptive statistics, correlation matrix and Variation Inflation Factors to test for 
multicollinearity. The results of logistic regressions are presented for (a) the adoption 
and non-adoption of ESOs (b) the early adoption of ESOs and (c) the later adoption of 
ESOs. 
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Finally, Chapter 7 concludes the thesis by synthesising the major findings of the 
research, discussing their significance to academic debate and any implications it might 
have for policy in developing and transition economies, and for remuneration practices 
in firms. Finally, the chapter considers the limitations for the research and highlights 
suggestions for future work. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Institutional Background: Corporate Governance in the USA, UK and 
Germany 
2.1 Introduction 
Chapter 1 laid the foundation of this thesis, in the fonn of a long introduction, 
explaining that its main aim is to find out the circumstances under which radical change 
in the context of a corporate governance template change is possible, and more 
specifically under which the adoption of a potentially illegitimate governance 
innovation (i.e. Executive Stock Options) may take place in Gennany. The purpose of 
this chapter is to provide a background for the understanding of corporate governance in 
general and executive stock options in particular, as a basis for the work that follows in 
the rest of the chapters. 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 outlines the categorization of corporate 
governance within the varieties-of-capitalism perspective, i.e. under "Stock Market 
Capitalism" and "Welfare Capitalism." Section 2.3 provides some background on 
corporate governance systems, contrasting the traditional Gennan model with the US 
and UK versions. In order to be able to assess institutional change, this section will 
focus on Gennan corporate governance before the mid-1990s. Section 2.4 represents a 
continuation of the discussion of Gennan corporate governance from the mid-1990s (a 
period that represents change in Gennan corporate governance) to the present day. 
Section 2.5 turns from governance in general to executive pay in particular, and explains 
the typical structure of executive pay in both models. Section 2.6 analyses executive 
stock options from a corporate governance perspective, with special emphasis on the 
alignment of executives' interests with those of shareholders. This section also deals 
with conventional optimal contracting theory, a model that arguably reduces agency 
problems. Section 2.7 tackles managerial power theory, a model that casts doubts on the 
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relevance of the optimal contracting approach by claiming that executives have 
excessive power to decide on the design and structure of their pay packages. Section 2.8 
reviews trends and the history of executive pay structures, in particular executive stock 
option schemes in the USA, UK and Germany. Section 2.9 summarises and concludes. 
2.2 Stock Market Capitalism and Welfare Capitalism 
Corporate governance operates differently in two broadly distinct worlds, namely those 
of "Stock Market Capitalism" (e.g. the USA and UK) and "Welfare Capitalism" (Dore, 
2000; Buck and Shahrim, 2005) which embraces countries such as Germany and Japan. 
The governance definition in an Anglo-American context is narrower, and is usually 
restricted to shareholders, i.e. the means by which a firm's outside investors try to 
ensure that they are not exploited by senior managers within the firm (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997). In this context, corporate governance is a means of ensuring that 
corporate actions, assets, and agents are directed at achieving the corporate objectives 
established by the corporations (Sternberg, 1998). The key goal of corporate governance 
here is to ensure a maximum return to investors, with the firm viewed as a capital 
market institution with a primary duty to its shareholders (Monks and Minow, 1995). 
Shareholders, being residual claimants, thus exert substantial influence on managerial 
decisions while other parties, such as employees, suppliers, customers, banks and the 
government, are usually dealt with on a bilateral market basis. Managers are disciplined 
by market-based rewards and punishments through capital markets. Market control via 
equity encourages hostile takeover where performance is poor and, thus, partly resolves 
the conflict between management and shareholders (Jensen, 1993). This "variety of 
capitalism" (Hall and Gingerich, 2001) depends upon high levels of information 
disclosure to outsiders to inform investment decisions, and laws that protect minority 
shareholders (La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 2000; Weimer and Pape, 
1995). 
The other group of corporate governance models, most commonly analysed outside the 
discipline of economics with its emphasis on agency, embraces a wider definition which 
14 
2. Institutional Background: Corporate Governance in the USA, UK and Gennany. 
refers to the means by which stakeholders (creditors, employees, etc) may have control 
over the firm's decisions. Here, corporate governance is taken as the means by which 
important decisions are controlled by the firm's stakeholders (Buck and Tull, 2000). 
The focus is on the entire network of formal and informal relations which determine 
how control is exercised within corporations and how the risks and returns are 
distributed between various stakeholders (Lane, 2000). Here, executives are influenced 
only weakly by stock prices and shareholders but strongly by the voice of other 
stakeholders (Noteboom, 1999) who are highly committed to the firm and are prepared 
to contribute formally to its governance (Hall and Gingerich, 2001). The principle 
embodied in this form of corporate governance is that companies should be required to 
serve a number of groups, rather than treat the interests of shareholders as overriding all 
others (Schneider-Unne, 1992). In Germany, where the stakeholder approach is 
followed, this commitment is rooted in Article 14(2) of her constitution, which requires 
that property be used to serve the "public weal" (Charkman, 1995). The interests of 
labour here are very important, and both their right to an equitable share of surplus and 
their entitlement to industrial participation are emphasised (Streeck, 2001). 
The shareholder approach is identified with outsider and arms' length control, 
associated with dispersed share ownership and the prevalence of institutional investors. 
The stakeholder approach, dwelling on the whole network of control, occurs when share 
ownership is more concentrated and owners of significant portions of shares are able to 
exercise control. Concentrated holdings may be held by family owners, banks or other 
non-financial firms. 
Whereas the stakeholder or insider system is associated with management goals of 
stability and growth and longer-term returns to significant owners, the shareholder or 
outsider system implies the goals of liquidity of capital markets and of opportunities for 
short-term maximisation of returns on capital invested. 
The foregoing discussion underlines that different countries uphold different definitions 
of the objective of the firm and therefore have different definitions and interpretations 
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of corporate governance. Hence, a nation's system of corporate governance can be seen 
as an institutional matrix (North, 1990) that structures the relations among owners, 
boards, and top managers, and determines the goals pursued by the corporation. In this 
thesis, corporate governance in the USA and UK is defined as the " ... means by which 
important decisions made by senior managers are controlled by the firm's shareholders" 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997: 45). Conversely, when referring to corporate governance in 
Germany, the term corporate governance shall be taken as the " ... means by which 
important decisions are controlled by the firm's stakeholders" (Buck and Tull, 2000: 
98), where stakeholders comprise employees, banks, suppliers, the government and the 
communities in which firms are located. 
2.3 Corporate Governance Systems 
As indicated above, the USAIUK have a distinctly different corporate governance 
system from that of Germany. Corporate governance systems, therefore, comprise 
country-specific characteristics enshrined in what might be referred to as a national 
corporate governance framework; a collection of legal, institutional and cultural factors 
that shape the influence that stakeholders (shareholders included) exert on managerial 
decision-making (Weimer and Pape, 1999). Blair (1995: 3) argues that corporate 
governance involves" ... the whole set of legal, cultural, and institutional arrangements 
that determine what publicly traded corporations can do, who controls them, how that 
control is exercised, and how the risks and returns from the activities they undertake are 
allocated. " 
These subsystems of the overall framework can be referred to as elements of a corporate 
governance system. The number of these elements is large, but the main ones, for the 
purpose of this thesis, include: the prevailing concept and objective of the firm, the 
board system, the power and influence of stakeholders over the firm's decisions, the 
importance of the capital markets in the national economy, the presence and importance 
of an external market for corporate control, the ownership structure and the extent to 
which executive compensation is dependent on corporate performance (De Jong, 1989; 
Moerland, 1995). 
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Therefore, classifying countries with respect to their corporate governance 
characteristics (as discussed above) places the USA and UK in one group and Japan and 
Germany in the other. For example, the USA and UK share the same prevailing concept 
of the firm, the board system, the ability of salient (i.e. influential) shareholders to exert 
influence on managerial decision-making, the importance of stock markets in the 
national economy, an external market for corporate control, the ownership structure and 
the extent to which executive compensation is dependent on corporate performance. On 
the other hand, the German corporate governance system is characterised by a system of 
co-determination, the ties that corporations have with banks, dual shareholdings and 
interlocking directorates. 
Further distinction of these two main groups has been made in the extant literature (e.g. 
Buck and Shahrim, 2005; Vitols, 2004; Lane, 2003). The USAIUK system of corporate 
governance is often referred to as a "market-oriented" system and "network-oriented" 
refers to the Japanese/German style of governance. A "market-oriented" system is 
characterised by an active market for corporate control which acts as a mechanism for 
independent shareholders to influence managerial decision-making. A "network-
oriented" system is characterised by a relationship-oriented structure where 
shareholders are able to influence managers directly, based on the strength of their inter-
corporate relationships (Adams, 1999). 
The next sections extend this distinction by discussing the Anglo-American and German 
corporate governance systems in detail, with the emphasis on the distinctive 
characteristics of the two models. To a certain degree, this implies abstracting from real-
world realities. Not all US or UK enterprises are organised according to the Anglo-
American model, e.g. the John Lewis Partnership in the UK is employee-owned and 
controlled. Similarly, in Germany some companies may be closer to the German model 
than others. However, analysing the two archetypal models makes it easier to link 
theories on stakeholder relationships to institutions and to assess their impact on 
enterprise performance. 
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2.3.1 The Anglo-American Corporate Governance System 
In the Anglo-American system of corporate governance, the firm is viewed as an 
instrument for the creation of shareholder wealth. The present view of the purpose of 
the corporation was laid down in 1919 in the case of Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., the 
Michigan Supreme Court: "There should be no confusion of the duties which Mr. Ford 
conceives that he and the stockholders owe to the general public and the duties that he 
and his co-directors owe to protecting minority shareholders [i.e., the Dodge brothers}. 
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the 
stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end. The 
discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to attain that end, and 
does not extend to a change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits, or to the non-
distribution of profits among stockholders in order to devote them to other purposes. " 
(Walsh, 2000: 45). 
This concept of the firm was further institutionalised by pieces of legislation in the USA 
[the Securities Exchange Act (1934), the Securities Investor Protection Act (1970), the 
Insider Trading Sanctions Act (1984), the Private Securities Litigation Act (1995)] and 
in the UK (the Company Securities Act, 1985 revised in 1989), the City Code on 
Takeovers and Mergers and the Financial Services Act (1986). 
Further to the shareholder value maximization view of the firm, the Anglo-American 
model is characterised by a single-tier board, elected by shareholders. The main 
functions of the board of directors are to select, evaluate and dismiss the CEO and 
senior managers, to review financial objectives and strategies of the company and to 
counsel top management (Monks and Minow, 1995; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988, 
2003; Warther, 1998; Adams and Ferreria, 2003; Harris and Raviv, 2005). The board 
generally consists of a number of executive directors, who are employed by the 
company, and a number of independent or non-executive directors, who help with 
strategy and represent the interests of shareholders (Bleicher and Paul, 1996). However, 
the effectiveness of independent directors in monitoring management on behalf of 
shareholders may be limited because strong linkages exist between board and 
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management, either because the CEO is also chairman of the board or because a 
considerable number of board members are company managers (Main and Johnson, 
1993; Milgrom and Roberts, 1992; Jensen, 1993; Hart, 1995). Moreover, non-executive 
directors are very "busy" people (they may themselves be CEOs elsewhere and sit on 
numerous boards) and probably have little time to think about the company, over and 
above the inputs provided by management (Hart, 1995; Ferris, Jagannathan and 
Pritchard, 2005; Fich and Shivdasani, 2006) and owe their positions to management 
who proposed them as directors in the first place, although many boards have 
nomination committees comprising non-executives. Recent empirical work in the USA 
focuses on the evolution of board structure over time, and changes in board structure 
post-Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX). For example, Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2005a, 2005b) 
focus on recent changes in board structure, finding that board size and independence 
have increased since SOX. 
Besides the control of managers by non-executive directors, the governance of 
managers by shareholders is another central characteristic of the Anglo-American 
model, which has been referred to as the model of "shareholder democracy" or 
"corporate democracy" (Blair, 1995: 68). However, possibilities for direct influence are 
limited. Opportunities for individual shareholders to influence management by "voice" 
through active participation at the general meeting are small and relatively costly in 
large publicly traded corporations with a highly dispersed distribution of shares (Blair, 
1995). 
Consequently, changes in share prices and takeover threats are the main instruments to 
discipline management (Burkart, 1999; Grossman and Hart, 1980). Thus, in the 
USAIUK the most essential mechanism for enforcing attention to share price is the 
takeover market or "market for corporate control" through the stock market. A poorly-
run corporation may suffer a low stock market valuation, which creates an opportunity 
for outsiders with better management skills to buy the firm at a premium from 
shareholders, oust the top management team, and rehabilitate the firm themselves, thus 
increasing its value (Manne, 1965). This provides an economic safety-net for 
shareholders, who use their "exit" options and an opportunity for outsiders who detect 
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undervalued firms. Moreover, it provides a mechanism to discipline top managers that 
fail to serve shareholder interests, as they may be required to leave the firm following a 
takeover. Under the market-oriented model, the market for corporate control, therefore, 
tends to weed out badly-run firms and may protect shareholders from bad management 
if internal control mechanisms fail. Boards may be compromised by "cronyism," and 
thus the hostile takeover - as an objective, market-based mechanism - is an essential 
weapon in the shareholder system (Jensen, 1993). U.S. public policy in the 1980s made 
it considerably easier for outsiders to mount hostile takeover bids, and the result was a 
massive wave of takeovers in which nearly one-third of the largest publicly-traded 
manufacturers faced takeover bids (Davis and Stout, 1992). 
However, the market for corporate control has its own share of problems. There is no 
evidence, for example, that the takeover of smaller firms by larger ones always results 
in marked improvements on the return to shareholders (O'Sullivan, 1999). 
Thus, the core of market-centred capitalism (as opposed to relationship-based) is clearly 
represented by the USA and UK. Additionally, in contrast to corporations throughout 
the rest of the world, for example, large American corporations have relatively 
dispersed ownership. Roughly seventy-five percent of the 100 largest U.S. corporations 
lack even a single ownership block of 10 percent or more. Of the 25 largest companies 
in 1999, the largest single shareholder averaged only 4 percent of the holdings, while 
comparable percentages are 11 in Japan, 18 in Germany, and 19 in France (Brancato, 
1999). In the UK, where there is also dispersed ownership, 16% of the listed companies 
had a single shareholder owning more than 25% of shares and in only 6% was there a 
single majority shareholder. 
The dispersion of ownership in the U.S. effectively rules out the direct control available 
in firms where a single family or bank owns most of the shares, because of free-rider 
abuse (LaPorta et al., 1999; 2000). Dispersed shareholders therefore delegate control to 
a board of directors that they elect to act as their agents in choosing and supervising the 
top management team. Apart from the financial institutions, control by minority 
20 
2. Institutional Background: Corporate Governance in the USA, UK and Germany. 
shareholders generally extends only as far as buying and selling shares, and voting for 
directors and other matters on the annual proxy. Minority shareholders rarely have a 
real say in the selection of top managers, or even in who ends up on the board. 
Given weak direct control by dispersed shareholders, management stock ownership, 
believed to align the interests of management with those of shareholders, is a significant 
element of the Anglo-American model of corporate governance. In particular, the USA 
has been characterised by increasing use of stock option compensation (Blair, 1995), 
and management ownership of shares in the firms they manage exceeds that in other 
countries (Prowse, 1995). In the UK management ownership of shares is also 
considerable (OEeD, 1998). 
Besides shareholders, another stakeholder worth discussion is labour, especially as its 
treatment is different in the two corporate governance models. In the archetypal Anglo-
American model, workers are promised a return on their investment in human capital 
through wages and bonuses. However, the use of profit- sharing, and employee share-
ownership arrangements have been introduced in the USA. 
In the Anglo-American model, workers bear the risk of the loss of human capital in the 
long run. If the performance of the firm weakens and share prices fall, managers have 
an incentive to cut costs and layoff employees. Employees have little formal means to 
counter the tendency for dismissal and to monitor the way management handles their 
relationship. 
Finally, international accounting standards (lAS) and/or US GAAP are typical of the 
Anglo-American model. These accounting standards are investor-oriented and are 
guided more exclusively by the notion of providing capital market participants with the 
necessary information to estimate true company value. Anglo-American accounting 
rules, compliant with the rest of governance elements in the system, therefore, stress 
market valuations and precise definition of profits. 
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Therefore, this section has reviewed the Anglo-American model, treating the nexus of 
institutions that characterises a shareholder-oriented system of corporate governance. In 
the next subsection, a similar approach will be followed in reviewing Germany's 
relational model of corporate governance. 
2.3.2 The German Corporate Governance System 
The German model in relation to large firms is characterised by cooperation and long-
term relationships between stakeholders in the firm. According to Schneider-Lenne 
(1992) interest in the firm as a community is a key concept of the German corporate 
culture. Charkman (1995) alludes to the values of cooperation and consensus as the 
cornerstones of the German model of corporate governance. 
The German model is based on a two-tier principle by distinguishing a management 
board (Vorstand) and a supervisory board (Aufsichtstrat) with no overlapping 
membership between them. While the management board (a more collegial version of 
the CEO and senior management of the Anglo-American firm) consists of executives of 
the company and is responsible for managing it. The supervisory board (analogous to 
the American board of directors), is responsible for appointing and supervising the 
management board (Streeck, 1995). It also formulates (or at least approves) major 
corporate policies and strategies. 
Important rights of control have been vested in the supervIsory board, which is 
independent from the management board, and seats on it are held in varying proportions 
by representatives of owners and employees. Following the Co-determination Act of 
1976, a law that incorporates employees into the firm's governance processes, the 
number of seats held by representatives of labour on supervisory boards differs 
according to firm size but amounts to parity with representatives of capital in the largest 
firms (Lane, 1989). 
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Specifically, in companies with more than 500 employees (whatever their legal status), 
one third of the supervisory board members are employee representatives. In companies 
with more than 2,000 employees, the Co-Determination Act of 1976 stipulates that 
labour should take half the seats on the board. However, the representatives of capital 
retain the right to nominate the chairman of the supervisory board who has the casting 
vote when the two sides are deadlocked (Wiedemann, 1980; Charkman, 1995). Thus, 
the structure of the supervisory board preserves shareholder formal (or managerial) 
dominance, but possibly alters the bargaining dynamics on the board by allowing 
managers to ally with employee representatives to resist shareholder pressures for 
higher returns. 
Two-thirds of the employee representatives must be members of the company's staff, 
while one third are external trade union representatives (Schneider-Unne, 1992). 
Representatives elected by shareholders are typically representatives of firms with close 
functional relations with the company, including suppliers, customers and bankers 
(Sternberg, 1998). Where the German law requires the supervisory board to include a 
stipulated number of employee representatives, corporations are prevented from 
pursuing decisions that lack employee support (Sternberg, 1998). For employees, the 
survival of the company, the protection of jobs as well as their wage and non-wage 
benefits is naturally of primary interest (Hansmann, 1996). These interests are further 
protected by works council codetermination which provides a second form of employee 
representation in firm governance. 
The market for corporate control, which is important in the Anglo-American system, 
does not provide a significant disciplining influence in Germany, although there has 
been a shift from that belief of late (Jenkinson and Ljungqvist, 2001). To start with, the 
stock market plays a relatively unimportant role in the German model. The number of 
listed firms in Germany is smaller than the one in the USA or UK, and stock market 
capitalization has been low compared to the USA and UK (Mayer, 2000; Bernhardt, 
2000; Vitols, 2004, 2005). Banks, other financial enterprises and non-financial 
companies own large blocks of shares of companies listed on the stock exchange. 
Shareholdings are concentrated and block shareholders monitor firms through their 
23 
2. Institutional Background: Corporate Governance in the USA, UK and Germany. 
representation on supervisory boards. Cross holdings of shares, bank control of voting 
rights at general meetings and regulations with respect to the number of votes required 
to replace management at general meetings, make the market for corporate control 
virtually non-existent in Germany. Instead, representatives of the relatively small group 
of shareholders who own large equity stakes influence management through their voice 
to a considerable extent, through informal procedures and meetings. Thus, while the 
market for corporate control helps discipline managers in the USA and UK, in 
Germany, insiders like employees, banks and inter-locking shareholders are well 
informed, and it is their influence through a two-tier board system that disciplines the 
behaviour of managers (Conyon and Schwalbach, 2000b; Vitols, Soskice, and 
Woolcock, 1997). 
This form of relational, or network, governance has implications for strategic decisions. 
For example, the participation of employees and banks on an upper-tier supervisory 
board may limit managers' attempted retrenchment actions (Morek, Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1998). Takeovers will be easier to resist, and banks will be well informed about 
decisions concerning the finance of investments, etc. 
The ownership structure in Germany partly explains the absence of an active market for 
corporate control. Ownership structure is central to the field of corporate governance 
and possible agency problems (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Murphy, 1999; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997) As German corporate governance is characterised mainly by 
concentrated ownership, large corporations are in the hands of large block-holders, who 
have a majority interest and minority shareholders play a limited role (Hapner and 
Jackson, 2001). Large share blocks are primarily held by families and other firms, often 
in the form of inter-corporate holdings of large blocks of shares, notably in the form of 
pyramids of shareholdings and cross-holdings. Gorton and Schmid (1996) reported that 
80% of German listed companies had a non-financial owner holding at least 25% of 
shares and in more than 50% of these companies, there was a single majority 
shareholder. 
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Two other traditional features of the German corporate governance system differ 
significantly from the Anglo-American model. The first is the ties that German 
companies have with financial institutions, which are predominantly German banks. 
The second is the dual shareholdings and the nature of the interlocking directorate that 
is produced. Large German financial institutions are salient influential stakeholders. 
Apart from their role as suppliers of finance/debts, they exercise influence through 
equity ownership (Prowse, 1995; Peck and Ruigrok, 2000). In contrast to the USA, 
where the Glass-Steagall Act (1933) and the Bank Holding Company Act (1956) 
forbade commercial banks from participating in the shareholders' capital or non-
financial corporations on their own account, there are almost no restrictions on the 
German financial institutions' ability to hold large blocks of shares of non-financial 
firms (Weimer and Pape, 1999). The banks directly held 13% of all German shares in 
2000, much the same as in 1991 (Deutsches Aktieninstitut, 2001). Deutsche Bank and 
Dresdner Bank together controlled the greatest market value. Additionally, most 
directors sitting on supervisory boards come from other firms or particularly banks that 
have a major stake in the firm. The supervisory board is not only used to exercise 
supervision over companies but also as a tool for business cooperation in the fields of 
production and finance (Jackson, 2001). A survey by Ziegler (1997) of large German 
firms in 1927 provides an insight into the extent of entanglement of the German 
republic in earlier days: within the iron and steel industry: 28% of supervisory board 
members belonged to banks, and an additional 36% represented industrial interests. 
While the ownership stakes of banks are substantial, their dominating role is based less 
on direct share ownership than on proxy voting. Through a legal device called 
Depotstimmrecht, banks have the right to assemble the voting rights conferred in them 
by keeping custody of bearer shares of individual/company shareholders who have 
surrendered their proxies. In 1992, banks cast on average more than 84% of all votes 
present at the meeting of the 24 largest stock corporations with widely dispersed 
ownership (Baum, 1994). This influence rests on equity holdings, the votes cast by their 
subsidiary investment funds and above all their role as proxies for their clients who 
have deposited their shares with them (Hapner and Jackson, 2001). The status of banks 
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as dominant shareholders (mainly by proxy) explains why bank representatives can be 
found on most companies' supervisory boards. 
Thus, bank representation on the supervisory board cements the combination of voting 
power with long-term relational lender and shareholding relationships (Vitols, 2004). In 
theory, the banks' status as shareholders, it may be argued, aligns their interests with 
those of other shareholders; and the banks' power within firm governance presumably 
protects these other investors. In fact, banks do not play the active monitoring role (with 
the interests of other shareholders) assumed by conventional wisdom and the 
contradictory status of banks as lenders first and shareholders second may generate 
conflict of interests (Cheffins, 2001; Vitols, 2004). 
Finally, disclosure requirements are less strict in Germany, and legal requirements make 
accounting information more relevant to tax policy than to the purpose of obtaining a 
proper insight in the equity value of a company (Lane, 2000) and legislation prohibiting 
insider trading has only recently been established. 
More specifically, German accounting and disclosure rules are generally considered to 
lack transparency. Substantial discretion exists in the creation of hidden reserves and the 
valuation of assets. Traditionally, German accounting has stressed very conservative 
prudence rules (Vorsichtsprinzip) and creditor protection. These rules favour a long-
term business conservatism allowing firms to build up substantial reserves for rainy 
days. For example, up to 50 percent of profits can be dedicated to reserves with the 
approval of the Supervisory Board and the shareholders' meeting, a situation that does 
not benefit shareholders, at least in the short term. 
Furthermore, the valuation of assets at book rather than market prices leads to hidden 
valuation reserves. While large reserves might make German companies attractive 
targets, the general impact of accounting standards would seem to deter takeover 
activity since the uncertain risks to bidders is large: liabilities remain undisclosed, and 
true levels of profit may be hard to gauge (Schmidt, 1997). In addition, strict capital 
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protection rules in Gennan accounting prohibit the use of certain financial techniques 
during takeovers. Most importantly, this inhibits takeovers financed through the assets 
of target finns such as the large levered buyouts (LBOs) in the United States. 
Another strategic issue concerns the disclosure of ownership stakes. Until recently, 
disclosure was required only for stakes exceeding 25 percent compared with the 
disclosure thresholds of 5 percent in the United States and 3 percent in Britain. 
Disclosure regulations were changed in 1998 to require reporting of stakes at the 
thresholds of 5, 10, 25, 50 or 75 percent. 
Likewise, most finns issue bearer shares which make the identity of shareholders hard 
for the company to determine. Such lack of disclosure has contradictory effects on 
takeover strategies and defences. On the one hand, bidders have the advantage of being 
able to accumulate quite large stakes without being detected. This was the case in the 
Krupp-Hoesch deal, since Krupp was able to secretly accumulate a 24.9 percent stake 
through Credit Suisse prior to attempting a takeover (Jenkinson and Ljungqvist, 2001). 
However, on the other hand, lack of transparency might discourage potential bidders, 
since they cannot estimate the power of minority block-holders acting as white knights 
in defending the target company either. Minority block-holders can easily hide their true 
influence by dividing stakes among family members or fonnally separate organizations. 
Similar to accounting rules, lack of disclosure makes takeover battles even more 
uncertain and risky than would otherwise be the case. 
Besides disclosure and other general governance elements, of course, executive pay is a 
particular governance device at the heart of this thesis, but this will be extensively 
discussed in Sections 2.5, 2.6, 2.7 and 2.8. Suffice, at this stage, to say that the treatment 
of executive compensation in Gennany is different from the way this issue is handled in 
the USAIUK. 
While the story painted on Gennan corporate governance so far represents the state of 
affairs before the mid-1990s and what has come to be considered, "stereotypically", as 
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the German style, it must be remembered that changes have taken, and are still taking, 
place. These changes induced by both internal and external factors to the firm are the 
subject of the next section. 
2.4 Changes in German Corporate Governance 
The German system of corporate governance began to change during the second half 
of the 1990s. There have been a number of forces behind these changes, some of which 
are: the transformation of the capital markets (Heinze, 2001), intensified competition in 
product markets and the poor performance of the German economy in the face of 
reunification. The transformation and importance of capital markets had far reaching 
effects on German corporate governance. The following paragraphs in this section will 
discuss fully this factor, including the resultant changes in legislation to promote "good" 
corporate governance. 
The mid-1990s saw the liberalisation of international capital markets, spreading the 
Anglo-American model. These changes enabled firms that had traditionally used bank 
finance to consider alternative and cheaper ways to raise funds for growth, thus calling 
for their participation in international capital markets. This in tum, introduced new 
actors to these firms by way of investments through the acquisition of shares. These 
actors (investors) arrived with demands, putting pressures on listed firms to restructure 
their operations in line with their expectations - hence the changes in German corporate 
governance. 
Specifically, there has been a shift of the objective of the firm towards shareholder 
value maximization, at least in principle, as more and more companies started using this 
term, and introduced investor relations departments (Bradley and Sundaram, 2004, 
Vitols, 2004). Since the mid-1990s, some German firms have adopted international 
accounting standards (lAS) or US GAAP which are by comparison better than the local 
German GAAP, popularly known as HGB. The proportion of shares owned by foreign 
28 
2. Institutional Background: Corporate Governance in the USA. UK and Germany. 
institutional investors increased from four percent in 1990 to thirteen percent in 1998 
(Deeg, 2001). 
Most of these specific firm changes in corporate governance were triggered by the 
reform of securities law and regulation. For example, the landmark Second Financial 
Market Promotion Act of 1994 replaced the decentralized system of state-level 
exchange regulators, and largely self-regulating stock exchanges, with a centralised 
federal regulator, German Federal Securities Supervisory Office (Bundesaufsichtsamt 
fUr den Wertpapierhandel, or BAWe). 
Over the remainder of the 1990s further legislation and regulations increased the 
stringency of disclosure rules and other regulatory standards. From late 1997 through 
1998, another series of Financial Market Promotion Laws and other legislative changes 
markedly reformed corporate governance in Germany. For example, BAWe came to 
oversee the filing of prospectuses, the financial disclosure by public companies, insider 
trading, and the reporting of voting rights and ownership stakes (Cioffi, 2002). 
The Control and Transparency Act of 1998 (KonTraG) complemented the earlier 
massive overhaul of securities law by addressing issues of bank power, the function of 
the supervisory board, auditing, share voting rights, stock options, and litigation rules 
(Cioffi, 2002). The law sought to reduce the power of Germany's universal banks in 
voting shares and supervisory board representation while strengthening their disclosure 
and their fiduciary obligations to shareholders. However, in the end, the law's 
restrictions were measures acceptable to large banks and did fit with their emerging 
business strategies that diverged from the relational banking model of the past. 
An equally important regulatory reform introduced by the KonTraG was the mandating 
of shareholder democracy through a "one share, one vote" that prohibits unequal voting 
rights. However, in contrast to the general principle of one share-one vote, the KonTraG 
prohibits the voting of cross-shareholding stakes above 25 percent (a blocking minority 
under German company law) in supervisory board elections. This provision was 
29 
2. Institutional Background: Corporate Governance in the USA, UK and Gennany. 
designed to prevent managers from wresting control from shareholders by engaging in 
reciprocal voting with the managers of other firms involved in cross-shareholding 
relationships. By weakening their defensive ownership structures, this new structure of 
voting rights exposes some German firms to unprecedented threats of hostile takeover. 
The KonTraG also allowed stock repurchases and the use of stock options as executive 
compensation for the first time, though with more restrictions than in the USA (Buck 
and Shahrim, 2005), probably to prevent excessive executive compensation and 
"abuse". Executive compensation in general and the use of stock options as a 
compensation instrument in particular, is central to this thesis and thus will be dealt 
with in detail in the next sections. Suffice to say at this juncture that the KonTraG 
appears to have partially embraced Anglo-American financial practices and litigious 
enforcement mechanisms. 
2.5 Executive Compensation Structures and Determinants 
Executive compensation, which is one of many different elements of governance, has 
long attracted a great deal of attention from financial economists. Many academic 
papers on this topic were written during the 1990s prompting Murphy (1999) to declare 
that the increase of these academic papers exceeds even the remarkable increase in CEO 
pay itself. 
However, a handful of studies of executive compensation were published prior to 1980, 
including pioneering works by Roberts (1956), Baumol (1959), and Lewellen and 
Huntsman (1970). Most early studies focused on whether pay was more closely tied to 
company size or company profits (e.g. Ciscel and Carroll, 1980). 
Research in the nineties and later focused on how executive compensation schemes, 
particularly share option plans, can help alleviate the agency problem in publicly traded 
companies (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003; 2004; Murphy, 1999). Early studies in this area 
focused on documenting the relationship between CEO pay and company performance 
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(Coughlan and Schmidt, 1985; Murphy, 1985; 1986; Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Abowd, 
1990; Leonard, 1990). Others examined whether CEOs' contracts were tenninated 
following poor performance (Weisbach, 1988; Warner, Watts, and Wruck, 1988) and 
whether CEOs' rewards for performance are measured relative to the market or industry 
(Antle and Smith, 1986; Gibbons and Murphy, 1990). 
Executive compensation generally consists of four basic components: a base salary, an 
annual bonus tied to accounting performance, perquisites, and long-term incentive plans 
such as stock options, with the value of stock options dominating other sources of 
wealth for executives certainly in the USA and UK. 
Base salaries are universal and are detennined through competitive comparisons based 
on industry surveys and tend to reflect company size (Baker, Jensen and Murphy, 1988; 
Rosen, 1992). However, apart from company size, base salaries should also be 
influenced by the age, experience, education and performance of executives, especially 
as most components of compensation are measured relative to base salary (Murphy, 
1999). For example, target bonuses are expressed as a percentage of base salary, and 
likewise pension benefits and severance arrangements. 
Annual bonus plans relate to payments which are made to executives upon achieving 
their performance targets. A study by Murphy (1999) using data from Towers Perrin 
Annual Plan Design Survey shows that almost all companies base their bonuses on 
some measure of accounting profits such as revenue, net-income, pre-tax income, 
operating profit, or economic value added. Where such financial performance measures 
are not used, individual performance relating to pre-established objectives as well as 
subjective assessments is utilised. Thus, although annual bonus plans do provide 
incentives for executives to increase company profits to a certain extent, they can also 
induce executives to make decisions which might conflict with shareholders' objectives, 
as they pursue their own targets rather than shareholder returns directly. 
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Unlike base salaries and most bonus plans, long-term incentive plans in the form of 
stock options are more complicated. In general terms, stock options are contracts which 
give the executive the right to buy stocks at a specified exercise price after a specified 
term. They typically take effect over time, are non-tradable, and are forfeited if the 
executives leave the firm before vesting. The value of the stock option varies according 
to the share price performance of the firm. For example, where the market price 
increases above the exercise price during the period in which the option is eligible for 
exercise, the value of the stock option will increase. Conversely, should the share price 
remain below the exercise price (under water) throughout the eligible exercise period, 
they will become worthless. The realised value received by executives from exercising 
options thus is the difference between current market price and exercise price, less 
transaction costs. 
Unlike base salaries and annual bonus plans which offer no strong incentives for 
executives to act in the interest of owners, and take risks, stock option grants increase 
managerial risk-taking by rewarding share appreciation in full and imposing only 
limited penalties for falling share price. For example, sustained growth in the market 
price of a share over a number of years will provide considerable returns to the 
executives holding the options. On the contrary, should the share price remain below the 
exercise price throughout the eligible exercise period, the executive enjoys no gain. The 
executive however experiences a sense of loss, if the options offered a notional gain that 
was lost when prices fell. Problems with options arise because share price movements 
may be caused by factors not relating to the company's, let alone the executive's, 
performance. From the relatively undiversified executive's viewpoint, therefore, options 
carry risks that reduce their value. 
From a corporate governance perspective, it is the direct link between stock options and 
share appreciation that cause stock options to be regarded as a vital component of 
executive pay. This theme is the subject of the next section, where it is considered in 
more depth. Thus, the next two sections (Sections 2.6 and 2.7) discuss the theory and 
literature on this form of executive compensation, thus setting a platform on which the 
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executive compensation structures in Germany are discussed in comparison with the 
ones in the US and UK. 
2.6 Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance 
Accepting the importance of executive compensation contracts as a corporate 
governance mechanism IS acknowledging the relevance and importance of agency 
theory. Agency theory IS concerned with the relationship between the principals 
(shareholders) and agents (executives) and the determination of the optimal contract 
which would align the interests of shareholders with those of executives. Agency 
problems arise with the recognition that executives can potentially pursue their own 
interests at the expense of shareholders (Grossman and Hart, 1982; Kaplan, 1982). This 
problem is caused by the separation of ownership and control (Berle and Means, 1932; 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and by information asymmetry that results from delegating 
authority (i.e. of executives by shareholders). 
In their seminal work on the separation of ownership and control, Berle and Means 
(1932) argue that when control is distinct from ownership and dispersion of 
shareholders is too great to enforce the maximisation of shareholder wealth, those in 
control (i.e. management) may deploy assets in ways that benefit themselves rather than 
owners (shareholders). Thus, management's unobserved actions, particularly where 
personally costly decisions by management (e.g. laying off employees) and privately 
beneficial activities (the taking of perquisites) are involved (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976) can prejudice shareholder wealth and give rise to agency costs. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) formalise agency costs by demonstrating that when the 
owner-manager sells equity in the firm to outsiders and both parties are utility 
maximisers, the owner's interest will diverge from that of the new principal's. As a 
solution, agency theory suggests that the performance-based pay contract, which links 
pay to shareholder wealth via performance indicators, such as share prices or 
accounting-based targets, is a powerful way of attracting, retaining, and motivating 
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managers to pursue the shareholders' agenda (Jensen and Murphy, 1990; 2004; Conyon 
and Leech, 1994; Hall and Liebman, 1997). 
Another school of thought (e.g. Coughlan and Schmidt, 1985), attributes agency 
problems to information asymmetry associated with delegated authority. If executives' 
actions and decisions were easily and fully discernible, then a risk-neutral shareholder 
could fully insure a risk-averse executive by only paying a fixed salary. From this 
argument, it appears that the classical agency problem arises because shareholders 
cannot monitor cheaply numerous executives' decisions, some of which could be quite 
"adventurous" (Murphy, 1999). 
The moral hazard problems resulting from information asymmetry, some scholars have 
argued (e.g. Mirrlees, 1974, ; Holmstrong, 1978; Grossman and Hart, 1982), can be 
overcome by employing the optimal-contracting model. The model basically suggests 
that executive compensation practices in large, publicly traded companies are viewed as 
designed to minimize the agency costs that exist between senior executives (the agents) 
and shareholders (the principals). The board is viewed as seeking to maximize 
shareholder value, with the compensation scheme being designed to serve this objective. 
The optimal contract thus depends on reducing the risk aversion of the executives, 
increasing the certainty of firm value, and the function describing the cost of effort to 
the executive (Murphy, 1999). 
Relating this concept to a specific compensation instrument such as stock options, they 
may be considered as optimal contracts because they involve trading-off both 
executives' risks and incentives, by virtue of there being a direct and mechanical link 
between executive rewards and share price appreciation. Conversely, the link between 
pay and performance via executive cash compensation and shareholder returns 
demonstrates only an implicit link between one-component pay and shareholder returns. 
However, tying executive pay to shareholder wealth directly is not without risks. For 
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instance, increasing the sensitivity of executive pay to finn's perfonnance will result in 
more risk being imposed on the executives where perfonnance measures might also be 
affected by factors beyond the control of the executives, share price movements being 
noisy (Murphy, 1999). 
The pay scheme designer attempting to optimize an executive compensation program 
would be concerned with attracting and retaining high quality executives, providing 
executives with incentives to exert sufficient effort and to make decisions that serve 
shareholders' interests, and minimizing overall costs. To induce an executive to take 
and retain a position and to subsequently expend effort on behalf of principals, then, a 
finn must offer an overall package of benefits that meets or exceeds the executive's 
opportunity cost i.e. the executive pay-off must be at least as great as those presented by 
outside opportunities. 
Giving the agent a package of benefits that exceeds his/her opportunity cost may not be 
enough as the success of optimal contracting theory is also dependent on other factors. 
For example, the board must be in a position to bargain with the executives at arms' 
length, the directors or executives are constrained by market forces from deviating from 
optimal compensation contracts, or shareholders could use the courts or another 
mechanism to force managers to adopt compensation contracts that maximize 
shareholder value. 
However, the key problem is the pervasive influence of management, particularly the 
CEO, on all facets of the pay-setting process. First, managers influence the appointment 
of independent directors (Main and Johnson, 1993; Yennack, 1996), which in many 
cases enables them to block the appointment of directors who are likely to try to bargain 
with the managers at arms' length. Secondly, once appointed, independent directors are 
influenced by board dynamics that make it difficult for them to deal with managers in a 
truly ann's length way (Main and Johnson, 1993), especially if other directors have no 
interest in confronting the managers over their pay. Finally, even if directors were 
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otherwise inclined to challenge managers on the issue of executive compensation, they 
would likely have neither the financial incentive nor sufficient information to do so. 
Additionally, empirical studies have so far only provided weak support for the pay-
performance link (Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998; Tosi, Werner, Katz, and Gomez-
Mejia, 2000; Core and Larcker, 2002). For example, a negative relationship has been 
established between the share option wealth of CEOs and the measures of firm risk 
(Wiseman, McNamara and Devers, 2001). Moreover, empirical evidence has also yet to 
prove whether stock option contracts actually motivate executives. Such studies are 
difficult to conduct where stock returns have shareholder expectations embedded in 
them (Abowd and Kaplan, 1999; Westphal and Zajac, 1998), allowing the 
announcement effect to occur prior to the executive responding or ahead of the 
announcement of the plan. Also, while an innovation in the structure of incentives 
which is followed by improved performance might suggest a causal link, they might 
also reflect the exploitation of a scheme by executives in anticipation of improved 
performance (Bruce and Buck, 1997; Tehranian and Waegelein, 1985). 
Given these weaknesses, there remams the possibility and danger that the optimal 
contracting approach may not be relevant to the solution of agency problems through 
executive pay, especially as shareholders are ineffective in monitoring executive 
decisions. This possibility introduces a role for theories based on the executive's power 
to extract more than optimal payor rents, from shareholders, subject to an outrage 
constraint (Bebchuk and Fried and Walker, 2002; Bebchuk and Fried, 2004). As a 
possibility, Bebchuk et al. (2002) argue that managerial power theory and the desire to 
camouflage rents perhaps explain significant characteristics of the stock option plans 
that have been problematic from the optimal contracting perspective. The next section 
addresses managerial power theory in relation to executive pay in general and stock 
options in general. 
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2.7 Executive Compensation and Managerial Power Theory 
According to Bebchuk et al. (2002) executive compensation can be explained by 
managerial opportunism and power over the board of directors. Like the optimal 
contracting approach, the managerial power theory recognises the principal-agent 
framework. Unlike the optimal contracting approach however, the managerial power 
approach argues that executive rewards are not optimal contracts but instead contain 
characteristics which allow executives to extract excess payor rent (Bebchuk et al., 
2002). Thus both optimal contracting theory and managerial power theory, when 
applied to the study of executive compensation, start with the recognition that there is 
an agency problem, but they take that recognition in different directions. 
The underlying hypotheses of managerial power theory are that executives prefer more 
rather than less compensation and that they possess excessive power over the level and 
structure of their pay. While the optimal contracting approach assumes that most pay 
decisions are made by independent directors in legitimate arm's length transactions, the 
managerial power approach argues that independent directors are not independent in 
making these decisions. Executives, especially the CEO, exercise power over 
independent directors because they control the nomination process, maintain social 
relations with board members (the result of board dynamics), and expect total support. 
Moreover, although executive compensation is set against the background of market-
forces measures which offer corporate governance control, these forces are hardly 
strong enough to compel optimal contracting outcomes (Bebchuk et al., 2002). 
However, the managerial power model does not claim that there exist no constraints 
which will prevent executives from extracting rent. Indeed, the model explicitly 
recognises that an important factor affecting executives' ability to increase their 
compensation is affected by how the compensation arrangements are perceived by 
outsiders or, in the language of Bebchuk et al. (2002), by the amount of "outrage" 
expressed in response to the proposed compensation. The tightness of the constraints 
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that managers and directors confront depends, in part, on how much "outrage" a 
proposed compensation arrangement is expected to generate among relevant outsiders. 
"Outrage costs" impose constraints via their effect on the board in the form of 
increasing social and reputation costs to directors, or by affecting market measures 
through the reaction of shareholders who may, for example, view excessive pay rises as 
insensitive to their interests. 
In fact, there is evidence that the design of compensation arrangements is indeed 
influenced by how outsiders perceive them. Johnson, Porter, and Shackell (1997) find 
that CEOs of firms receiving negative media coverage of their compensation 
arrangements during 1992-1994 subsequently received relatively small pay increases 
and had the pay-performance sensitivity of their compensation arrangements increased. 
Thomas and Martin (1999) find that, during the 1990s, CEOs of firms that were the 
target of shareholder resolutions criticising executive pay had their annual 
compensation reduced over the following two years by an average of $2.7 million. 
However, outrage costs are a function of perception (i.e. they depend on the visibility of 
the rent extraction), implying that it is not necessarily excessive compensation that 
triggers outrage costs. Subsequently, opportunistic executives will prefer compensation 
packages which are camouflaged as optimal contracting, and use their power to 
influence design. Thus, using compensation consultants is one sure way of giving 
legitimacy to excessive pay and thus reducing outrage costs. Under managerial power 
approach, therefore, executive compensation is viewed not only as a potential 
instrument for addressing the agency problem but also a part of the agency problem 
itself. 
Thus, unrestrained opportunism or self-interested opportunism (Bruce, Buck and Main, 
2005) by executives in the design of their own reward packages may be dangerous and 
costly for shareholders, a situation that might have caused concern in Germany and to 
some extent in the UK, where the use of stock options has been advocated as a means to 
align the interests of executives with those of shareholders. In Germany, resistance to 
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generous option schemes has come from supervisory boards, government regulators, 
academics and the media (see Appendix 2.1) and, in the UK, self-regulatory bodies such 
as the London Stock Exchange, accountancy profession and the association of 
institutional investors have voiced concerns. 
It is this intriguing theoretical clash, between agency theory and managerial power-
based theories, that brings flavour to research into US-style pay innovations like 
executive stock options in Germany. In fact, as can be discerned from the foregoing 
discussion, the mere adoption of an option scheme by German firms does not 
necessarily mean an alignment of the interests of executives and shareholders. Nor does 
it imply the Americanisation of German corporate governance. 
To appreciate the differences in national executive compensation arrangements, the next 
section is devoted to a discussion of the prevailing situation in the USA, UK and 
Germany. 
2.8 Executive Compensation Structures in the USA, UK and Germany 
The executive share option as an element of executive remuneration has gained 
popularity over the last two decades, quite rightly so as stock options are seen as an 
instrument of compensation which seek to address the conflict of interest between 
owners and decision makers. In the USA and UK, the early use of stock options can be 
linked to their tax efficiency relative to other forms of executive reward. 
As a result, stock options have been growing in importance since the 1980s. Lambert, 
Lanen and Larcker (1989) found that by 1986, 193 of the Fortune 200 companies had 
introduced executive stock option programmes. Studies of CEOs' compensation in US 
Standard and Poor 500 Industrials (S&P 500) companies by Murphy (2002) have shown 
that, over the 1990s, the percentage of stock options of total CEOs pay, swelled from 27 
percent to 51 percent. Although option valuation involves problems, an earlier study of 
CEO pay components of S&P 500 by Murphy (1999) also revealed that in the early 
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1990s, stock options had replaced base salaries as the single largest component of 
compensation in all US industry sectors with the exception of the utilities sector. 
Conyon and Murphy (2000), examining CEO pay for almost 1,700 US publicly quoted 
companies, found a strong bias in favour of stock options. More recently, a study of 
S&P 500 firms by Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005) shows that the average CEO 
compensation increased from $3.7 million in 1993 to $9.1 million in 2003 (an increase 
of 146%), and average compensation to top-five executives rose from $9.5 million in 
1993 to $21.4 million in 2003 (an increase of 125%). From these compensation figures, 
equity-based compensation was 37% of total pay for top-five executives in 1993, this 
fraction rising to 55% by 2003. The overall picture is that stock options continue to rise 
in importance in the USA, despite declining capital markets in the period 1998-2004. 
In the UK, executive stock option schemes were relatively new in 1987 (Conyon and 
Murphy, 2000). During the 1990s, however, stock options became hugely popular with 
average remuneration in the form of share options increasing over 145 percent, 
representing nearly 41 percent of the overall pay package in 1995 compared to just less 
than 26 percent in 1993 (McKnight and Tomkins, 1999). In a later survey, Towers and 
Perrin (2002) show this figure as having increased to 57 percent in the year 2000. 
As in the USA, the strong growth of the executive stock option schemes in the UK was 
facilitated by similar tax incentives thanks to the Finance Act of 1984 and a more 
fundamental desire to realign potential conflicts of interest within the corporation. 
Another argument was the fear by larger UK companies to be disadvantaged in 
international executive labour markets, where American firms had been the pioneers in 
developing such schemes (Murphy, 1999) and there was a sharp disparity between the 
earnings potential of UK and US senior executives (Main, O'Reilly and Crystal, 1990). 
As stock option schemes became established with larger firms in the UK, it appears that 
the rest of the firms followed in isomorphic fashion. 
However, despite the self-regulatory mechanisms in place and the recommendations of 
the Cadbury Report (1992), ESOs were not judged to have induced better company 
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performance in the late 1980s and early 1990s, prompting a public scrutiny of executive 
pay through the media and the influential Association of British Insurers (ABI). These 
developments led to the establishment of the Greenbury (1995) and Hampel (1998) 
Committees, bodies designed to explore the wider issue of corporate governance and 
recognising the role of executive compensation in this context. 
While these developments occurred in the USA or UK, CEOs in Germany received no 
compensation in the form of stock options prior to 1998. The granting of executive 
stock option schemes by corporations was impossible until the German Stock Company 
Law (Aktiengesetz) was changed. Nonetheless, there existed performance- related pay 
since 1986, which ultimately achieved similar ends to the option schemes in the USA 
and UK. These took the uniquely German form of option bonds, warrant bonds, stock 
appreciation rights (SARs, or phantom stocks) and convertible bonds (Bernhardt, 1999). 
Despite the existence of these instruments, German executive compensation packages 
prior to 1996 only contained a small variable portion (Bernhardt, 1999) and were 
typically based on operating results and absolute magnitudes such as annual profit, 
dividends, turnover and cash flow, or in direct relation to the company's performance 
on factors like return on equity, return on investment, and return on assets (Becker, 
1990). 
To be sure, studies conducted on German executive pay structure confirm that, prior to 
1996 performance-related pay was not a foreign idea (Cheffins, 2001). A comparison of 
Germany and UK executive pay from 1960 to 1995 conducted by Conyon and 
Schwalbach (2000b) showed that the only difference between the two countries, in 
relation to executive compensation, was that German executives were not awarded 
stock options. 
There are a number of reasons why equity-related pay was missing in the executive 
compensation package. For example, prior to 1998, German companies that intended to 
issue stock options to their executives would have to submit a resolution to the 
shareholders and obtain a three-quarters majority vote. Moreover, gains from options 
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were not tax deductible (unlike in the USA), a fact that left companies with no incentive 
to award stock options. Conyon and Schwalbach (2000a; 2000b) attribute the lack of 
stock options in Germany to the national corporate governance, where employees can 
resist any incentive plans which result in executives becoming more disposed towards 
shareholders. Most importantly, executive compensation innovations such as ESOs, 
designed to minimise the conflict of interest between shareholders and executives, are 
not vital instruments to large German firms, traditionally associated with long-term, 
relational investors and a Gemeinschaft of stakeholders with voice-based corporate 
governance (Buck and Shahrim, 2005). 
However, the situation in Germany has changed. In 1996, larger German corporations 
such as Deutsche Bank, DaimlerChrysler and Deutsche Telekom started introducing 
compensation in the form of US-style executive pay, by granting compensation in the 
form of convertible bonds, warrant bonds and SARs. Further changes came in 1998, 
when the German government decided to formally end prohibition of US-style stock 
option schemes and amended the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG) to freely allow 
German corporations to issue outright stock options. Equally, German tax laws were 
changed to remove the disincentives for share sales by long-term relational investors 
like banks, making shares of large firms more liquid, and a necessary condition for 
stock options as effective incentives. 
Indeed, since 1998, most large German corporations have started introducing US-style 
stock option schemes. By 2005 all DAX 30 firms had adopted executive stock options, 
with the single exception of BMW. Although no stock option culture can yet be said to 
exist in Germany, the country is nevertheless adapting to the international trend raising 
the question as to what has finally happened to the embedded social construction of 
German corporate governance known for its persistence and inertia. Of course this 
apparent adoption of an American pay institution may be a surface phenomenon only, 
and there is a possibility that the adopted innovation could be translated (Buck and 
Shahrim, 2005) to suit the German social environment. 
42 
2. Institutional Background: Corporate Governance in the USA, UK and Germany. 
2.9 Summary 
The objective of this chapter was to provide a background to corporate governance and 
executive rewards for the analysis of executive rewards as a specific governance 
element in future chapters. Consequently, this chapter started with discussing the 
"varieties of capitalism", linking them to the dichotomous definitions of corporate 
governance which are system specific. In the Anglo-American model, corporate 
governance refers to the means by which important decisions made by managers are 
controlled by the firm's shareholders. In Germany, corporate governance is taken as the 
means by which important decisions are controlled by the firm's non-managerial 
stakeholders. 
Consequently, the chapter then contrasted German and Anglo-American models of 
corporate governance, outlining the respective corporate governance mechanisms used 
in both models in the process. The most important corporate governance characteristics 
in Germany were identified: the establishment of the two-tier board system, enshrined 
in the Co-determination Act of 1976, the ties that German companies have with 
financial institutions, the ineffective market for corporate control and the illiquid capital 
markets, the dual shareholdings, and the nature of the interlocking directorates that are 
produced. In a similar fashion the Anglo-American characteristics were identified as: 
the dispersed ownership and the direct monitoring exercised by shareholders through 
annual general meeting, the transparency of financial accounts and, most importantly, 
the active market for corporate control. 
The chapter proceeded by discussing the typical structure of executive compensation, 
explaining that executive compensation consists of a base salary, annual bonus, 
perquisites and long-term incentive plans including stock options. Emphasis was made 
that the link between stock options and share price appreciation provided the basis of 
regarding stock options as a vital component of the executive pay structure. That is by 
linking pay to performance, conflict of interest between shareholders and executives are 
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addressed and are supposed to be minimised. However, empirical studies have shown 
weak support of this hypothesis. 
The lack of empirical evidence on the link between pay and performance provides a rich 
basis to claim that optimal contracting theory fails to address the principal-agent 
problems. It would appear therefore that managerial power theory, which argues that 
executive compensation contains characteristics which allow executives to extract 
excess pay (rent) from their compensation, has more explanatory power of what actually 
happens in the corporate world. Capitalising on the legitimacy of optimal contracting 
theory, but clandestinely and effectively adopting an approach consistent with 
managerial power theory, opportunistic executives (Bruce et al., 2005; Gomez-Mejia, 
Wiseman and Dykes, 2005) thrive, using compensation consultants in the process. 
The chapter also assessed the relative importance of stock option plans within executive 
compensation packages awarded in the USA, UK and Germany. Stock options use 
started in the USA in the 1980s, followed in the UK about a decade later and arrived 
officially in Germany in 1998 after the amendment of the German Stock Corporation 
Act (AktG). Several German corporations have since adopted stock options thus 
prompting academics to wonder whether institutional change is actually taking place 
from a country that is well known for its deeply embedded relational governance that is 
expected to display inertia and additionally whether convergence on Anglo-American 
corporate governance is taking place. 
The next chapter reviews the literature on institutions, institutional theories and the 
possibility of institutional change in order to understand the changes in German 
corporate governance, particularly on executive pay. 
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Institutional Theory and Innovation Diffusion Theory 
3.1 Introduction 
The introduction to this thesis argued that the stage should be set for a research 
approach that explicitly recognizes the institutional influences on changing corporate 
governance practice e.g. the adoption of ESOs in Germany. As such, this thesis draws 
on institutional theories as explanatory devices for corporate governance changes and 
particularly the adoption of an American executive pay practice in Germany. 
Definitions of "institution" refer to humanly-devised frameworks of behaviour: 
institutions that reduce uncertainty and guide the behaviour of actors in a society. On 
the other hand, culture usually refers to "invisible" customs and beliefs that are not 
consciously devised by humans. For instance, collective actions in control of individual 
action are regarded as institutions, and so are the highly standardised social customs and 
prescribed patterns of correlated behaviour, although such customs may elsewhere be 
recognised as "culture" (Peng, 2002). A useful distinction can here be made between the 
"institutional environment" on the one hand and "institutional arrangements" on the 
other. The firm and other "governance structures" are institutional arrangements; norms, 
routines, legal rules etc. are part of the institutional environment. 
Institutions have also been defined in the broad sense covenng the institutional 
environment and arrangements as: The norms, rules and structures that guide, constrain 
andfacilitate the behaviour of human actors (North, 1990; 1991). 
Institutionalisation is, therefore, seen as a process of social construction by which 
individuals come to accept a shared definition of social reality or institutions which 
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include the way things are, what is important and the way things are done (Scott, 1987; 
Jennings and Zandbergen, 1995). 
In this sea of definitions, Scapens (1994) has defined institutions as a way of thought or 
action of some prevalence and permanence, which is embedded in the habits of a group 
or the customs of a people. 
However, choosing a definition remains rather arbitrary, as different meanings reflect 
many different approaches to institutional theory (MaId., 1993; DiMaggio and Powell, 
1991). New Institutional Economics (NlE) differentiates itself most from other 
approaches as it retains a notion of bounded rationality and it assumes (limited) 
economic optimization "through economizing on transaction costs" (Scapens, 1994: 
308). Moreover, some applications of NIB assume a degree of opportunism that affects 
the behaviour of the actor. 
Whereas NIB uses the concept of institutions in relation to transaction costs, Old 
Institutional Economics (OlE) emphasises the enabling and constraining qualities of 
institutions. Thus, OlE is a theory that maintains that human action is constrained by 
institutions, but it also recognizes that institutions enable people to come to meaningful 
action (Hodgson, 2000). It assumes considerable uncertainty in the range of alternatives 
available to agents and in the possibility that agents can evaluate these alternatives in 
time. In this sense, OlE challenges the assumption of rationality found in neo-classical 
economics. New Institutional Sociology (NIS) also deals with institutions, but it treats 
them largely as a given. Moreover, the processes of institutionalization over time are not 
well developed by NIS. Instead, its focus is primarily on how and why firms conform to 
institutionalized beliefs in society. While institutions are an integral part of 
organizational life in the view proposed by OlE, the view held by NIS treats institutions 
as largely exogenous to the firm. 
This range of views on institutionalism is bound to give rise to questions regarding the 
differences between them. What are the properties of the different views? How do they 
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differ? How can they best be applied? How do they relate to each other and most 
importantly to this thesis: how do these strands of institutional theory help us to 
understand processes of change and the adoption of a practice completely alien to a 
corporate governance system? In order to assess the usefulness of the different strands 
of institutional theory for a study on organizational change (e.g. the adoption of ESOs in 
Germany), it is therefore necessary to confront their properties and assumptions. This 
chapter will describe some of the properties of the three strands of institutional theory 
addressed here: New Institutional Economics, New Institutional Sociology and Old 
Institutional Economics. The purpose to this thesis is to clarify the properties and 
assumptions of the various institutional theories so that the most appropriate theory or 
combined theories can be selected to address the research questions that were posed in 
chapter 1. It will be argued that NIE is not suitable for this thesis and that a synthesis of 
DIE and NIS is appropriate here. 
Contrary to conventional wisdom, therefore, NIE will be discussed first and not OlE as 
discussion of the later should be linked to the discussion of NIS. Besides, NIB was not a 
development from OlE, but was aimed at dismissing some notions of neo-classical 
economics (as will be shown later). NIS will also be discussed before OlE, as the 
former is about the wider environment and the latter about the actors within the 
organization, a situation that befits the approach taken in this study where the external 
environment is considered first, subsequently narrowing down to intra-organizational 
dynamics. 
Moreover, by treating the use of ESOs in Germany as an innovation, the later part of 
this chapter will explore the literature on innovation diffusion, linking it to three 
variants of institutional theory. These variants are identified and synthesized in the rest 
of this chapter. 
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 covers New Institutional Economics, 
Section 3.3 discusses New Institutional Sociology and Section 3.4 deals with Old 
Institutional Economics. Section 3.5 considers the fusion of OlE and NIS as the basis to 
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study organizational change, followed by Section 3.6, that looks at a specific fusion of 
OlE and NIS by Greenwood and Hinings (1996) through the Neo-Institutional lens. 
Section 3.7 develops further the ideas raised in 3.6 by considering the intra-
organizational dynamics of change. Section 3.8 discusses Innovation Diffusion theory 
as a theory that informs firm behaviour on the early and later adoption of an innovation, 
linking it to Neo-Institutional theory (i.e. OlE and NIS brought together) setting the 
stage for the development of hypotheses in Chapter 4. Section 3.9 summarizes and 
concludes the chapter. 
3.2 New Institutional Economics 
NIB is known from many different strands of theory. For example agency theory, game 
theory, property rights theory and transaction cost theory all contribute to NIB theory. 
This section discusses Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) as the main basis for NIB. 
The early pioneers of the transaction cost reasoning (originating in the work of Coase, 
1937) were especially interested in the boundaries of the firm, an issue that was later 
reformulated into the make-or-buy decision (Williamson and Ouchi, 1981). In tum, 
TCE exists in many variants, but the variant promoted by Oliver Williamson has 
received the most widespread application (Ghoshal and Moran, 1996). It is regarded as 
a response to the stringent assumptions made by neo-classical economics (Van der 
Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman, 2000). TCE makes use of transactions and their 
associated costs as the primary unit of analysis (Williamson, 1998). TCE is essentially a 
theory of the coordination of transactions between and within business organizations. It 
assumes that organizations incur costs of transactions, such as costs of contracts, 
supervision costs, costs associated with opportunistic behaviour, and costs associated 
with specific assets (in particular those that are not easily used for different 
transactions). TCE argues that firms will select the governance structure that minimizes 
the costs of effecting a transaction. 
Markets, firms, common law and regulations all provide alternative forms of 
governance (Palay, 1985: 156). Williamson (1973) proposed that depending on a 
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number of general dimensions of transactions, different modes of contracting exist 
through the market or through the hierarchy or through an intermediate form. 
Transaction costs are costs that are usually ignored in standard economic theory, but 
play an important role in TeE. However, similar to neo-classical theories, NIE appeals 
to the idea of optimization. As Hira and Hira (2000: 269) state: " ... rather than seeking 
to replace neoclassical economics, the new institutionalists wish only to modify the 
rational choice, utility-based neoclassical model by relaxing some of its assumptions. 
The new institutionalism focuses on the central assumption of zero transactions costs in 
neoclassical economic models as the main gap to be filled." Williamson (1998: 35) 
notes that "many would-be theories of economic organization are primarily 
retrospective, in that they offer an ex post explanation of what has transpired", but that 
"sooner or later, candidate theories of economic organization must go beyond ex post 
rationalization and offer predictions". His ultimate goal is to predict beforehand which 
structure decision makers will choose, given the dimensions of the transactions. 
One of the most attractive features of NIB is its ability to generalize human qualities. It 
" .. .is attractive in the sense that rational choice perspectives seem to allow for a 
"universalization" of individuals' political actions, just as a market-based model allows 
for the aggregation of individuals' economic behaviour" (Hira and Hira, 2000: 268). 
Below is a description of five features embedded in TeE reasoning that are critical to 
the functioning of the theory. They are thus partly responsible for the focus of the 
theoretical ideas. Moreover, the section below will identify a potential problem with 
TeE that reduces the usefulness of TeE reasoning for this thesis. 
3.2.1 Important Features of TeE 
This section discusses the important features of TeE. It starts by briefly discussing the 
dimensions of transacting conditions, distinguished by TeE, under the two behavioural 
assumptions of opportunism and bounded rationality, which together generate a need 
for elaborate contracting. Finally, the section addresses a problem with TeE: its 
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"invisible hand" approach (Langlois, 1989), meaning that it perceives the drive for 
efficiency as an inherent feature of institutions, without providing an explanation for the 
emergence of these institutions. This lack of attention for the emergence of institutions 
will constitute the argument why TCE is not the most appropriate theory for this thesis. 
3.2.1.1 Features of Transacting Conditions 
Williamson (1998) identifies three critical features that describe transactions, and thus 
influence the choice for a particular governance structure: the frequency with which 
transactions recur, the uncertainty (disturbances) to which the transactions are subject, 
and the condition of asset specificity. The frequency of transacting is the number of 
times that a transaction takes place within a given amount of time. Uncertainty results 
from the inability to predict events in the environment. Finally, asset specificity relates 
to the specificity of organizational assets involved in specific transactions; e.g. specific 
investments or particular technologies. Asset specificity addresses the fact that assets 
are part of specific contractual relationships, from which they cannot be released or they 
can only be released at a cost. Asset specificity is especially important, as it formulates 
a condition of mutual dependency. It takes a variety of forms, among which are site 
specificity-e.g. stations located closely together to facilitate transacting; physical asset 
specificity-e.g. specialized production equipment; human asset specificity that arises 
from learning; and dedicated assets that are purchased for specific customers. 
Williamson (1985; 1997; 1998) argues that the combination of these three dimensions 
(frequency, uncertainty and asset specificity) determine a very large part the optimal 
governance structure i.e. transactions can be effected through the market, or through 
internal organization, or through an intermediate form. TCE uses two behavioural 
assumptions that allow theorists to make inferences on the selection of a governance 
structure: opportunism and bounded rationality. These will be discussed below. 
Opportunism 
Opportunism refers to a more sophisticated form of self-interest seeking, namely self-
interest seeking with guile, " ... making false or empty, that is, self-disbelieved threats or 
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promises, cutting comers for undisclosed personal advantage, covering up tracks, and 
the like" (Williamson and Ouchi, 1981: 351). The assumption of opportunism dictates 
more sophisticated calculating behaviour of the actor than assumed in neo-classical 
theories. TeE argues that the presence of opportunism in itself is not a problem per se, 
it is the combination of opportunistic behaviour and bounded rationality (see next sub-
section) that creates the need for elaborate contracts. The basic idea of transaction cost 
theories boils down to the following: A situation where individuals have the propensity 
to behave opportunistically on the one hand and the individual property of bounded 
rationality on the other. In this situation, the task is to organize transactions that will 
economize on bounded rationality "while simultaneously safeguarding those 
transactions against the hazards of opportunism" (Williamson and Ouchi, 1981: 351). 
As Williamson assumes that agents are looking for personal gain (opportunism), 
contracts need to be drawn up to attempt to minimize this opportunism. The costs 
associated with these contracts are an example of transaction costs. In Williamson's 
(1985) view, contracts enforce legal rights ex post. However, organizations can also 
employ other means, such as specific investments to demonstrate "credible 
commitments". These "credible commitments" signal to the other party that the 
organization intends to honour the agreements as it has a clearly visible interest in its 
outcomes. For example, an investment in a specific asset places the organization in a 
position in which it has an interest in honouring the contracts. As such, it provides 
information on the probability that it would engage in acts of opportunism. Williamson 
(1985) discusses this notion of "credible commitments" particularly in relation to 
intermediate structures, which are located between discrete market contracting on the 
one extreme and hierarchical organization on the other. It is important to note that given 
the overall aim of economizing on transaction costs, the assumptions of opportunism 
and bounded rationality are essential to the functioning of the model. Therefore, the 
next section will explore the notion of bounded rationality somewhat further. 
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Bounded rationality 
Bounded rationality is an assumption that attributes qualities such as the propensity to 
optimize on a (limited) number of different alternatives. It assumes more moderate 
qualities than the neo-classical agent, who is assumed to maximize based on a 
"superhuman" ability to assess all available alternatives. Bounded rationality allows for 
an imperfect ability to assess all alternatives. Therefore, individuals do not maximize 
, 
but only optimize with the information at their disposal. Indeed, Williamson (1997: 22; 
1998: 30) states that bounded rationality "is behavior that is intendedly rational but only 
limitedly so". This means that all complex contracts are unavoidably incomplete. 
The notion of boundedly rational behaviour is not particularly problematic when the 
original objectives of TCE are considered. TCE was developed as a positive theory to 
explain the boundaries of the firm. Specifically, this positive theory set out to explore 
why firms exist and continue to exist in competitive markets. However, more recently, 
it has been extended to explain behaviour within firms (Ghoshal and Moran, 1996). This 
constitutes a problem as the prediction and explanation of organizational behaviour is 
relatively different from that of individual behaviour. When studying firm behaviour as 
a whole, only basic assumptions of individual rationality may suffice, as one does not 
seek explanations of individual behaviour. "Economics does not seek to explain 
individual behaviour per se, an undertaking that would no doubt require a picture of the 
agent that is quite complex and hence "realistic" in any number of senses. Rather, 
economic theory most often uses assumptions about individual behaviour as an 
intermediate element in the explanation of various economic phenomena (changes in 
price and quantity, for example)" (Langlois and Csontos, 1993: 115). Therefore, a 
highly abstract agent may be very well suited for the description of the behaviour of the 
firm, as any quality of this agent that does not purport directly to perceived firm 
behaviour is ignored (Curwen, 1976). However, the notion of bounded rationality can 
prevent TCE to predict behaviour within organizations, as that would require a more 
elaborate depiction of individuals. As Argyris (1973) observed, it is not likely that a 
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single, isolated individual can ever reach any high degree of rationality, simply because 
the environment is too complex. 
Bounded rationality causes imperfect ex-ante contracting, thereby introducing the need 
to adjust contracting as more information becomes available. However, the choice of 
the optimal governance structure is assumed to be a choice that is made under 
conditions of perfect rationality. Whereas transaction cost theorists have successfully 
incorporated bounded rationality into their analyses of the comparative efficiency of 
alternative designs, there has been much less attention paid to the implications of 
bounded rationality at the design-selection level (Roberts and Greenwood, 1997). As 
such, TCE is not entirely consistent in its views on human behaviour: it accepts 
imperfect ex-ante contracting, because of the notion of bounded rationality, but it also 
assumes that the agent is able to select the most appropriate governance institutions for 
a given configuration of uncertainty, asset specificity and frequency of transacting. 
A number of arguments used by TCE have attracted some criticism over the years. One 
category of criticism relates to the source of the drive for efficiency. Rutherford (1989) 
and Langlois (1989) both question the "invisible hand" approach that NIB assumes. 
They both argue that the assumption of an invisible process of selection, leaving 
institutions that are most efficient, can lead to a limited applicability of the ideas of NIB. 
Langlois (1989: 294) puts it like this: "The maximization metaphor is an extremely 
appealing and powerful "positive heuristic" for a theoretical structure. It is easy to use, 
and it provides an explanation in terms of a widely applicable set of fundamental ideas. 
But only in a very restricted set of situations is it in fact a substitute for looking at the 
actual process by which institutions come into use and are maintained over time". 
Similar comments were made by Rutherford (1989). Consequently, the next sub-section 
will discuss two separate processes that can account for the drive for efficiency assumed 
by TCE. It also indicates why this drive for efficiency limits the application of TCE for 
this thesis. 
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"Homo transaction cost economicus" vs evolution: the source o/the "invisible hand" 
NIB rests on either of the two following principles: the assumption of man as "homo 
transaction cost economicus" or the evolution principle. The first principle implies that 
man is naturally concerned with efficiency. He would then be "homo transaction cost 
economicus" (Buckley and Chapman, 1997: 132). This view implies that individuals 
can and will perceive all transaction cost minimizing arrangements beforehand. The 
evolution principle argues that the market will favour the most efficient organizational 
form and that it will eventually drive out those that are less efficient. 
The assumption of "homo transaction cost economicus" is unlikely to hold as the mere 
ability of man to assess all alternatives beforehand has been doubted, even by TCE 
itself. As Dow (1987: 27) observes: "Intentionality arguments collide with the 
transaction cost school's emphasis on bounded rationality. If agents cannot cope with 
contracts featuring complex contingencies ... it is doubtful that they can select in 
advance an efficient decision making procedure to use in adapting to future 
contingencies." Moreover, individuals prefer the energy saving properties of acting 
rationally, and engage in this type of behaviour routinely. This has also been remarked 
by Ritzer (1993: 35), who notes: "people rarely search for the best means to an end on 
their own. Rather, the previously discovered best possible means to innumerable ends 
have been institutionalized in a variety of social settings." Lastly, Schumpeter (1934) 
asserts that, individuals act based on routines and habits that are consistent with wider 
beliefs of what is to be considered "rational". When knowledge and habit "become as 
firmly rooted as a railway embankment in the earth, individuals do not undertake much 
calculating action" (Raines and Jung, 1992: 113). Ultimately Schumpeter suggests that 
if individuals act rationally (consistent with their established ideals) it is because they 
have learned from experience how things are done and prefer the energy-saving feature 
of fixed habits of thinking. It is for these reasons that "homo transaction cost 
economicus" may not be a viable assumption upon which to base the workings of TCE. 
The evolution principle causing the drive for efficiency does not necessarily relate to the 
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most efficient form that can be identified, but it can be limited to structural 
arrangements that have actually been applied (Vosselman, 2002). As Vromen (1995: 
60) observes: "Following Simon (1983) ... only a weak form of selectionism is tenable. 
A strong form of selectionism would hold that the most efficient form possible will of 
necessity be established. Weak-form selectionism entails "survival of the fitter", not 
"survival of the fittest". Evolutionary selectionism rests critically on the motive of 
survival. Buckley and Chapman (1997: 129) note that "the only analytically robust 
definitions of "successful adaptation" and "betterment" are coterminous with survival 
itself'. TCE is thus about the adaptation of governance structures in response to 
pressures for survival of the organization. It is logical that competitive pressures play an 
important role in the functioning of TCE. As we assume that TCE works through a 
weak-form evolutionary process (Vromen, 1995) and as this implies a satisficing 
decision maker, it is competition that drives the need for an optimal governance 
structure. The level of competitive pressure determines the level of efficiency that 
would be perceived as minimal for the organization. 
Sub-optimal intra-organizational arrangements may persist over long periods, as 
competitive pressures operate on whole organizations with varying intensity (Roberts 
and Greenwood, 1997). Agents at different positions in the organization can perceive 
competitive pressures differently, and thus different views would be taken of the need 
for efficiency enhancing measures, i.e. different satisficing levels of efficiency can exist 
among different people depending on their position within the organization and their 
outlook on the environment. The line of argument proposed by Roberts and Greenwood 
(1997) is that the institutional environment enables and constrains decision makers in 
their efforts to be as rational as possible. This is in line with the evolution principle. If 
one wants to explain decisions using TCE, one needs to go beyond frequency of 
transacting, asset specificity and uncertainty, to clarify how the institutional 
environment influences the pressures faced by decision makers. Williamson (1997; 
1998) acknowledges the importance of the institutional environment in which the 
organization operates. However, his view of the institutional environment is limited. He 
explicitly argues that the institutional environment consists of "the formal rules of the 
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game", especially property (polity, judiciary and bureaucracy) (Williamson, 1998: 26). 
Langlois (1989) argues that this limited view on institutions reduces the applicability of 
TeE outside those institutions that are typified by a drive for efficiency maximization. 
He notes: "we have good reason to think that many processes leading to institution do 
not select for efficiency (that is they maximize something other than wealth or the 
negative of the sum of production and transaction costs) ... It seems much more 
reasonable to look beyond the maximization metaphor to a consideration of the actual 
processes involved. The fact that an institution economizes on transaction costs, is an 
important part of the story; but it is not the whole story" (Langlois, 1989: 294). 
Moreover, another variant of NIB developed by Douglass North (1984; 1990; 1991) 
carries arguments that support institutional change and does appear to embrace both 
economic and political issues of societal change through considerations of property 
rights. His economic history of the rise of the West, for example, showed that 
institutional change" ... comes from a change in the relative bargaining power of rulers 
versus constituents (or rulers versus rulers), and, broadly speaking, changes arise 
because of major, persistent changes in relative prices" (North, 1984: 260). The 
dynamics of institutional change in North's theory stem from a continuous interaction 
between institutions and organizations within the context of competition over scarce 
resources. From his arguments, institutional innovations will come from states rather 
than constituents because states generally do not have a free rider problem, whereas 
individuals and organizational actors are limited in their capacity to implement large-
scale changes (Libecap, 1994). 
In its entirety, North's approach may not help much in a study where organizational 
actors are considered as agents of change, but the relevance of the institutional 
environment (created by political legitimacy) for the organizational actors cannot be 
underestimated. Therefore, his work has indirect implications for institutional change 
through the political and economic conditions set at state level. 
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In conclusion, one can argue that in the absence of a "homo transaction cost 
economic us" , TeE assumes an institutional environment that emphasizes the achieving 
of efficiency as primary motive for action. This is especially the case in market 
relations; but TeE provides little evidence that relations within organizations and 
between people are governed by the same principles. For many applications of TeE this 
poses no problem, as it does not seek to describe or explain relations at such a low level. 
However, to this thesis, it does pose a problem, because here there is a need to take into 
account the wider institutional environment so as to provide a richer image of 
management change at the level of organizational actors. 
Therefore, the discussion will shift the focus to a set of theoretical principles that allows 
assessment of the effects of a wider range of externally induced preferences in the 
organizational setting. 
TeE emphasizes the legally sanctioned role of institutions, but institutions have a 
broader effect on organizations and its participants. An institution may not only 
constrain the action choices of agents but it can also "enable" the bounded-rational 
agents to economize on the infonnation processing needed for decision making (Aoki, 
2000). Institutions do not only constrain options, they establish the very criteria by 
which people discover their preferences (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). NIE describes 
processes of structural co-ordination with the purpose to affect transactions as 
efficiently as possible (minimizing costs of transaction). As such, the following features 
make the TeE variant of NIE theory unsuitable for the purpose of this thesis: the 
provision of an explanation for the adoption of ESOs in Gennany. TeE assumes that a 
drive for efficiency comes either from a natural propensity of people to act as efficiently 
as possible or from economic pressures. These assumptions cannot be used for this 
work, as there is need to explore which institutional influences and actors determine the 
possibility for change. 
Moreover, the unit of analysis of TeE is the transaction, and individual behaviours are 
simplified to accommodate the analysis of transactions. The current study is interested 
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in the interactions between actors before and during a process of management change. 
For this purpose, the simplified individual will not do. 
TeE is not a process theory. By this, is meant that TeE does not describe the processes 
by which organizations change. Rather, it identifies an optimal governance structure for 
a given configuration of asset specificity, frequency of transactions and uncertainty. It 
does not address how the organization arrives at the desired governance structure. 
Furthermore, the economic rationality assumed by TeE may not hold when interactions 
within specific social groups are studied, since rationality is an institutional 
phenomenon, not a universal property of human action. As DiMaggio and Powell 
(1991: 10) note: "the very notion of rational choice reflects modem secular rituals and 
myths that constitute and constrain legitimate action." These rituals constitute rules of 
acceptable means to desirable ends: "modem societies are filled with institutional rules 
which function as myths depicting various formal structures as rational means to the 
attainment of desirable ends" (Meyer and Rowan, 1977: 46). These last quotes belong to 
the domain of NIS, a theory that uses a different concept of institutions and their role in 
society. The next section discusses New Institutional Sociology. 
3.3 New Institutional Sociology 
Most social analysis has been built upon two distinct models of organisational actors: 
the rational actor model and the institutional model (Tolbert and Zucker, 1996; Pfeffer, 
1981). The rational actor model assumes the individual to be a rational decision maker, 
constantly engaged in the calculation of costs and beliefs from alternatives. As such, the 
rational actor tries to make optimal decisions. The institutional model assumes an "over-
socialised" individual whose decisions are mainly influenced by prevailing social 
norms, and not by any reflection or resistance based on personal interest. This model 
resembles the decision model discussed by Pettigrew, Ferlie and McKee (1992: 15) who 
argue that actions can be seen as "politically and socially approved tokens of concern". 
Tolbert and Zucker (1996: 176) propose that these two general models of the individual 
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(overly rational vs "over-socialised") should not be seen as two opposing views, but 
rather as two ends of a continuum of decision-making processes and behaviours. They 
note that what is needed "are theories of when rationality is likely to be more or less 
bounded". 
NIS addresses the behaviour of organisations as motivated by forces in wider society. It 
argues that organisations will seek legitimacy by adhering to rules and norms that are 
valued by society and, more specifically, by certain institutions in society. The 
mechanism through which organisations adopt similar procedures is termed institutional 
isomorphism, which is "a constraining process that forces one unit in a population to 
resemble other units that face the same set of environmental conditions" (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983: 149). Early NIS theorists sought to explain how different organisations in 
many respects, confonned to similar standards of behaviour and how they employed 
similar structures. Moreover, they sought to explain the stability in these standards of 
behaviour and organisational structures. 
3.3.1 Institutional Isomorphism 
Early views of isomorphism (e.g. Hawley, 1968) argue that distinguishable differences 
in environmental features tend to lead to different optimal organisational structures and 
practices (Hannan and Freeman, 1977). As a result, one can find similar organisational 
configurations in similar environments. The earlier ideas on isomorphism regarded the 
environment as static and homogeneous. However, Hannan and Freeman (1977) 
suggested significant extensions to these views, which provided more clarity on the 
processes of competition that drive organisations to adopt "optimal" organisational 
configurations. Furthennore, they propose refinements that suggest that organisations 
face competing demands from various and changing environments. Nevertheless, 
Hannan and Freeman (1977) continued to assume a system of rationality, which 
encompasses measures of economic fitness and market competition (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983). They were primarily interested in competitive isomorphism, which is 
mostly concerned with organisational adaptation as a result of competitive pressures. 
On the other hand, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) were primarily interested in 
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institutional isomorphism. Institutional isomorphism, which is the domain of NIS, 
emphasises that organisations do not only compete for resources, but also for political 
influence and institutional legitimacy. It points to the influence of political power and 
ceremonies that are aimed at increasing legitimacy of the organisation (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977). 
Meyer and Rowan (1977) argue that, as large rationalised organisations expand their 
dominance over other domains of social life, organisational structures have come to 
reflect these rationalised and institutionalised rules of society. Berger and Luckmann 
(1977) have asserted that society imposes an objectified reality upon individuals, based 
on these institutionalised rules. "All institutions appear in the same way, as given, 
unalterable and self-evident" (Berger and Luckmann, 1979:77).They appear to be 
undeniable facts, although institutions are human made. Individuals are confronted with 
an objective structure of facts presented to them on a day-to-day basis (Weber, 1976). 
The rules of society are presented to the individual as unchangeable objective facts and 
the application of these rules is a routine matter, according to the established norms of 
rationality. "The rational thought process spreads and becomes ingrained in the decision 
making process. If this accurately describes economic action, then rational behaviour is 
a learned response rather than innate organic behaviour" (Raines and Jung, 1992). 
Meyer and Rowan (1977) argue that rationalised institutions create myths of formal 
structure, which shape organisations and Scott (1987: 506) uses the example of schools 
to argue that "much of the orderliness of and coherence present in American schools is 
based upon institutionally defined beliefs rather than on organisational structures." 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) distinguish three mechanisms of institutional isomorphic 
change: coercive isomorphism, mimetic isomorphism, and normative isomorphism. 
These three mechanisms cause organisations to become increasingly alike. It can be 
argued, therefore, that NIS is more of a theory that explains similarity amongst 
organisational structures than differences between, and change within, organisations 
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(Greenwood and Hinings, 1996). A discussion of these mechanisms of institutional 
isomorphism is made in the following subsections. 
3.3.1.1 Coercive Isomorphism 
Coercive isomorphism relates to the formal and informal pressures that result from 
coercive authority. This coercive authority comes from the organisation's dependency 
on other organisations and the societal expectations from the environment in which the 
organisation operates (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Organisations may alter some of 
their structural features or practices quite directly as a result of changing legislation, but 
they can also change more organically in response to changing societal preferences. 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) and Meyer and Rowan (1977) argue that these 
organisational re-configurations can be in large part ceremonial, but that does not mean 
that they are inconsequential. Rather, they convey the message to the various 
stakeholders in the organisation that the organisation is responsive to the preferences of 
the society in which it operates. This adherence to societal preferences helps the 
organisation to secure economic resources, influence and power. 
3.3.1.2 Mimetic Isomorphism 
A second process leading to institutional isomorphism IS mimetic isomorphism. 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argue that uncertainty is a powerful incentive for 
imitation. In particular, ambiguous goals, poorly understood technologies or symbolic 
uncertainty may cause organisations to model themselves on other organisations. The 
introduction of Japanese management techniques in US firms in the 1990s constitutes 
an example of changes caused by mimetic isomorphism. American firms observed the 
successes of Japanese manufacturing industries and introduced their understanding of 
the techniques used by the Japanese firms. In addition, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) 
argue that one of the reasons that organisational structures tend to be homogeneous is 
that there are not many different models to imitate. 
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3.3.1.3 Normative Isomorphism 
The third source of isomorphic organisational change is normative isomorphism. It 
stems from pressures from professionalization. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argue that 
two aspects of normative isomorphism are of particular interest: the grounding of 
formal education and of legitimation on a cognitive base produced by university 
specialists, and the growth and influence of professional networks that allow new 
practices to be diffused rapidly across organisations. Universities function as knowledge 
centres that influence the development of professional norms and values for 
organisations. As such, they promote normative standards that make professionals 
comparable; i.e. their behaviours can be measured against these normatively determined 
standards. Examples are professional associations for accountants, medics and lawyers. 
These professionals have strong ties with their professional bodies, which determine the 
criteria for "proper" and professional behaviour (Greenwood and Rinings, 2002). These 
criteria are strongly influenced by universities and professional training centres. "To the 
extent managers and key staff are drawn from the same universities and filtered on a 
common set of attributes, they will tend to view problems in a similar fashion, see the 
same policies, procedures, and structures as normatively sanctioned and legitimated, 
and approach decisions in much the same way" (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991: 72). 
Normative isomorphism related to professional managers focuses our attention on the 
norms and values embedded in the act of management. Managers operate in a set of 
roles, a web of relationships with internal and external groups and individuals. They are 
constrained by their own structure of reality, which is influenced by normative pressures 
and accepted ideas on "proper" behaviour (Berger and Luckmann, 1979; Pettigrew et 
al., 1992; Javidan and Dastmalchian, 1993). 
Figure 3.1 below, shows the mechanisms and the drivers of homogeneity m 
organizational forms and practices from NIS view: 
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Figure 3.1: Drivers of homogeneity in organizational forms 
Organization Structures, Systems and Activities 
Realm of Organization 
3.3.2 Criticisms of NIS 
Nevertheless, despite its current vogue in organizational analysis, NIS is not without 
problems. Perrow (1991) depicts it as a theory full of contradictions and Scott (1987) 
conceded that it was still in its "adolescence" with recent work showing that it has 
reached "maturity" (Scott, 2006) negatively implying that it has lost its vigour. 
Amongst other things, there are three inter-related concerns: 
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3.3.2.1 Neglect of Power Issues and Actors' Interest-Based Behaviour 
NIS is frequently criticised for its detenninistic nature and its neglect of the role of 
active agencies and issues of power and interest at intra-organizational (micro-) level 
(Cannona, Ezzamel and Gutierrez, 1998). The concern expressed by Powell (1991: 194) 
is that NIS "portrays organizations too passively and depicts environments as overly 
constraining", (see also Collier, 2001: 466; Oliver, 1992). According to Zucker, NIS 
researchers risk treating institutionalisation as a "black box at the organizational level" 
without solid cognitive micro-level foundations (Zucker, 1991: 105) (see also DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1991a; Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1988; Dirsmith, Heian and Covaleski, 
1997; Covaleski, Dirsmith and Michelman, 1993; Perrow, 1986; Oliver, 1991, 1992; 
Carruthers, 1995; Greenwood and Rinings, 1996; DiMaggio, 1988; Carmona et al., 
1998; Powell, 1991). Carruthers (1995: 325) also adds that NIS "is too concerned with 
culture and taken-for-granted meanings to be able to discern the conflicts that abound in 
organizational life, and that to focus on myth and ceremony is to overlook power and 
control." 
3.3.2.2 Failure to Explain Processes of Organizational Change 
Critics of NIS argue that it precludes inquiry into what causes organizations to 
challenge, discard or abandon institutionalised procedures (Oliver, 1992). The focus of 
NIS is on the study of persistence rather than understanding organizational change. 
Hence, NIS is pointless for the study of the processes of organizational change 
(Genschel, 1997), and offers not "much guidance regarding change" (Ledford, 
Mohrman and Lawler, 1989). Similarly, Greenwood and Rinings (1996) argue that the 
theory is weak in analysing the internal dynamics of organizational change. The same 
authors add "institutional theory is not usually regarded as a theory of organizational 
change, but usually as an explanation of the similarity ("isomorphism") and stability of 
organizational arrangements in a given population or field of organizations" (1996, 
1996: 1023). Likewise, Buchko (1994: 90) comments that institutional pressures are "a 
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powerful force" against transformational change, (see also Carmona et at., 1998; 
Greenwood and Hinings, 1996; Oliver, 1992; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991a; Genschel, 
1997). Collier (2001) also criticises NIS due to its inability, at an organizational level of 
analysis, to provide a theory as to how these competing interests can be accommodated 
or reconciled by management. 
3.3.2.3 Failure to Explain Internal Generation of Institutionalized Forms 
The theory does not consider the path of change in organizational realm (micro level); 
rather it focuses on change at an extra-organizational (or macro) level (Abernethy and 
Chua, 1996: 572). Scott (1991: 165) argues that the focus of the theory is on "examining 
the effects of institutional environments on organizational structures rather than with 
examining the internal generation of institutionalized forms within organizations". He, 
for example, criticises Selznick's (1949) work as "largely definitional rather than 
explanatory: he defined and described the process but did not explicitly account for it. 
His treatment of institutionalisation informs us that values are instilled; not how this 
occurs" (Scott, 1987: 495). Abernethy and Chua (1996: 572) echo that view, stating that 
the theory provides only limited insight into "institutionalization in the making" (as 
opposed to institutionalisation as an achieved state) and deinstitutionalization processes 
(DiMaggio, 1988). "That is, it does not provide an adequate answer to the question, how 
do new values and beliefs take root and supplant earlier norms?" These criticisms 
indicate that the NIS suffers from "inadequate consideration of the relationship between 
environment/institutional determinism and cultural and political factors within 
organizations (see Child, 1972; Abernethy and Chua, 1996). Therefore, for institutional 
theory to fulfil its promise for organizational studies, researchers must develop dynamic 
models of institutions (see Whittington, 1992) and devise methodologies for 
investigating how organizational actions/innovations and environmental institutions are 
recursively related (Barley and Tolbert, 1997). In so doing, Scott (1987) has pointed out 
that NIS needs to be complemented by other perspectives. 
65 
3. Institutional Theory and Innovation Diffusion Theory 
3.3.3 Recent Developments in NIS: Towards a Theory of Institutional Change 
Section 3.3.2 discussed the shortcomings of NIS, particularly that: NIS was originally a 
theory more concerned with explaining stability than change; consequently failing to 
explain how institutionally-constrained actors can challenge and change those 
institutions. More recently, however, NIS theorists have made several attempts to 
extend NIS theory to cope with these problems. 
Oliver (1991) introduced a degree of wilfulness on the part of the institutionally-
constrained actors. She discusses the various strategies that an organisation can deploy 
in response to institutional pressures. She therefore questions the notion of institutional 
determinism, as she argues that people can make attempts to resist institutional 
pressures. She proposes that institutions do not cause a course of action to be selected, 
but rather there are variables in a selection process of alternative strategies that 
constitute varying degrees of active resistance to institutional pressures. Oliver (1991) 
argues that organizations do not only acquiesce to external pressures, but may also 
compromise, avoid, defy or manipulate depending on the type and nature of external 
pressures. In her argument, Oliver (1991) turned to resource dependency theory because 
of its focus on the role of the individual firm, and the different types of short-term 
pressures that causes a firm to react to external interests (e.g. shareholders, government 
agencies, interests groups, etc). The task, as Oliver saw it, was to merge institutional 
theory with resource dependency's insights that some firms will respond according to 
individual self-interest, even if against dominant civil society values, while others will 
acqUIesce. 
Baum and Oliver (1996) combined ecological and institutional explanations for 
organisational action to combine institutional arguments with resource dependency 
arguments. The advantage of this view is that it allows the combination of institutional 
pressures and also purposeful economic action, while earlier NIS theories largely 
ignored this type of action. Oliver (1992) sketched the outlines of a theory that 
addresses the way in which institutionally constrained people are able to bring about 
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institutional change. She focused on the determinants of institutional erOSIOn , 
dissipation and rejection. Instead of NIS' s emphasis on cultural persistence, she studied 
the factors that affect deinstitutionalisation, and thus she created the basis for a theory 
based on NIS, which can explain change, as opposed to NIS's earlier focus on stability. 
Roberts and Greenwood (1997) used a process-based VIew, but they proposed a 
synthesis of NIS and NlE. They used the foundations of NIE, consisting of the notion of 
comparative-efficiency in design selection as a starting point. This type of design 
selection means that an organizational design will be adopted; based on the expected 
improvements it will bring to the efficiency of the organization. Roberts and 
Greenwood (1997) adapted this view to include institutional pressures and constraints 
that influence this selection process. 
The early NIS pIOneers had discussed institutions primarily in terms of stable 
organizational structures that reflect institutionalized beliefs about legitimate and 
rational processes and structures. As Oliver (1992: 564) notes: " ... the emphasis in the 
institutional literature on legitimation processes, organizational conformity and 
enduring organizational change has tended to preclude inquiry into the factors that 
cause organizations to challenge, discard or abandon legitimated or institutionalized 
organizational practices". Since then, different authors have tried to expand NIS to 
include explanations of change. The authors discussed here have in common that they 
attempted to introduce a process-based view of institutional change. Oliver (1992) and 
Greenwood and Rinings (1996) studied the processes of institutional change using a 
theoretical framework that is grounded in NIS reasoning, but that also includes insights 
from OlE. Roberts and Greenwood (1997) combine insights from NIS and NIE to 
provide a process-based view of organizational design selection. 
However, these efforts have still not addressed the position of individuals in these 
processes or the effects of institutions on the actions of individuals. The frameworks 
discussed here remain quite impersonal, as they do not address the link between 
individual action and the wider institutional environment, nor do they clarify the role of 
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the individual in institutional change. The later NIS-inspired articles have, however, 
provided some valuable insights in the process of institutional change, and the work of 
Greenwood and Rinings (1996) and Rinings, Greenwood, Reay and Suddaby, (2004) is 
particularly interesting as it studied the dynamics of institutional change by combining 
viewpoints from NIS and OlE. Whereas NIS emphasised persistence, OlE uses changes 
in social entities as a starting point. Therefore, the next section will discuss the 
principles of OlE in more detail. 
3.4 Old Institutional Economics 
This section addresses Old Institutional Economics (OlE). This "theory" emerged early 
in the twentieth century, and is the oldest theory of the three discussed in this chapter. 
OlE grew out of dissatisfaction with existing economic theory. Its proponents, such as 
Veblen, Ayrens and Commons, were critical about the assumptions of mainstream 
economics, and coalesced around the radical Journal of Economic Issues. In particular, 
assumptions relating to the presumed rationality of economic actors and the concept of 
equilibrium conditions are challenged by OlE, arguing that individuals' behaviour and 
the mechanism of the market are both significantly influenced by the institutional 
context. OlE theorizing revolves around common beliefs, norms and values that bind 
together action patterns. As such it provides additional explanations for human action, 
apart from those proposed by "traditional" economics. 
OlE is not a clearly delineated theory. Rather, it is a collection of ideas that Hodgson 
(2000: 318) describes as follows: 
(1) Although institutional economists are keen to give their theories practical relevance, 
institutionalism itself is not defined in terms of any policy proposals. 
(2) Institutionalism makes extensive use of ideas and data from other disciplines, such 
as psychology, sociology and anthropology in order to develop a richer analysis of 
institutions and human behaviour. 
68 
3. Institutional Theory and Innovation Diffusion Theory 
(3) Institutions are the key elements of any economy, and thus a major task for 
economists is to study institutions and the processes of institutional conservation, 
innovation and change. 
(4) The economy is an open and evolving system, situated in a natural environment, 
affected by technological changes, and embedded in a broader set of social, cultural, 
political and power relationships. 
(5) The notion of individual agents as utility-maximizing is regarded as inadequate or 
erroneous. Institutionalism does not take the individual as given. Individuals are 
affected by their institutional and cultural situations. 
These general principles of economic action are clearly different from those belonging 
to "traditional" economic theory. With regards to human behaviour, OlE is situated 
between transaction economics, that provides an under-socialized account of human 
behaviour, and institutional sociology that arguably provides an over-socialized account 
of behaviour (Granovetter, 1985; Roberts and Greenwood, 1997). OlE maintains that 
human action is constrained by institutions, but it also recognizes that institutions enable 
people to come to meaningful action. For example, Sjostrand (1993) regards institutions 
as infrastructures for human action. In OlE, institutions can be either formal or 
informal. Formal institutions are grounded in existing procedures, manuals and formal 
rules. Informal institutions do not have a formalized basis, but they have rule-like status 
due to the perceptions that these institutionalized practices, "have always been done that 
way." OlE emphasizes that institutions appear unalterable and permanent. This is partly, 
because they tend to be self-reinforcing. As noted above, institutions constrain actions 
to those that fit the tacit assumptions that are part of the institution. Sjostrand (1995) 
argues that institutions are constituted by and reinforced through social (inter)actions. 
Moreover, OlE argues that institutions are not independent of the individuals that 
inhabit the various social settings; rather, institutions exist through behaviours of these 
individuals. As such, there must be some distinguishable relation between institutions 
and individual action. In this, OlE differs from the other approaches discussed in this 
chapter. Both NIB and NlS assume that institutions exist independently from individual 
behaviour. OlE sees individual behaviour as an integral part of the institutions that 
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govern much of social life: "institutions simplify action choices; they are not separate 
from, but are part of, the individual (inter)actions" (Sjostrand, 1995: 21). 
However, although DIE recognizes the relation between institutions and individual 
behaviour, it does not pursue a detailed explanation of this relation or the processes 
leading to changes in institutionally induced behaviours. 
Moreover, with its emphasis on the self-reinforcing qualities of institutions, DIE is not 
particularly sensitive to questions related to the source of change. If people perceive 
each other's actions and behaviours in terms of the institutions common to their social 
group, how can change ever occur? In fact, two problems related to DIE that are 
relevant for this thesis are discussed next. 
The first problem related to DIE, is that it does not provide insights into the drivers for 
institutional change. DIE assumes institutions to be present, but it does not clarify when 
people come to that conscious recognition that institutional arrangements are no longer 
adequate. In other words, it does not clarify when individuals come to the collective 
recognition that something needs to change (Seo and Creed, 2002). Here, the concern 
regarding limitation of DIE stems from its insufficient attention to environmental 
pressures, as its focus is primarily on micro-level institutions. 
The second problem related to the usefulness of DIE to this thesis is that DIE as a set of 
theories does not provide an explanation or detailed description of the relation between 
individual action and the presence of institutions. It provides an alternative to the 
assumption of the economically rational actor, and it outlines some of the influences on 
human (inter)action, other than an all-consuming desire to gain welfare or a mindless 
adherence to external institutional pressures. But it does not clarify how processes of 
institutional change proceed on a micro level. 
However, in the last decade, a number of authors have used the principles of DIE to 
come to an explanation of institutional change (e.g. Barley and Tolbert, 1997; Burns 
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and Scapens, 2000). Barley and Tolbert (1997) argue that institutions are encoded in 
behavioural regularities or "scripts" ("Observable, recurrent activities and patterns of 
interaction characteristic of a particular setting" p98) that are enacted in "the realm of 
action." Actions can replicate or revise these behavioural regularities. Finally, these 
regularities can be externalized in the institutional realm, meaning that these behaviours 
are rendered independent from the particular circumstances of their conception. They 
have become "just the way things are." Basically, Barley and Tolbert argue that 
institutional change can occur through alterations in behavioural regularities over time. 
These regularities thus constitute and are constituted by institutions. Basically, changes 
in scripts can cause changes in institutions. Barley and Tolbert (1997) conceptualized 
behavioural regularities by the notion of scripts, while Bums and Scapens (2000) have 
focused on rules (formal rules and procedures) and routines (actual behavioural 
patterns). Bums and Scapens (2000) have explicitly modeled how the interdependence 
between action and structure (i.e. at intra-organizational level) may lead to institutional 
change. This is depicted graphically in Figure 3.2 below. 
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Figure 3.2: A Framework of Institutionalization 
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To explain the framework of institutionalization of new systems and practices, it is 
important to realize that from an OlE perspective, there are institutional and action 
realms. "Whereas institutions constrain and shape action synchronically (i.e. at a 
specific point in time), actions produce and reproduce institutions diachronically (i.e. 
through their cumulative influence over time)" (Bums and Scapens, 2000: 10). From 
Figure 3.2 synchronic and diachronic elements are combined. However, change 
processes in the institutional realm occur over longer periods of time than change in the 
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realm of action. The top of the figure represents the institutional realm, whereas the 
bottom represents the realm of action. Both realms are ongoing in a cumulative process 
of change through time, as represented by the solid lines at the top and bottom of the 
Figure 3.2. 
The central part of Figure 3.2 illustrates the way in which rules and routines act as the 
modalities which link the institutional realm and the realm of action. Rules and routines 
are also in a cumulative process of change, as will be described below. However, from 
time-to-time new rules and routines may be introduced or emerge in a more discrete 
way. The four arrows (a-d) represent the synchronic (a and b) and diachronic processes 
(c and d). Arrow a shows the encoding of the existing institution, taken-for-granted 
assumptions, and meanings into new rules, routines and procedures, that embody 
organizational values. This means that new rules or procedures are usually interpreted in 
terms of the current norms and values of the group which uses the system. 
Arrow b is related to individuals' behaviour when enacting these new rules, routines 
and procedures which embody deep values. These rules are enacted when 
organizational members use them in their daily ongoing activities. The way these rules 
are enacted depends on existing institutions. Bums and Scapens (2000) argue that the 
successful enactment of the new rules depends on whether the norms and values 
underpinning them are in line or compatible with the norms and values of those who 
will enact or implement them. However, the process of enactment, especially if the rules 
and routines challenge existing meanings and values, and actors or individuals have 
sufficient resources of power to intervene in this process, can be subject to resistance 
(Bums and Scapens, 2000). In other words, there could be resistance if the new rules 
require a different way of thinking and doing things in the organization. The new 
system might not be considered as legitimate and organizational conflict could arise due 
to the implementation of new practices. 
The third step (arrow c) takes place as repeated behaviour leads to a reproduction of 
routines. This constitutes part of the continuous process of social validation that for 
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some specific values embedded in rules and routines will lead to a further 
transformation in shared taken-for-granted assumptions. Such transformation (arrow d) 
involves the institutionalization of the values (embodied and embedded in rules and 
routines) which have been reproduced through the behaviour of the individual actors. 
Such institutionalized rules and routines become "taken-for-granted ways of behaving ... 
They become the unquestioned way of doing things," (Bums and Scapens, 2000). 
However, this framework is not perfect. For example, it does not specify how human 
agency takes its form. How do people organize themselves to come to coordinated 
action that has the potential to alter the institutional arrangements in their social setting? 
How does the interaction between rules and routines manifest itself to an employee in 
an organization? How does the institutionalization of rules and routines work? These 
are questions that relate to the role of human agency in institutional theory. Bums and 
Scapens (2000) offer a framework to assess the process of institutional change. But "the 
framework is offered as a starting point for researchers interested in studying 
management change, and through such studies, the framework will be extended and 
refined" (Bums and Scapens, 2000: 3). 
So far, the thesis has argued that OIE allows for a more comprehensive 
conceptualization of the individual actor than NIE, which focuses on impersonal 
transactions. OIE allows us to abandon the "traditional" view of the individual. NIS 
emphasizes legitimacy as the motivation for much human action, but this resulted in the 
criticism that NIS theory depends on an over-socialized individual who disregards 
efficiency considerations (Granovetter, 1985). Moreover, NIS theory is primarily 
concerned with organizations and societies as the unit of analysis; institutions are 
regarded as external to organizational participants. OIE may provide a solution to these 
problems. However, there are two difficulties associated with OIE theories that are not 
resolved by the OIE-inspired literature: (1) OIE does not provide any insights into what 
causes people to recognize the inadequacy of institutions; or put differently: where 
institutional change comes from; and (2) OIE does not provide explanations of agency 
in the process of institutional change; the role of individual behaviours therein. 
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It therefore appears that NIS and OlE theories provide complementary insights. Both 
share the premise that action is largely organized by institutions, widely held definitions 
of the behaviour and relationships appropriate for a set of actors. 
Therefore, to extend the scope and enhance understanding of organizational behaviour 
and action, there appears to be a need for a combined framework drawn from the two 
theories. The next section, therefore, discusses the fusion of NIS and OlE. 
3.5 Bringing OlE and NIS Together 
Greenwood and Binings (1996) extended the significant synthesising work of Oliver 
(1992). They proposed a framework of radical change in which they bridge NIS and 
OlE. They model organisational change as a series of processes that are influenced by 
the institutional context. As such, they introduced a view that perceives organisational 
change as a complex process that is not only affected by institutional pressures, but also 
by the rationality of the market context in which firms operate. Similar to Baum and 
Oliver (1996), Greenwood and Binings (1996) proposed that institutional pressures do 
not prevent actors from acting reflectively, but rather that change consists of a web of 
different processes that affect the outcomes of change. Siti-Nabiha and Scapens (2005) 
presented a theoretical framework that retains an OlE perspective, but also addresses 
issues that used to belong to the NIS domain such as decoupling. They did so by 
addressing the processes of change, focusing on both internal and external institutional 
influences. 
Figure 3.1 has shown how the external environment dictates organizational behaviour 
using a NIS lens, and Figure 3.2 showed how institutions are formed within the 
organization through repetitive actions by actors. A fusion of NIS and OlE using the 
aforementioned frameworks is now represented by Figure 3.3 below. 
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Figure 3.3: A Fusion of NIS and OlE 
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The framework above conveys the message of a two-way interaction between the 
environment and organizations. This is in line with the stress made by some 
contributors that a firm's internal structure, systems and practices might shape external 
rules, rather than merely represent such firm-level structures and processes as passive 
reactors to external stimuli (Bums, 2000b). The combined institutional framework 
reveals mechanisms through which society level rules and myths through time impinge 
the intra-organization activities and come to underpin a firm's specific know-how or 
memory. It also helps explain how an organization's systems and practices, whose 
origins lie outside the organization, may come to be embedded within the company and 
create reality (Scott, 1987) in which the extra-organization's expectations of appropriate 
organizational forms, systems and behaviour come to take on rule-like status in thought 
and action (Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1988). 
Furthermore, and most importantly, the framework highlights the role of intra-
organizations factors in the adoption, implementation or possible resistance and 
rejection of the new systems. Being able to accommodate both extra- and intra-
organizational factors in analysing organizational behaviours and actions, the 
framework is suitable to conceptualise how organizational and environmental factors 
interact. 
Thus, to summarise this section, early NIS pioneers discussed institutions primarily in 
terms of stable organisational structures that reflect institutionalised beliefs about 
legitimate and rational processes and structures. As Oliver (1992: 564) notes: " ... the 
emphasis in the institutional literature on legitimation processes, organisational 
conformity and enduring organisational change has tended to preclude inquiry into the 
factors that cause organisations to challenge, discard or abandon legitimated or 
institutionalised organisational practice". Since then, different authors have tried to 
expand NIS to include explanations of change as a process. For example Oliver (1992) 
and Greenwood and Hinings (1996) studied the processes of institutional change using a 
theoretical framework that is grounded in NIS reasoning, but also includes insights from 
OlE. 
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Greenwood and Hinings (1996) do not only combine insights from NIS and OlE but 
explicitly show the enabling and precipitating factors of change within the firm as a 
result of external pressures from both the competitive and institutional environment. It 
is therefore the theorized framework by Greenwood and Hinings (1996), which they 
refer to as neo-institutional theory that is of great interest in this thesis and thus receives 
detailed attention in the next section. Consequently, hypotheses (Chapter 4) will be 
developed from this framework. 
3.6 Neo-Institutional Theory and Organizational Change 
Thus, from the discussion above, organizational responses during periods of extreme 
institutional change are not well understood (Newman 2000). From their political 
science perspective, Hall and Gingerich (2001) emphasize the interdependence of 
governance institutions and the way that different institutions mutually reinforce each 
other, resisting change. However, in the face of empirically observable, wide-ranging 
change in core institutional arrangements, analysts have begun to question whether 
institutional complementarity really is as strong as believed by the earlier approaches or 
whether discrete institutions may change independently from the rest (Thelen 2000; 
Lane, 2000; Vitols, 2001; Morgan and Kubo, 2002). Some scholars (e.g. Dougherty, 
1994; Greenwood and Hinings, 1996) have declared that the theory has an excellent 
basis for an account of change. Thus, neo-institutional theory has developed a new 
focus that considers the possibility of change beyond ideas of inertia and persistence 
(Greenwood and Hinings, 1996). 
Indeed, in discussing radical change, Greenwood and Hinings (1996: 1023) observe that 
neo-institutional theory is "silent on why some organizations adopt radical change 
whereas others do not, despite experiencing the same institutional pressures". How do 
organizations react when there is a wholesale change in their external institutional 
environment? Neo-institutional theory attempts to answer this question by suggesting 
that the response of organizations will be determined by the nature and degree of their 
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embeddedness within societal and organizational contexts (Ahmadjian and Robbins, 
2005). 
In a similar fashion, Greenwood and Rinings (1996) argue that despite criticisms to the 
contrary, neo-institutional theory contains insights and suggestions that, when 
elaborated, provide a model of change that links the external organizational context and 
intra-organizational dynamics. They accept that a major source of organizational 
resistance to change derives from the embeddedness of an organization within its 
institutional context - the underpinning notion of NIS. Greenwood and Rinings (1996) 
further argue that the incidence of radical change, and the pace by which such change 
occurs, varies across institutional sectors, as these institutional sectors have different 
structures and because organizations vary in their internal organizational dynamics. 
Thus, the manner in which organizations respond to institutional pressures, in so far as 
the choice of radical change and pace of change is a function of these internal 
organizational dynamics. 
The following sections discuss these intra-organizational dynamics which (when taken 
as complementary or an improvement to the insights of institutional theory in general) 
explain how organizations react differently, through their internal actors, to changes in 
their external institutional and competitive environments. 
3.7 Intra-Organizational Dynamics 
Intra-organizational dynamics as discussed earlier help to explain how organizations 
respond to institutional pressures. Four aspects of an organization's internal dynamics 
are: interests, values, power dependencies and capacity for action (Greenwood and 
Rinings, 1996). The role of intra-organizational dynamics in accepting or rejecting 
institutionalised practices has long been recognised (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). 
DiMaggio and Powell (1991a: 27) suspected that "something has been lost in the shift 
from the old to the new institutionalism" and "the goal must be a sounder 
multidimensional theory, rather than a one-sidedly cognitive one." They acknowledge 
that "power and interests have been slighted topics in institutional analysis" (1991a: 30). 
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For this thesis, in attempting to understand organizational change, the model below at 
Figure 3.4, developed from Greenwood and Rinings (1996), is used. 
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Figure 3.4 - Model of Organizational Change: 
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3. Institutional Theory and Innovation Diffusion Theon 
Shown on Figure 3.4 are exogenous and endogenous dynamics. Exogenous dynamics 
which are by definition external to the organization are market context and institutional 
context. Endogenous dynamics operating within the organization are interests, values, 
power dependencies and capacity for action. 
3.7.1 Exogenous Dynamics 
The institutional context has been extensively discussed above. The other external 
dynamic, market context, interacts with the intra-organisational dynamics in a manner 
that can fruitfully be analysed through the resource dependency theory lens. Resource 
dependency theory, proposed by organizational theorists, Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) 
explain organizations in terms of their interdependence with their environment (pugh 
and Hickson, 1997; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Daft, 2001). Resource dependency 
theory addresses the dependency relationship of one organization with the external 
environment for resources, conceptualizing organizations as being interdependent with 
their environment and other organizations in order to survive. As organizations are not 
self-directed and self-dependent (pugh and Hickson, 1997), they need resources for 
their survival. Resource dependency, which varies from one organization to the next, 
has materials, personnel, information and technology as resources. 
If organizations crucially lack any of these resources, their providers become more 
salient in governance, and the firm must effectively interact with those who control 
these resources (Pugh and Hickson, 1997; Ulrich and Barney, 1984). Pfeffer and 
Salancik (1978) think that interdependence with others lies in the availability of 
resources and demand for them. This interdependence may take the form of direct 
dependence of the seller organization or its customers or the mutual dependence of 
seller organs on potential customers for whom they compete (pugh and Hickson, 1997). 
Without these resources, modem organizations face difficulty surviving in a competitive 
market place. 
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3.7.2 Endogenous Dynamics 
As shown in Figure 3.4 endogenous (or within-firm) dynamics are further divided into 
precipitating dynamics and enabling dynamics. Interests and value commitments are 
precipitating dynamics and enabling dynamics are power dependencies and capacity for 
action. 
By emphasising endogenous dynamics the importance of the internal complexity of 
organizations is clearly underlined. We add to Greenwood and Rinings (1996), by 
suggesting that the institutional perspective is not only relevant to exogenous dynamics, 
as institutions are also existent within the organization. Our argument is based on the 
definition of institutions, taken to be "the humanly devised constraints that structure 
human interaction" (North, 1990: 3). Under the following section of endogenous 
dynamics, the discussion will first address precipitating dynamics followed by enabling 
dynamics. 
3.7.2.1 Interest Dissatisfaction and Value Commitments 
Within an organization there are different groups that have diverse interests, and hence 
different perceptions of value. Specifically, this organizational differentiation enables 
the different groups to translate their interests into favourable allocations of scarce and 
valued organizational resources (Greenwood and Rinings, 1996). As Palmer, Jennings 
and Zhou (1993: 103) put it: "Organizations are ... arenas in which coalitions with 
different interests and capacities for influence vie for dominance." Given, therefore, 
that interests translate into some form of acceptable value, a potential pressure for 
change or inertia is the extent to which groups are dissatisfied with how their interests 
are accommodated within an organization. A high measure of dissatisfaction may 
become a precipitating pressure for change (Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1988; Walsh, 
Rinings, Greenwood and Ranson, 1981). For example, a weak stock market 
performance may precipitate a shareholder revolt thus leading to a number of changes. 
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However, Greenwood and Rinings (1996) argue that dissatisfaction does not provide 
direction for change. " Intense pressure for change arising from dissatisfaction with the 
accommodation of interests will not lead to radical change, unless dissatisfied groups 
recognize the connection between the prevailing template and their position of 
disadvantage" (Greenwood and Rinings, 1996: 1035). To understand one's position of 
disadvantage, there must be awareness of an alternative template that could possibly 
make things right. What is therefore, important in explaining the possibility of radical 
change is the pattern of value commitments within an organization. Greenwood and 
Rinings (1996) identified four generic patterns, which are: 
1. Status quo commitment, a situation where all groups are committed and satisfied with 
the prevailing institutionalized template in use. This will not facilitate radical change. 
2. Indifferent commitment, a situation where groups are neither committed nor opposed 
to the template in use. 
3. Competitive commitment, a situation where some groups support the template in use, 
whereas others prefer an articulated alternative. The articulated alternative would have 
its origins in the institutional context. 
4. Reformative commitment, a situation where all groups are opposed to the template in 
use and prefer an articulated alternative. Change under these circumstances takes place 
with minimum resistance if any. 
Greenwood and Rinings (1996) add that organizations will vary in their pattern of value 
commitments partly because of their different locations within the institutional sector. 
(line b in Figure 3.4). Leblebici, Salancik, Copay and King (1991) showed that more 
peripheral, and therefore less embedded, organizations (e.g. in terms of technology or 
size of firm) are less committed to prevailing practices and readier to develop new ones. 
They lack the intensity of commitment to the status quo found in firms that are more 
centrally located and embedded within the institutional field. 
Interests and values are not independent precipitators in pressuring for change, but are 
in fact linked as shown in line c of Figure 3.4. Values can be taken for granted, thus 
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servmg to silence expressions of dissatisfaction; as dissatisfied groups may fail to 
realise that they are worse off because of the template in use. "The role of value 
commitments is thus critical, because there is no direct link from interests to radical 
change, only from interests to convergent change" (Greenwood and Rinings, 1996: 
1036). Radical change will occur only if interests become associated with a competitive 
or refonnative pattern of value commitment (line x in Figure 3.4). 
3.7.2.2 Capacity for Action and Power Dependencies 
It has been shown above, that internal pressures for change come from interest 
dissatisfaction and the pattern of value commitments. The severity of those pressures is 
dependant on the interaction of precipitating dynamics with market and institutional 
contexts. However, Greenwood and Rinings (1996) assert that radical change will occur 
only in conjunction with an appropriate capacity for action and supportive power 
dependencies. Thus, capacity for action and power dependencies are the enablers of 
radical change. According to Clegg (1975), a political model of organizational change 
that starts from groups with different beliefs and interests, must incorporate power. 
Thus, as shown in the Figure 3.4 (line k) groups use power dependencies to promote 
their interests. "Change ... can only occur when either a new set of actors gains power or 
it is in the interest of those in power to alter the organization's goals" (Fligstein, 1991: 
313). 
Some argue (e.g. Pettigrew, 1985; Ranson, Rinings, and Greenwood, 1980; Greenwood 
and Rinings 1996) that organizational groups vary in their ability to influence 
organizational change because different groups have different power to effect or resist 
change. Positions of power can be used to sustain or buttress the prevailing archetype 
(Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1988). The implication is that in a situation of a competitive 
pattern of value commitment, one cannot predict whether radical change would take 
place. The outcome would depend on whether those in position of privilege and power 
were in favour of the proposed change or not. Thus, power dependencies either enable 
or suppress radical organizational change (line e). 
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However, power dependencies are also influenced by their behaviour. For instance, one 
view from the resource dependency model (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) is that changes 
in market pressures can unsettle power dependencies within the organization, which 
then enable change. An important point is that shifts in power dependencies, whether 
brought about by market or institutional pressures, will produce radical change only if 
the dominant coalition recognizes the weaknesses of existing template arrangements 
and is aware of potential alternatives. 
Most importantly, change cannot occur if the organization is unaware of the intended 
destination of that change. This transition process also involves organizational abilities, 
the skills and competencies needed to achieve and function within the new template. 
This process refers to capacity for action whose importance has been alluded to by a 
number of authors (Camall, 1990; Clarke, 1994; Fombrun, 1992; Nadler and Tushman, 
1989; Tichy, 1983). Capacity for action embraces different kinds of resources, financial, 
human and technological etc. It is for this reason that capacity for action is linked to the 
market context (line h). 
Capacity for action is about how to manage the whole process of change from the 
beginning to the end; from the unwanted situation to the desired one. There is an 
implied recognition that there is a gap between the existing and the desired institutional 
arrangements and governance systems. This gap is about the degree to which 
institutions (e.g. structures, practices, legitimating actors) are not well defined and 
established as well as the inconsistencies between these institutions. This is the reason 
why capacity for action is an enabling dynamic. If the gap is wide, organizational 
members may lack the understanding of what the desired structures and values should 
be, as well as the expertise or capacity for action to change the organization. 
In order to have a destination, there must have been a departure point. This departure 
point, referred to in this thesis as the initial condition, is determined by the strength, 
ingrained nature and pervasiveness of the institutional arrangements that existed prior to 
the radical change. Zucker (1991: 105) observes that "every institutionalized system 
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tends to carry "baggage" of related structures and activities that become 
institutionalized over time". An unfavourable initial condition implies that the 
establishment of a new institutional arrangement will be very difficult. North (1990: 6) 
states, "although formal rules may change overnight as the result of political and 
judicial decisions, informal constraints embodied in customs, culture, traditions and 
codes of conduct are much more impervious to deliberate policies". 
The more ingrained and pervasive behaviours, routines and cognitive scripts are, the 
more difficult it will be to destroy them and replace them with a radically different set 
of scripts and behaviours. As observed by Oliver (1992: 580), "institutionalized values 
and activities will exhibit inevitable resistance to erosion or change". She asserts that 
even if organization members recognize the need for change, or transition to a new set 
of values and activities, they may be immobilized by the previously institutionalized 
arrangements. However, actors creatively recombine and extend the institutional 
principles at their disposal (i.e. initial condition) to devise institutional solutions to their 
problems. In this sense, already existing institutions are enabling because they provide 
the technical and symbolic means with which actors build new institutions. 
One way to make the initial condition favourable is to rid the firm of institutional 
hurdles, i.e. dismantle the old, deeply ingrained and widely shared and accepted 
templates. The problem is that institutional theory has not concentrated on the 
destruction of old structures but has given attention to the adoption of new ones. As 
Zucker (1991: 105) notes, "there has been little work on the processes by which 
institutions disappear". Oliver (1992) introduced the notion of dissipation, a gradual 
deterioration in the acceptance and use of a particular institutionalized practice. Her 
framework involves both environmental and organizational features that can produce 
deinstitutionalization. The organizational features include conflicting internal interests 
and increasing social fragmentation. Oliver (1992) also, however, emphasizes how 
institutionalized practices break down and are replaced by new ones. She identifies a 
variety of social, functional, and political pressures that are likely to promote 
deinstitutionalization and reverse the trend toward homogeneity and convergence 
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(isomorphism) m institutionalized fields. Examples include shifting external 
dependence relationships (political), declining rewards for institutional conformity 
(functional), and increasing internal diversity (social). 
Capacity for action could also entail tactics like introducing external mechanisms that 
have the power to destroy the status quo. Thus, inviting equity ownership by foreigners, 
participating in foreign product and capital markets, adopting International Accounting 
Standards or GAAP could all be considered as part of the process to deinstitutionalize a 
corporate governance system. Such activities may facilitate the process of change. 
Oliver (1992: 577) asserts that, "firms that diversify their operations into other sectors 
or markets, particularly in different countries are likely to be exposed to alternative 
organizational customs ... ". 
We extend the analysis above by narrowmg down the discussion to a corporate 
governance model of change and by linking institutional with innovation theories in a 
manner that takes into account the circumstances of an individual firm. This perspective 
recognizes the fact that although there may be an overall trend within an industry, sector 
or economy towards change, organizations respond differently to institutional pressures 
(Fennel and Alexander, 1993). The reason is that organizations do not experience such 
pressures uniformly. We add that intra-organizational dynamics as discussed above are 
at the disposal of institutions or actors to use. Using these dynamics as weapons, 
institutions may choose to be supportive or resistant to the organizational change. We 
refer to supportive institutions as facilitating institutions and to unsupportive ones as 
institutional hurdles. Figure 3.5, below shows a situation of transformation from one 
state of corporate governance to another. 
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Fig 3.5: Conceptual Model of Governance Change. 
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The current corporate governance institutions are the starting point of this model. At 
this point (initial condition) the firm has deeply ingrained culture and doctrines. The 
firm is often loaded with old templates that may be unwanted and disadvantageous. It is 
this state of affairs that agents of change seek to dismantle or transform. In the attempt 
to effect change, the firm has certain aspects or institutions that will make the task 
easier. In the model, these are shown as facilitating institutions. Thus, the firm uses 
facilitating institutions to effect corporate governance changes. Facilitating institutions 
have either a competitive or reformative kind of value commitment. They are 
dissatisfied with the template in use and prefer an alternative template from elsewhere. 
Within the organization, the balance of power is tilted in their favour. Facilitating 
institutions could be internal or external, implying that the external environment like the 
firm's internal environment plays an important role in the transformation process. 
Internal facilitating institutions include, for example, elements such as an effective 
management culture, supportive institutions, like shareholders' representatives, and 
effective accounting behaviour. External facilitating institutions could include, for 
example stock exchange requirements, influence from an Institute of Directors, lAS or 
GAAP accounting standards, professional associations of accountants and company 
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secretaries, and cultural spillovers through foreign ownership of equity or issuance of 
ADRs. 
Whereas facilitating institutions will come to the aid of the firm, institutional hurdles 
will provide resistance to change. Like facilitators, hurdles can be internal or external, 
again underlining the importance of the business environment. Internal institutional 
hurdles cover aspects like: organizational conservative culture, employees, depending 
on their perception of change and some board members. External institutional hurdles 
are the national culture, for instance, resistance by other stakeholders such as banks or 
suppliers and block-holders if they think change might lead to loss of control. The 
characteristics of hurdles are naturally in direct contrast with those of facilitators. 
Institutional hurdles are associated with the status quo value commitment. Interest 
groups are satisfied with the template in use and because they do not have any intention 
to destabilise the organisation, they do not have the strategy or capacity for action to 
change. The level of their satisfaction does not require any form of support from those 
in positions of power, or they may be linked to power dependencies that resist change 
(Greenwood and Rinings, 1996). 
All firms tread the transition time path towards a new form of corporate governance. 
Taking full advantage of facilitators and minimizing the effects of hurdles is an obvious 
recipe for success. We argue that all firms will eventually change, but the speed and 
degree of success is dependant on how quickly an organization neutralizes the hurdles 
and promotes facilitators. Thus, this model recognises that institutions are 
simultaneously constraining and enabling. 
The initial condition for any firm is also crucial as it affects the pace at which the 
changes will take place. A favourable initial condition would mean a relatively smaller 
amount of change towards the desired end. Thus, the two complementary models 
(Figures 3.4 and 3.5) help to explain why given the same institutional pressures some 
firms may emerge as early adopters of changes and some lag behind. For example, the 
organization's policies and its strategic positioning (Fennel and Alexander, 1993; Judge 
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and Zeithmal, 1992) may magnify or dilute the pressures for isomorphism. Similarly, an 
organization's own traditions and history may also affect the extent to which it 
conforms to isomorphic pressures (Eisenhardt, 1989). Helped by starting from a 
favourable initial condition, with effective facilitators and weaker hurdles, "leaders" 
may adopt early, and their motives could be efficiency-oriented. On the other hand, late 
adopters seeing minimum gains from change may eventually adopt change driven by 
institutional pressures and the need to acquire legitimacy and have access to resources 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
3.8 Linking Neo-Institutional Theory to Innovation Theory 
Changes in a firm's internal institutions may be viewed as organisational innovations 
(Douglas and Judge, 2001; Westphal, Gulati and Shortell, 1997). During the early 
stages of the diffusion of organizational innovations, change has been found to be 
typically driven by an efficiency rationale, while organizational change tends to follow 
symbolic and isomorphic patterns among later adopters, i.e. social legitimacy 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Westphal and Zajac (1994) reported that early adopters 
of long-term executive incentive plans were more likely to use such plans extensively, 
while late adopters were more likely to use these incentive plans in symbolic style. 
Tolbert and Zucker (1983) proposed that early adoptions of civil service reforms were 
motivated by technical or economic needs, while later adopters responded to the 
growing social legitimacy of these programs as taken-for-granted improvements in 
organizational structure. Similar findings have been obtained in studies investigating the 
adoption of personnel programs (Baron, Dobbin and Jennings, 1986). 
What can be discerned from this is that there is a clear link between institutional and 
innovation theories. Some scholars (e.g. Witt, 1989; Bush, 1987) have previously used 
diffusion processes to provide a framework for understanding institutional change. The 
tradition of innovation diffusion theory covers not only the spread of new objects 
reSUlting from inventions but also new ideas and organisational changes that can also be 
treated as innovation. Specifically, innovation is not only limited to the invention of 
technological objects but also encompasses the trying out of new ideas. Trying out new 
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ideas brings the idea of change. Bell (1968) regarded diffusion as the key engine of 
change in society. At the time he was referring to the spread of both, new goods and 
privileges, particularly access to higher education and the institutional changes which 
radiated through society as a result. 
One element that may hinder a synthesis of diffusion theory and institutional theory in 
relation to organizational change is that diffusion theory assumes that individual 
behaviour is embedded in the rational choice model. Thus, while diffusion theory is not 
explicitly about cognitive assumptions, bounded rationality is the underlying hypothesis 
(Redmond, 2003). The assumption is that potential adopters of any innovation will 
weigh the costs and benefits of the innovation in a more or less traditional economic 
sense and from an individualistic perspective. In other words, decisions by 
organizations are not seen to be influenced by institutional pressures. We argue here 
that the analysis of the adoption of innovations such as ESOs requires more than 
rationality. The idea is not to deny the importance of diffusion theory with its bounded 
rationality, but to embrace it, recognizing the institutional pressures that may constrain a 
rational approach in adopting an innovation. An institutional perspective draws attention 
to the binding force of habit and tradition as well as the impact of adoption on social 
relations. From this approach, the possibility of an informed resistance to innovation or 
change, based on values, norms and traditions and not economic sense, does in fact 
happen and is compatible with the institutional perspective. Specifically, those 
subscribing to social constructionist views hold that actors suffer from extremely 
limited information and high levels of uncertainty and thus are driven more by concerns 
for doing what is institutionally acceptable and culturally appropriate than by some kind 
of cost-benefit analysis (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). 
However, what may seem like incompatibilities between the two theories may in fact be 
complementarities. For instance, in diffusion theory an important dimension is time, i.e. 
the length of time from the introduction of an innovation to its adoption. From an 
institutional perspective, however, an important dimension involves the ability and 
willingness to overturn established ways. To be among the first to break with tradition 
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and "taken for granted" habits is to be a "first mover" or innovati ve adopter; and having 
"follower adopters" is a case of innovation diffusion. 
Earlier adopters are marked by venturesomeness, intelligence, ability to cope with 
uncertainty, and willingness to accept risk (Rogers, 1995). These early adopters or 
innovative adopters as they are referred to (Rogers, 1995) are the initial adopters in their 
social networks. No one else in their circle of acquaintances has direct experience of the 
innovation (Redmond, 2003). In other words, innovative adopters have no social model 
to follow. There is however, a problem with this perspective. With modem business and 
the importance of globalization, it is very difficult to discern whether any adopter had a 
model to follow or not. Resolution of this issue could lie in the manner in which one 
defines a circle of acquaintances or one's social network. 
What can be safely said is that innovative adoption requires imagination and research on 
the earliest adopters and that they have a greater ability to deal with abstractions than 
later adopters (Rogers, 1962). There is also an element of risk-taking. Because of 
novelty, innovation carries an element of uncertainty as to the efficacy of attaining the 
desired ends and often presents an unsanctioned and unwelcome departure from 
habitual and highly embedded patterns of behaviour. There is therefore the presence of 
both economic and social risk; factors that may discourage most risk-averse actors. In 
diffusion theory, fewness is a hallmark of the innovative (early) adopter who finds that 
prospective rewards outweigh perceived risks. There is likely to be great anticipation by 
early adopters that their actions will be imitated. This anticipation, as Bourdieu (1990) 
notes, is based not on what actors see but what they foresee to be the response of 
specific and relevant individuals. The social position of an innovative adopter is 
enhanced only in the degree that others follow suit (Witt, 1989). That way, social risk is 
minimized. 
For some actors, the arrival of an innovation is a social irritant which must be carefully 
evaluated. Once the leaders have positioned the innovation and it has been socially 
accepted as desirable, potential followers must assess the consequences both of 
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adoption and non-adoption. The follower relies, in this case, on the judgments, 
decisions, and opinions of others in order to clarify the social meaning of the 
innovation. 
Naturally, followers are slower to adopt than first movers. The reason for this is 
uncertainty regarding economic benefits or social reactions or both. Social reaction is 
important because the adopters of novel ideas or objects are highly prominent. While 
many consumers seek to be noticed in a favourable light, few consumers wish to draw 
unwanted attention to themselves (Hamilton, 1988). Emulation is thus a drive to keep 
up with others, not a desire to be ostentatious (Trigg, 2001). 
Followers do not only boast of having a model to follow, but also do have less 
uncertainty in decision making. The observation by followers of applications of an 
innovation reduces uncertainty of the economic component while observation of 
previous adopters reduces uncertainty of the social component (Redmond, 2003). 
Followers weigh the suitability of adoption in the light of their social position and in 
doing so; seek to know the shared social meaning attached to the innovation by others in 
a similar position. Interest is focussed not on whether others have adopted but rather on 
who has adopted. From an institutional perspective this behaviour is likened to mimetic 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) or trait-based (Lu, 2002) isomorphism. That way, 
individuals considering adoption can enjoy the lUXUry of paying little attention to 
information about the innovation until diffusion reaches their level (Burt, 1987). Once 
this point is reached, adoption by members of that position is quite rapid in order to 
avoid an embarrassing loss of prestige. For late followers, adoption is about avoiding 
loss of status, rather than gaining status. It will no longer be a case of adopting for 
economic reasons but of gaining legitimacy. Rogers (1995), notes that later adopters are 
motivated less by the potential benefits of the innovation than by peer pressure to adopt. 
In the final analysis, all adopters undergo an individual process of change in terms of 
deliberate and guided action followed by habituation (Jensen, 1988). The cycle of 
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change opens when some individuals create new institutions and closes as the new 
institutions mould and constrain large numbers of individuals (Hodgson, 2000). 
Institutional change is complete when the once novel becomes a matter of routine, 
waiting for new initiatives to start the evolution process again. 
Innovation diffusion theory (e.g. Rogers, 1995) has traditionally been the dominant 
innovation theory, typically addressing those factors that influence an innovation's 
speed of diffusion, (as discussed above) but also concerned to a minor extent with the 
"re-invention" of innovations, i.e. the degree to which an innovation is changed or 
modified by a user in the process of adoption and implementation (Rogers 1995: 17). 
This perspective implies that the adoption of an innovation is not congruent to the 
template from which it is derived. There is, therefore, an alternative to diffusion theory, 
whereby some elements of the original template are dropped or modified i.e. translated. 
It is therefore useful to consider theories of innovation translation proposed by the 
actor-network approach (Law, 1992; Czarniawska and Joerges, 1996). Translation 
theorists (e.g. Schon, 1971: 49) identified "co-option" as the process by which social 
systems absorb changes, i.e. they "defuse, dilute and tum to their own ends the energies 
originally directed towards change." Thus, as the firm treads the "transition time path" 
(see Fig 3.5) a number of actors are at work. These actors either in their resistance or 
acceptance of a proposed template are actually transforming the originally intended 
template: the actors are translating the template. Buck and Shahrim (2005) note that, 
the adoption of an innovation depends upon the power and believability of an actor. 
The power is not exerted linearly, but through a network where powerful participants 
set up "obligatory passing points" (CalIon, 1987). In the final analysis, it is difficult to 
identify the author of an innovation as all the actors and artefacts in a network shape the 
innovation (Buck and Shahrim, 2005). Therefore adoption of an innovation may be 
effected through translation and transformation by different interests groups (Latour, 
1996). 
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Latour (1996) observes that translation applies to any innovation, whether an artefact, 
idea or organizational procedure, and the translation of a diverse set of strategic 
innovations has been observed, e.g. diversification (Mayer and Whittington, 1999), 
human resource procedures (Newman and Nollen, 1997; Gooderham, Nordhaug and 
Ringdahl, 1999), foreign entry modes (Barkema and Vermeulen, 1997), and TQM 
procedures (Zeitz, Mittal and McAulay, 1999). 
Thus, going back to the model in Figure 3.5, facilitators, which can also include 
institutions (e.g. institutional shareholders), could possibly facilitate and quicken the 
adoption of an innovation (share options). On the other hand, hurdles (e.g. trade union 
representatives) could possibly slow down the rate of innovation adoption. 
3.9 Summary 
This chapter has provided an overview of institutional theory. More specifically, it 
discussed three streams of institutional theory: New Institutional Economics (NIE) , 
New Institutional Sociology (NIS) and Old Institutional Economics (OlE). The purpose 
was to clarify the focal points of the various institutional theories. NIE was identified to 
be closely associated to "traditional" economics, in that it adopts the image of a 
boundedly rational individual. Moreover, NIE, in its application of Transaction Cost 
Economics is especially concerned with the evolution of the governance structures of 
organizations. As such, the cost of transacting is the unit of analysis. However, 
Transaction Cost Economics does not describe or explain processes of organizational 
adaptation. Rather, it identifies optimal future states of the organization's governance 
structure under specific conditions. These considerations make NIE an unlikely 
candidate to theorize about the process of institutional change. 
NIS does not employ a process view either. It regards individual behaviour as primarily 
governed by external institutions and driven by a desire to increase the legitimacy of 
oneself and the organization in which one works. Although NIS may explain the 
emergence of practices such as for example Activity Based Costing and the Balanced 
Scorecard, by referring to the acceptance of these practices by the wider business 
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community as legitimate and desirable, it does not describe how the process of 
implementation of new practices proceeds. NIS therefore focuses more on 
organizational responses to wider institutional pressures, and as such its view of the 
individual may be regarded as deterministic (in that human actions are primarily 
dictated by the presence of institutions). On its own, NIS fails to provide a basis for 
studying organizational change. 
The third theory discussed that OlE is not a theory in itself, but a set of principles that 
allow for eclecticism. As a result, theories inspired by OlE can be sophisticated with 
regards to the qualities of the individual. OlE has inspired a number of theorists to apply 
the notion of institutions to processes of organizational change. Barley and Tolbert 
(1997), Bums and Scapens (2000), Seo and Creed (2002) and Phillips, Lawrence and 
Hardy (2004) have attempted to model how the process of institutional change 
proceeds. 
This thesis is about the processes of change that are instigated by a formal change 
program. The knowledge it needs to yield must include the ways in which actors within 
the organization deal with programs of organizational change inspired by either the 
internal or external environment or both. While NIS is concerned with institutional 
pressures from the external environment, OlE considers actors and conditions within the 
organization. The theoretical basis of the thesis will therefore contain the fusion of NIS 
and OlE to explain the process of change through intra-organizational dynamics that are 
influenced by both the market and institutional contexts. Generally it will use the ideas 
drawn from Bums and Scapens (2000) and DiMaggio and Powell (1983) and more 
specifically, it will use the framework devised by Greenwood and Rinings (1996). 
Such work by Greenwood and Rinings (1996), Rinings et al. (2004) goes beyond the 
general fusion of NIS and OlE by looking at the finer details of intra-organizational 
dynamics. The work covers the characteristics of actors and conditions that enable and 
precipitate organizational change; thus also allowing for an examination of earlier and 
later adopters of an innovation. 
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Thus, studies of the dynamics of change provide a bridge between institutional theory 
and innovation diffusion theory, as changes in an organization's institutions may be 
viewed as organizational innovations. This approach now provides the opportunity to 
study the adoption of ESOs in Germany by firms as earlier/later adopters. Hypotheses 
following this line of argument (i.e. using neo-institutional theory and innovation 
diffusion theory) are therefore developed in the next chapter. 
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Development of Hypotheses 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 reviewed the literature on corporate governance in the UK, USA and 
Germany citing the differences between the stylised Anglo-American and German 
models for large firms. The chapter highlighted that changes to the German model of 
corporate governance seem to be taking place, with the adoption of ESOs cited as a 
good example of the semblance of convergence on the Anglo-American model. Given 
the renowned embeddedness of the German model in the stakeholder system this new 
development is intriguing as it represents the abandonment of one template In 
preference for another. Such a decision is arrived at through a great contest, as 
organizational actors push for their diverse and contrasting interests. Chapter 3 
discussed the process of changing an organizational template, arguing that a clear 
understanding of this process goes beyond the economic models of rationality, and 
demands a scrutiny using the relevant strands of institutional theory and insights from 
innovation diffusion theory. 
Therefore, this chapter will pull together work covered in Chapters 2 and 3 by 
generating hypotheses using neo-institutional theory in the context of German ESOs. It 
is structured as four main sections. Section 4.2 briefly recapitulates the research 
background by providing, in the process, the rationale of developing hypotheses from 
neo-institutional theory. Section 4.3 restates the research questions. Section 4.4 
generates the research hypotheses from the inter- and intra-organizational dynamics of 
neo-institutional and innovation diffusion theories. Section 4.5 concludes. 
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4.2 The Rationale of Developing Hypotheses from Neo-Institutional Theory 
In the context of corporate governance, Germany provides a strong contrast to the USA, 
based on significant historical differences in social, political, and legal environments 
(La Porta et al. 1997; 1999). In fact, Germany has frequently been cited as the classic 
case of non-shareholder orientation, confirmed by the original German corporate law of 
1937, which stated that the company was to be managed "for the good of the enterprise 
and its employees (Gefolgschaft), the common wealth of the citizens (Volk) and the 
state (Reich)" (cited in Bradley, Schipani, Sundaram, and Walsh, 1999: 55). This 
observation sees the corporation as a social institution (rather than an economic entity) 
with public responsibilities and influenced by societal beliefs and norms, i.e. echoing 
institutional theory. 
Moreover, these important institutional features of the traditional German corporate 
governance system have persisted (Lane, 2000). For example, the German stock market, 
in comparative perspective, remains undercapitalised. Substantial family ownership of 
large companies persists, and shareholding by individuals, although increasing, remains 
low by international standards, and thus hinders the development of a shareholder 
culture. The system of co-determination is still intact with employee stakeholders 
retaining some degree of influence, if not control within the firm. The two-tier board, 
designed for insider control, also remains in place. 
Applying institutional theory to changes in large-firm German corporate governance 
also makes perfect sense, as the behaviour of German corporations can be said to be 
isomorphic in nature, certainly in comparison with Anglo-American firms. Attempts to 
reform corporate governance can be seen as a way for adopting German firms to gain 
legitimacy under a changing global economic rationale. Consequently, there have been 
demands for transparency in corporate practices and calls for more attention to be paid 
to the interests of shareholders from such groups as German shareholders' rights groups 
(e.g. DSW), the stock market regulators, and the government. 
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Additionally, where corporate governance in Germany has been defined as the means 
by which important decisions are controlled by the firm's stakeholders, both governance 
systems in general and individual elements in particular (e.g. executive pay) can be seen 
as institutions, subject to regulative, normative and cognitive influences on firms (Scott, 
2006). 
Specifically, since institutional theory focuses on the normative and coercive pressures 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) that develop within an industry or social system, its 
application to executive remuneration in Germany must be tailored to the historical, 
cultural and economic characteristics of German society. Indeed, executive 
compensation in Germany has traditionally been designed in a strong institutional 
environment that had more respect for other stakeholders (e.g. employees) besides 
shareholders. In this institutional environment, organizations adopted structures and 
practices, i.e. institutions, that conformed to society's image of them as "welfare 
capitalist" (Dore, 2000). Executives were paid to serve primarily according to the 
stakeholder community, securing resources and political legitimacy for the organization 
(Cheffins, 2003). 
Globalizing product and financial markets have triggered renewed interest in corporate 
governance among academics in Germany and the global business community. Here, 
we see that German firms in need of capital to finance global strategies have looked at 
international capital markets instead of the traditionally important banks. This is one 
case where market pressures have influence on the organization's power dependencies. 
Specifically, banks, for example, lose the power and prestige they have always enjoyed, 
as stock markets gradually take over as providers of finance. Thus, the precipitator of 
change (for the resource dependence model) is the market context, which, when the 
salience of some issues is raised relative to others, (e.g. the need for foreign capital), 
alters the relative power of groups within organisations (e.g. banks vis-a-vis foreign 
shareholders). Banks are not the only group affected by such a trend. Issues of global 
finance and others, including managerial talent, shift the power dependencies among 
directors, employee representatives and shareholders' representatives. The resource 
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dependence approach in this case complements the institutional perspective as firms 
seek resources (Oliver, 1992), resulting in the reconfiguration of power relationships. 
The focus and interests of groups are changed, (e.g. banks may tum to other areas of 
operations other than firm lending) leading to erosion of value commitment. 
Greater exposure to international product markets also exerts market pressures on firms. 
Competition in these product markets may bring German firms in direct contact with 
firms adhering to alternative corporate governance systems, thereby providing 
opportunities to learn and observe. The institutional context also acts to reconfigure the 
power and status of groups within the organization. As firms face new challenges from 
increased cross-border competition, pressures to adapt to an internationally integrated 
environment mount. Thus it seems that global financial pressures may be changing the 
nature of institutional pressures and weakening the German organizational template 
from that of a welfare organization towards a shareholder-centred one. A shareholder-
centred organization comes with institutional pressures for executive compensation to 
be aligned with shareholders' interests, with the expectation that such payments should 
reflect performance. 
Thus, the external context through market pressures (need for human and financial 
capital) and institutional pressures (e.g. legislation), could possibly influence 
organizational actors to consider a shift by German firms toward a more shareholder-
centred corporate governance system. 
German corporate governance is a crucial adopter of the Executive Stock-Option (ESO) 
innovation. However, one may argue that the German ESOs are not strictly an 
innovation, since this system of executive compensation has long been used in the 
United States and the UK. This argument makes adoption of ESOs in the United States 
a radical change (template bending), but any subsequent "Germanification" of ESOs 
(i.e. by followers) may be seen as convergent change (i.e. fine-tuning of an existing 
template). 
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Nevertheless, an argument, for the purpose of this thesis, is raised in defence of German 
ESOs as a German innovation, thus calling for radical change analysis. An innovation is 
defined by Zaltman, Duncan and Holbek (1973: 158) as "any idea, practice or material 
artefact perceived to be new by the relevant unit of adoption." The fact that the adoption 
of ESOs in Germany was unknown before 1996 makes their use an innovation. Besides, 
the adoption of ESOs in Germany is not being achieved in the same manner as in the 
United States (Buck and Shahrim, 2005; Chizema and Buck, 2006). Here, we see 
evidence of transformation, dilution and readjustment to suit the German business 
culture (e.g. German ESOs may not only be offered to directors but may cover hundreds 
of employees in management). Thus, the departure from an Anglo-American style of 
ESOs justifies the treatment of German ESOs as an innovation. Accepting this argument 
opens the possibility of analysing the adoption of ESOs from "an early adopter/late 
adopter" perspective rather than treating all German firms as late adopters. 
Accepting the early/late adopter argument implies that these changes will not be 
uniformly adopted but that they will be met with mixed responses. Some institutions 
influenced by both exogenous and endogenous dynamics, hence different pressures, will 
be in favour of the changes (facilitators) and some will present isomorphic inertia 
(constraints). As observed by Machiavelli (1972: 71): " ... there is nothing more difficult 
to plan or more uncertain of success or more dangerous to carry out than an attempt to 
introduce new institutions ... " 
Thus, although the overall expectation is of a change in executive remuneration to 
reflect the Anglo-American model, organizations respond differently to institutional 
pressures (Fennel and Alexander, 1987). For example, firms with ADRs are expected to 
disclose their operations and performance according to the requirements of the 
Securities Exchange Commission and the Stock Exchange on which their ADRs are 
traded (i.e. coercive isomorphism). Firms with foreign subsidiaries are also likely to 
import practices that they pick up from abroad, a process that neo-institutional theorists 
refer to as mimetic isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). This is a form of 
imitation which institutional theorists argue is a result of prior decisions or actions by 
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other organizations which were successful (Tolbert and Zucker, 1983; DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983; Haunschild and Miner, 1997). 
Initial conditions for firms or current templates in use are also different. Deeply 
embedded firms may be prevented by the institutional context from developing an 
action capability. Such organizations, Greenwood and Rinings (1996) argue, are 
centrally located within an institutional context and are less likely to develop the 
specialties and competencies of an alternative archetype. Peripheral organizations in 
contrast, may develop these competencies because they are less fully socialized by the 
context (Leblebici et al., 1991). For example, German DAX 30 firms may be considered 
as the organizations that are centrally located within an institutional context as most of 
the institutional pressures (regulatory, political and cultural) bear on them. The rest of 
the firms far removed from the DAX 30 may be assumed to be peripheral organizations. 
Some firms start with different institutional governance configurations, e.g. a higher 
proportion of block-holders, some with a greater presence of institutional shareholders 
or foreign shareholders. Some firms may be making good profits or achieving excellent 
share values, implying little incentive to change from the viewpoint of weak 
performance and dissatisfied interest groups. 
Given the foregoing justification of using neo-institutional theory, here in the context of 
German ESOs, it is appropriate to discuss testable hypotheses. However, before doing 
that, a quick reminder of the research questions is provided. 
4.3 The Research Questions Restated 
It has been shown so far that changes in German corporate governance are taking place. 
Important legal reforms have proceeded, a significant hostile takeover has occurred (i.e. 
Mannesmann takeover by Vodafone) and German corporations started to adopt ESO 
schemes from 1996. Some scholars have pointed to these changes as a clear case of 
convergence on the Anglo-American governance model, while others discern 
convergence on some hybrid, i.e. the merging of two corporate governance systems 
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(Mishaupt, 1998). On the other hand counter-convergence theorists emphasize that 
important features of the traditional German corporate governance system have 
persisted; noting that German corporate governance is constrained by institutions and 
culture, leading to zero convergence or even divergence (Mishaupt, 1998). 
There are, therefore, fundamental contradictions between relational governance and US-
style ESOs. The implicit aim of US-style ESOs of maximizing shareholder value is 
incompatible with the concept of the German firm as a social institution and its sense of 
Gemeinschaft created to enhance community welfare. This research is therefore about 
the process by which a corporate governance practice (ESOs) from one corporate 
governance model (Anglo-American) diffuses among corporations in a different 
(German) corporate governance regime. More specifically, the thesis aims at answering 
the following questions: What causes German firms to adopt a contested US-style 
corporate governance element: ESOs? Which firms are likely to adopt ESOs and at 
what rate ( i.e. earlier or later adopters)? 
The thesis attempts to answer the first question through a neo-institutional lens and the 
second by using both neo-institutional and innovation diffusion theories. Hypotheses are 
therefore generated accordingly in the next section. 
4.4 Hypothesis Development 
The proposed synthesis of neo-institutional and innovation theories will be developed to 
generate testable hypotheses for German executive pay. 
It has been discussed above that the salience of institutional forces, or the strength of 
their influence on what constitutes social legitimacy and hence firm survival, may also 
be explained by resource dependence theory. In Germany, institutional pressure for the 
adoption of a standard American element of executive pay packages may be expected to 
be felt according to the dependence of firms on American capital (Cheffins, 2003; 
Fuerbringer, 2004). American investors are familiar with the ESO and may be 
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suspicious of the motivation of executives who receive rewards mainly in the fonn of 
guaranteed salary and bonus, at quite low levels by American standards (Towers Perrin, 
2003). 
Additionally, new institutional sociologists argue that a driving force behind 
organizational activities is an organization's desire to fit with its external institutional 
environment by conforming to institutional pressures from other organizations 
(Martinez and Dacin, 1999). This isomorphic tendency often leads to mimetic behaviour 
(as discussed already), uniformity in decisions and homogeneity in organizational fonn 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Gennan finns with ADRs will experience these 
pressures and may succumb to inter-organizational mimetic behaviour. This reasoning 
centres on the idea that the likelihood a finn will imitate a decision or organizational 
fonn increases with the frequency that other organizations in the environment 
implement a decision or use an organizational fonn (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). For 
example, Gennan finns with ADRs are exposed to an American capital market 
environment in which most American finns have adopted ESOs. The likelihood that the 
Gennan finns with ADRs will want to be like other international finns listed on 
American Stock Exchanges is high. Indeed, it would be expected that such finns that 
had ADRs when this refonn started (i.e. ESO adoption), become earlier adopters. 
We predict therefore that these finns will not only adopt ESOs but will seize the first 
opportunity to adopt them. Hence for the first pair of hypotheses it is proposed: 
Hla: ESO adoption will be positively associated with the extent of a German firm's 
dependence on American investors. 
Hlb: Firms with a heavier dependence on American investors will be earlier adopters 
of ESOs. 
Of course, ESOs are characteristic of most English-speaking countries and foreign 
ownership as a whole may indicate a finn's willingness to accept new influences. 
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Foreign shareholders have access to information derived from various sources. The 
view taken of the foreign institutional investors in this thesis is that they are well 
informed, and have exposure to other business practices that promote value maximizing. 
Their concern would be to maximize their returns and they are convinced that this can 
be done by aligning managerial interests with their own. Foreign investors may also be 
aware that the executive labour market is now internationally competitive and the only 
way to attract and keep good managers is by paying them well. 
Additionally, Anglo-American institutional investors have promoted the use of stock-
based incentives among firms in the United States (Useem, 1996). We also expect them 
to favour such management incentives when investing in Germany. Foreign 
shareholders will not therefore resist the adoption of ESOs; in fact they could be leading 
advocates of this innovation. Recent studies in Japan, a country very close to Germany 
in governance terms, have documented a strong relationship between the percentage of 
shares owned by foreigners and corporate behaviour (Ahmadjian and Robbins, 2005). 
Following Ahmadjian and Robbins (2005), therefore, the second set of hypotheses are 
proposed as follows: 
H2a: ESO adoption will be positively associated with a firm's level of foreign 
ownership. 
H2b: Firms with higher proportions of foreign ownership will be earlier adopters of 
ESOs. 
4.4.1 Interest Dissatisfaction and Value Commitment 
Where a firm is doing well as measured by its level of profits, organizational groups 
(shareholders, employees, etc) are expected to be satisfied. Dissatisfaction may arise 
when profits are low, however. Thus, we expect a status quo form of value 
commitment, power dependencies tilted towards resistance to change and capacity for 
action mobilised towards resistance to change, if a firm has a healthy profit and loss 
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account. There is no need to reject the template in use in favour of something that has 
not been tried and tested. 
What is true of profitability can also be said of the firm's stock market performance. 
Good stock market performance provides satisfaction among organizational groups and 
poor performance, dissatisfaction. Thus, a firm's performance may cause an erosion of 
commitment. In particular, performance problems (e.g. in terms of stock market prices) 
and crises may act to trigger political "dissensus" over existing arrangements and permit 
groups less committed to prevailing practices to more legitimately raise and promote 
alternative perspectives (Child and Smith, 1987; Oliver, 1992; Pettigrew, 1985; 
Tushman and Romanelli, 1985). Thus, weak financial performance is seen as a key 
outcome of the market context capable of generating interest group dissatisfaction and 
pressure for change (line a in Figure 3.4). For example, weak firm financial 
performance may be associated with low levels of job creation that may create 
dissatisfaction among employees and their union representatives. Similarly, weak share 
price performance may stimulate shareholders to quickly press for reforms to executive 
pay packages that place a new emphasis on rewards that respond to share price 
performance, e.g. ESOs. 
To represent this possibility, it is proposed: 
H3a: ESO adoption will be associated with low profitability in firms. 
H3b: Low profitability firms will be earlier adopters of ESOs. 
It has been discussed in Chapter 3 that organizations will vary in their patterns of value 
commitments partly because of their different locations within the institutional sector. 
Leblebici et al. (1991) showed that more peripheral, less embedded organizations may 
be less committed to prevailing practices and readier to develop new ones. Indeed, 
Hinings and Greenwood (1988a), found from their studies of municipalities that change 
occurs more quickly where organizations are small and where there is low structural and 
task complexity. Organizations that are peripherally located within their institutional 
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field may lack the intensity of commitment to the status quo. As an empirical device, 
membership of the DAX 30 group of the biggest firms in Germany could be used to 
define core firms, with other firms in the DAX 100 but outside the DAX 30 being 
peripheral. Firms outside the DAX 30 may be hypothesized to have a lower value 
commitment to the traditional German governance template and may be early adopters 
of ESOs. Alternatively, market capitalization may be used as a measure of peripherality. 
It is acknowledged, however, that peripherality may conflict with access-to-resources 
variables, and, as with H3a and H3b, applications of H4a, H4b may conflict with those 
of H7 a, H7b see below. 
We may therefore hypothesize that: 
H4a: ESO adoption will be positively associated with the peripherality of firms. 
H4b: Peripheral firms will be earlier adopters of ESOs. 
The third precipitating influence addresses the value commitment of firms directly, or 
rather declarations of value commitment. In the context of German Welfare Capitalism, 
declared commitments to shareholder value orientation rather than to the Gemeinschaft 
(community) of the firm represent a contingency that favours the adoption of a pay 
innovation, itself associated with the values of Stock Market Capitalism. Studies on the 
shifting of commitment from relational governance in Germany to a market-oriented 
system of corporate governance have cited changes in the accounting system as a 
suitable indicator of commitment (e.g. Fiss and Zajac, 2004). 
Therefore, we propose: 
H5a: ESO adoption will depend on the declared value commitments offirms. 
H5b: Firms with clearer and stronger declared value commitments will be 
earlier adopters of ESOs. 
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However, it should be emphasized that H3a, H3b; H4a, H4b and H5a, H5b only 
constitute precipitating mechanisms and change may fail to occur without enabling 
dynamics. 
4.4.2 Capacity for Action and Power Dependencies 
Greenwood and Hinings (1996) propose that radical change will occur only in 
conjunction with enabling dynamics: an appropriate capacity for action (e.g. line g in 
Figure 3.4) and supportive power dependencies (line e, Figure 3.4). Ranson et al. (1980) 
argue that organizational groups vary in their ability to influence organizational change 
because different groups have different power to effect or resist it. Positions of power 
can be used to enable or suppress the prevailing template (Covaleski and Dirsmith, 
1988). 
Employees, undiversified compared with shareholders, may be expected to favour job 
security and resist labour retrenchment (Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991), and ESOs that 
link executive pay directly with share price may be perceived as increasing job-related 
uncertainty. 
However, large German firms exhibit little variation in employee board representation 
since precisely 50% of the supervisory board must be employee representatives for 
firms with more than 2,000 employees. Supervisory board representation for employees 
may therefore not be used as an independent variable. As the importance of labour costs 
as a proportion of sales may be a proxy for employee power and voice within the firm, 
we suggest: 
H6al: ESO adoption will be negatively associated with labour power. 
H6a2: Firms with less labour power will be late adopters of ESOs .. 
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Of course, the power of employees was granted by the German government under Co-
Determination Laws, and governance institutions hang together in a nexus of parallel 
interests (Hall and Gingerich, 2001). Employee representation on supervisory boards 
may be reinforced by State ownership (at a Federal and Land level) of a firm's shares, 
which may also be associated with board representation. It follows that: 
H6bl: ESO adoption will be negatively associated with the proportion of State 
ownership of a firm's shares. 
H6b2: Firms with a higher proportion of state ownership will be later adopters of 
ESOs. 
The organizational templates of enterprise founders have been found to have a 
persistent influence on the institutions and strategies of firms (Baron, Hannan, and 
Burton, 1999). The ownership of shares in large German firms by founding families still 
represents an important obstacle to high stock liquidity, and may also be expected to act 
as a conservative influence in relation to ESO adoption, another feature of Stock Market 
Capitalism, like stock liquidity. Therefore: 
H6cl: ESO adoption will be negatively associated with the proportion of founding 
family ownership. 
H6c2: Firms with a higher proportion of family ownership will be later adopters of 
ESOs. 
Besides the question of power dependencies and who owns a firm's stock, (e.g. the 
State or founding family), the concentration of stock ownership may be an important 
element in relation to power dependencies. 
Dispersed share ownership is associated with Stock Market Capitalism, where the exit 
of shareholders from a particular stock can put pressure on executives to adopt 
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organizational changes. Such dispersed ownership is not characteristic of the Gennan 
system, but where it exists: 
H6dl: ESO adoption will be positively associated with the dispersed ownership of 
shares. 
H6d2: Finns with dispersed ownership will be earlier adopters of ESOs. 
In apparent contradiction of H5d, the coalescence of stock into significant blocks has 
been an important influence on corporate strategies in US finns (Maug, 1998). Block-
holders may provide more powerful pressures for institutional change, and in Gennany, 
block-holdings not in the hands of families or the State (e.g. institutional investors) may 
press for a refonn with the capacity to boost shareholder value through an incentive 
effect for executives. Thus: 
H6el: ESO adoption will be positively associated with the presence of significant 
block-holdings of shares. 
H6e2: Firms with block-holdings of shares will be earlier adopters of ESOs. 
Banks are an important category of corporate stakeholder in Gennany, and represent 
one of the main pillars of the Gennan corporate governance system (Jurgens et al., 
2000). Gennan banks have played a central role in the historical development of 
Gennan corporations. They were among the primary financiers of Gennan 
industrialization and of the great wave of company foundings of the 1870s (Jurgens, 
Naumann and Rupp, 2000), thereby laying the foundation for the prominent role of the 
banks in company financing and supervision. Apart from controlling significant 
share holdings in most of the largest Gennan finns (Baums and Fraune, 1995), banks 
also represent individual shareholders through proxy voting. Since banks often hold 
significant shares over long periods of time, they also have both the incentive and the 
ability to engage in extensive and ongoing monitoring of the finn. 
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One channel by which the internal institutional environment can influence the adoption 
of ESO schemes is intra-organizational imprinting. Imprinting is a process of 
institutionalization that creates reality for a firm in its own internal environment (Berger 
and Luckmann, 1967; Zucker, 1977). With imprinting, once a practice or decision has 
been implemented, it reduces the likelihood of alternatives being used in future 
decisions. As the frequency of adoption of a practice grows, it becomes a "taken for 
granted" approach (Zucker, 1977; March, 1981) that becomes difficult to change 
(Mezias, 1990). For banks, the adoption of ESOs marks a radical change in the status 
quo. Their fear stems from the wave of changes in corporate governance which one day 
may directly affect them. German banks may have traditionally been more interested in 
keeping corporations as profitable debtors (Cheffins, 2003) rather than taking the risk of 
losing these clients due to increased profits, arguably following a profit-enhancing stock 
based pay scheme. We therefore predict that banks will lead resistance to the adoption 
of ESOs. 
H6f1: ESO adoption will be negatively associated with the proportion of bank 
ownership. 
H6f2: Firms with a higher proportion of bank ownership will be later adopters of ESOs. 
Besides these hypotheses (H6alIH6a2-H6f1IH6f2) relying on power dependencies, it 
must be recognized that capacity for action must also buttress motivation if reform is to 
occur. Actual reform requires the skills, competencies and resources (line g in Figure 
3.4) needed to achieve, and function with, a new template (Clarke, 1994; Nadler and 
Tushman, 1989). Thus, capacity for action embraces different kinds of resources: 
financial, human and technological etc. Sherer and Lee (2002) consider that resource 
endowments are linked with the prestige of an organization, important to the initiation 
of change in many organizational fields. Large organizations with prestige may have the 
legitimacy and access to resources to act as initial and early adopters (Rogers, 1995). 
Therefore, we propose: 
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H7a: ESO adoption will be positively associated with the size and prominence of finns 
on capital markets. 
H7b: Larger finns will be earlier adopters of ESOs 
Networks are a resource that does not appear in conventional financial statements, yet 
repeated exposure to reformed templates in contacts with trading partners can be an 
important source of information on reforms. Thus, inviting equity ownership by 
foreigners, participating in foreign product and capital markets, adopting International 
Accounting Standards (lAS) or American Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
(GAAP) could all be considered as part of the process of de-institutionalizing a 
corporate governance system. Such activities may facilitate the process of change. 
Oliver (1992: 577) claims that: " ... firms that diversify their operations into other sectors 
or markets, particularly in different countries are likely to be exposed to alternative 
organizational customs ... " 
It has also been suggested that greater exposure to international product markets may 
encourage a firm to move towards a shareholder value orientation (Hansmann and 
Kraakman, 2001; Vitols, 2001). Competition in international product markets may bring 
German firms in direct contact with American firms, for example, and executives may 
make direct comparisons with their own pay packages, stimulating mimetic 
isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). This implies: 
H8a: Greater foreign links will be positively associated with the adoption of ESOs. 
H8b: Firms with greater foreign links will be earlier adopters of ESOs. 
Besides these thirteen pairs of hypotheses (26 in all) developed from neo-
institutional and innovation diffusion theories, other variables are proposed as 
controls in empirical tests, without formal hypothesizing. As with peripherality, 
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embeddedness may be related to the age of the firm, which is included here as 
a control, plus debt-to-equity ratio (leverage) as a possible influence on 
executive pay packages through risk mechanisms (Gray and Cannella, 1997). 
In addition, time may have an influence on ESO adoption through the 
legislative process. 
With these hypotheses and controls in hand, the next section concludes this 
chapter, to be followed by Chapter 5 that covers sources of data used to test 
these hypotheses. 
4.5 Summary 
This chapter is important to the thesis in formulating a set of research hypotheses 
relating to the convergence of German executive pay in general and to the adoption of 
ESOs in particular. This process was achieved by firstly, discussing the rationale for 
generating hypotheses from neo-institutional theory, noting in particular the persistence 
of German institutions known especially to be embedded in their social context. It was 
also noted that the implicit aim of US-style ESOs, of maximizing shareholder value, 
remains incompatible with the concept of the German firm as a social institution and its 
sense of Gemeinschaft created to enhance community welfare. 
Attempting to show the organizational dynamics involved in a decision such as the 
adoption of ESOs at firm level, this chapter developed a set of testable hypotheses that 
recognise the reality of institutional change that will help to answer the research 
questions which were again restated in this chapter. Thus, it has been hypothesized that 
the extent of a German firm's dependence on American investors is associated with 
ESO adoption. The same has been hypothesized for the proportion of foreign 
ownership, size and prominence of firms on the capital markets, dispersed ownership, 
block-holdings, value commitment, the peripherality of firms and the extent of foreign 
links. On the other hand, a negative relationship is expected for labour power, state 
ownership, family ownership and bank ownership. 
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The hypotheses are presented in patrs, reflecting the two levels of the research 
questions: the general adoption of ESOs and the early/late characteristics of Gennan 
finns' ESO adoption. 
The next chapter discusses the process of data collection and suggests the most 
appropriate methods to test the hypotheses generated in this chapter. 
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Data and Methodology 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter developed the hypotheses to be tested in this study. Chapter Five 
discusses data collection and the statistical method to be used to test the hypotheses. 
Data for this study were collected from various sources using a number of methods. To 
perform tests on the data, logistic regression analysis is used following the unavoidable 
nature of the dependent variable: adoption or non-adoption of ESOs. 
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 5.2 explains the philosophical approach 
behind the research i.e. the epistemological and ontological issues of the study. Section 
5.3 explains choice of sample, an overview of the data collection strategy and 
specifically how data on dependent, independent and control variables were collected. 
Section 5.4 is a discussion of event history analysis in logistic regression. Statistical 
models to be tested are also shown under this section. Section 5.5 gives a brief 
explanation of how the SPSS software handles logistic regression, especially the main 
issues of model fit and regression coefficients. The final section, 5.6, summarizes and 
concludes the chapter. 
5.2 The Philosophical Approach of the Study 
Lawson (1997) asserts that every philosophy presupposes a reality. This implies that the 
interpretation of behaviour must take into account the vantage point from which it is 
observed, and indeed "where you stand can influence what you see" (Fischer, 1998: 
128). As a result, the epistemological stance of any research work influences its design 
and the methods used for data collection. Epistemological issues concern the question of 
what is or should be regarded as acceptable knowledge in a discipline. A central issue in 
this context is the question of whether the social world can and should be studied 
117 
5. Data and Methodology 
according to the same principles, procedures and ethos as the natural SCIences. An 
epistemological position that advocates the application of the methods of the natural 
sciences to the study of social reality, such as the current one, is known as positivism 
(Blaikie, 1993). It is therefore the dominant philosophy of this study. 
The positivist approach, arguably, often designed as a quantitative research, essentially 
proposes that the subject under analysis should be measured through so-called objective 
methods rather than being inferred subjectively through sensation, emotions, reflection 
or intuition (Hussey and Hussey, 1997; Denscombe, 2002a; Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and 
Lowe, 2002). From an ontological perspective, positivist research is conducted in an 
observable and tangible social reality, which is viewed as a complex set of causal 
relations between events which are depicted as an emerging patchwork of relations 
between variables (Blaikie, 1993; Denscombe, 2002b; Easterby-Smith et al., 2002). 
This approach stresses the need for the formulation of hypotheses for empirical testing, 
and searches for causal explanations and fundamental laws, reducing the whole to the 
simplest possible elements in order to facilitate analysis (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002; 
Remenyi, Williams, Money, and Swartz, 1998). Such an approach assumes there are 
independent causes that lead to observed effects and that evidence and prudence are 
important to ensure that findings are generalisable to the wider population, hence the 
employment of a reductionist approach (Remenyi et al., 1998). 
It is clear that this is a simplification of the real world environment, an approach that is 
necessary in order to understand how social constructs work. However, positivism and 
reductionism bring problems, as the real world environment is much more complex than 
simple models may portray; a fact that may suggest the possibility of missing some of 
the most interesting dimensions of social phenomena. Indeed, Giddens (1974) has 
spoken pejoratively about the unsuitability of positivism, while Jung (1995) claims that 
methods borrowed from natural science are far too general and fail to adequately 
manage the subjective variety of individual life. 
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To address these shortcomings, the interpretive or phenomenological approach, which 
tries to understand and explain phenomenon rather than search for external causes for 
fundamental laws (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002; Remenyi, et al., 1998) may be 
employed. 
Notwithstanding this long-standing debate on the appropriateness of the epistemological 
and ontological approach, in reality the positivist and the interpretive approach are not 
entirely different in terms of their impact on research and the generalizability of their 
findings. Indeed, Easterby-Smith et al. (2002) argue that, while it is true that the 
positivist approach is epistemologically different from the interpretive approach, this 
incompatibility is blurred when it comes to actual research. 
These arguments favour the use of a positivist approach in this study. Furthermore, the 
difficulties of obtaining data through interviews or any such method that requires direct 
contact with managers, of German firms, eliminates the use of the interpretive approach 
as an option. Any limitations resulting from the use of a single approach, in this case 
positivism, are, therefore, acknowledged, in light of the justification given above. 
Data collection methods, variables and the statistical methods used In a spirit of 
positivism in this study are discussed in the next subsections. 
5.3 Data 
The sample size, choice and the strategy used to collect data are issues addressed, in this 
subsection, in detail. 
5.3.1 Choice of Sample 
Data was collected from a sample comprising German firms listed in the DAX 100 at 
any time between 1992 and 2003. This yielded a sample n=120. Information disclosure 
by German firms is notoriously thin (Buck and Shahrim, 2005) and so a focus on large, 
DAX firms is inevitable, with the smaller firms of the Mittelstand comprising 
unincorporated partnerships and sole proprietorships that account for around half 
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German GDP, but with even weaker disclosure standards (Edwards and Fischer, 1994). 
In this sense, the sample employed was the population of large German firms, with 
certain adjustments. 
For example, firms with less than eight years of complete data were excluded from the 
sample. Thus, firms established after 1995 were omitted, and firms that stopped 
operating as a result of bankruptcy, amalgamation or acquisition with fewer than eight 
years in the DAX 100 were also excluded. For example, Mannesmann was acquired by 
Vodafone in 2000, but was included in the sample for the period 1992-2000. Firms that 
were DAX 100 members but were wholly owned subsidiaries of other firms in the 
sample were excluded, to avoid double-counting. For example, while RWE-DEA was 
listed, 1992-1998, another firm, RWE AG, held more than 99% of its shares, making 
RWE-DEA a subsidiary of RWE AG. 
Generally a company needs to be listed for at least three years prior to the inclusion of 
its stock in the DAX and the free-floating capital must at least reach 15%. Other 
conditions include the company's turnover and market capitalization. These stringent 
conditions of DAX 100 membership underline the significant importance of large 
German firms in the economy. For example, in 2000, five per cent largest companies 
(42 in number) accounted for 73.5% of total market capitalization (Deutsches 
Aktienstitut, 2001). 
The choice of time period (1992-2003) was determined by changes in corporate 
governance in Germany, that began to occur in the early nineties and are still ongoing. 
Specifically, the German government enacted the first of three Financial Market 
Promotion Laws in 1990, aimed at liberalizing financial regulation and promoting the 
growth of the German stock market, and declarations of shareholder value orientation 
first emerged among German firms around 1992 (Bradley and Sundaram, 2004; Fiss 
and Zajac, 2004). 
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5.3.2 Sample Representativeness 
In relation to the quantitative methodological approach, this study selects a sample from 
a much larger group i.e. the entire population of large (DAXI00) companies in 
Germany over the period 1992-2003. The rationale behind this selection is, first, the 
sample consists of large companies that feature the wide range of governance 
institutions and elements included in the database. Secondly, it comprises large 
corporations that are distributed across Germany and that operate in various industries 
and market sectors. Thus, the sample consists of firms with a wide variety of different 
property forms: state-owned firms, family-dominated or owned, widely dispersed 
ownership firms, and firms with significant block-holders. Similarly, a wide range of 
industries is represented, e.g. construction, manufacturing, services, chemical and 
pharmaceutical, food, engmeenng, transport, clothing, technology and 
telecommunications. 
Finally, the size of the sample is large, which is likely to increase the probability of the 
sample being representative of the population (Hussey and Hussey, 1997; Remenyi et 
al., 1998). It is also noted that companies that are listed on the DAX have an obligation 
to publish annual reports making access to the required data more feasible. However, 
data availability continues to represent a fundamental constraint on progress (Bushman 
and Smith, 2001). 
5.3.3 An Overview of the Data Collection Strategy 
The main approach taken to collect data is that of documentation, consisting of multiple 
published sources, for example in the form of individual company annual reports, proxy 
statements filed with American Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), archives, 
financial reports from the press and financial analysts, books, journals and website 
pages as to promote the achievement of "triangulation" (Denzin, 1970). As will be 
explained later in this chapter, detailed data regarding awarded executive stock option 
schemes are simply not available in other forms. Annual reports and proxy statements 
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however provide a route of gaining access to infonnation relating to Gennan executive 
share option schemes and some scholars have used this approach (e.g. Fiss and Zajac, 
2004; Tuschke and Sanders, 2003; Bradley and Sundaram, 2004). 
Additionally, where annual reports and proxy statements represent meaningful 
constituents of executive stock option schemes adopted by companies, they can be 
considered to be more consequential than verbal utterances particularly where 
executives hesitate to disclose infonnation about their pay. Indeed, Hakim (2000) writes 
that administrative records provide more reliable infonnation than interviews (most 
certainly in Gennany where the institutional environment does not support voluntary 
disclosure) on topics such as annual earnings. 
Talking about the credibility of documentary evidence, Mason (1996) asserts that many 
qualitative researchers see the analysis of documents as a meaningful and appropriate 
method in the context of research strategy. That observations and interviews become 
data when they are transfonned into text emphasizes the inherent credibility of 
documentary data. Indeed, previous studies on executive pay and especially on cross-
country comparisons have also mostly used data sourced from published sources. For 
example, studies using aggregate figures relied on databanks or surveys compiled by 
international consultancies such as Tower Perrin, European Independent Remuneration 
Network (EILN) and several other consultancies. Surveys published by Forbes, 
Business Week and Wall Street Journal although less comprehensive have also been 
utilised (Murphy, 2002). Similarly, where data are required on a more micro level, 
published reports in the fonn of company annual reports and proxy statements filed with 
SEC have been used whether obtained directly or through secondary sources such as 
Datastream, Price W aterhouseCooper' s Corporate Register and Compustat ExecuComp 
database. 
The next subsections, discussing the dependent and independent variables will further 
explain the relevant sources of data for each variable. 
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5.3.4 Dependent Variable 
Information was collected for each year 1992-2003 on whether a firm had adopted an 
ESO, including executive-only schemes, schemes for executives-plus-other managers 
but not all-employee SO schemes. The unit of analysis being the firm-year, each 
observation was coded 1 if the firm adopted an ESO (excluding phantom ESOs, that are 
effectively annual cash bonuses related to share price) in a particular year and 0 
otherwise. 
Data was collected on the composite DAX 100 sample (as defined above, n=120) for 
the years 1992 through 2003. Information on ESOs was compiled from the executive 
compensation reports within companies' annual reports. Unlike large listed firms in the 
USA and UK, German firms rarely provide detailed information on options awarded to 
individual directors, exercise prices etc., so option values cannot be estimated. This is 
mainly because German law requires the disclosure of the aggregate amount paid to the 
group of top executives. Another common objection to the disclosure of executive stock 
options is that such disclosure breaches individual privacy. 
Moreover, executive stock option schemes were only made legal in 1998 (as discussed 
in Chapter 2), and there is no national body collecting aggregate statistics and neither 
are there publicly available databases listing information on executive stock options. 
German companies adopting executive stock option schemes only have to announce 
their intention in the Federal Bulletin (Bundesanzeiger) without disclosing details of 
their schemes. 
Information on executive pay only became public recently when German corporations 
started to issue Level II and ill ADRs on the American Stock Exchanges. Issuers of 
ADRs are required by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) to file proxy 
statements disclosing details about their stock option plans, although this is limited to 
the aggregate remuneration for the whole board of directors, in their financial accounts 
under notes to the balance sheet and profit and loss statement. 
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However, it is still possible to test hypotheses in relation to the dates of option adoption 
(as this information is available from the companies' annual reports), so this 
information was collected. In any case this study is not on how much is paid but is 
aimed at changes in the philosophy of executive pay and of executive stock options 
adoption in particular. 
Where the date of adoption was not stated or appeared vaguely in annual reports, the 
investor relations departments of firms were contacted directly. Journal publications on 
German corporate governance in general and on executive compensation in particular 
(e.g. Bradley and Sundaram, 2004) were used as supplementary sources of information 
on ESOs. 
5.3.5 Independent Variables 
Information was collected for each year 1992-2003 for each firm. Dependence on 
American capital markets (H1a and H1b) is represented by whether firms have 
American Depository Receipts (ADRs, at levels 2 or 3) on US exchanges (AMEX, 
NASDAQ, and NYSE), coded 1, and 0 otherwise. This data was obtained from the 
website: www.adr.comaswellasdirectlyfromthesethreeexchanges.This information 
was cross-checked for reliability with companies' annual reports and Form 20-Fs 
supplied to the U.S. Stock Exchange Commission. 
In relation to (H2a and H2b), the foreign ownership of German firms was established 
from a number of sources. A database derived from Hoppenstedt AktienfiIhrer (Share 
Gazette) was the principal source of ownership data for the majority of firmsl. This 
database was checked with and complemented by data taken from Deutsches 
Aktieninstitut (DAI) and directly from companies' annual reports. Where data was 
incomplete, investor relations departments of firms were again contacted directly. 
1 Thanks to Prof Stefan Winter of Bochum University for his enormous help with this data. 
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Firm performance (H3a and H3b) was measured for each year by an accounting-based 
variable, namely Return on Assets (ROA) from Datastream International, Thomson 
Financial and Deutsche Borse. ROA is taken as the ratio of net income to total average 
assets, expressed as a percentage. ROA has been used in many studies to proxy for firm 
performance (e.g. Bhagat and Black, 2002; Botosan and Plumlee, 2001) and is arguably 
a better measure than Return on Equity (Barber and Lyon, 1996). 
In relation to peripherality (H4a and H4b), firms were coded 1 if not in the DAX 30 (the 
thirty largest German firms) during each observation year and 0 otherwise. German 
DAX 30 firms may be considered as the organizations that are centrally located within 
an institutional context as most of the institutional pressures (regulatory, political and 
cultural) bear on them (Leblebici et ai. (1991). As a practical short-cut, membership of 
the DAX 30 group of the biggest firms in Germany is used to define core firms, with 
other firms in the DAX 100 but outside the DAX 30 being peripheral. 
For (HSa and HSb), the dependence of the accounting system used by firms on 
American standards (i.e. lAS, US GAAP or HGB, where the latter represents the 
German standard) was again obtained from annual reports and the Deutsche Borse 
website at www.deutscheboerse.de. To complete missing data, companies' annual 
reports were again searched and the investor relations departments contacted. Firms 
were coded 1 for using either International Accounting Standards (lAS), now known as 
International Financial Reporting Standards (!FRS), or US GAAP, and 0 for German 
GAAP commonly known as HGB. 
Consistent, with Fiss and Zajac (2004), the adoption of lAS or US GAAP accounting 
standards is used in this study as a measure of value commitment. An alternative 
approach could have been that used by Bradley and Sundaram (2004) where value 
commitment is measured by the number of times the phrase "shareholder value" is used 
in the directors' annual report. The use of lAS or US GAAP is a much more practical 
way of demonstrating commitment to shareholder value maximization, rather than 
relying on mere statements that may be used ceremonially. 
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Data on firms' ownership proportions and ownership concentration (various subsets of 
H6) were taken from a number of sources, as described for H2a and H2b, above. 
To measure the interests and power dependence of employees (H6a1 and H6a2), the 
percentage of personnel costs on total sales was obtained from Datastream International , 
supplemented by Thomson Financial and Deutsche Borse. One great possibility for this 
variable could have been employee supervisory board representation. However, German 
co-determination law eliminates employee representation as a possible measure of 
power dependency, as it decrees uniformity, without variation in employee 
representation in large firms. This is because, where a firm has at least 2000 employees, 
50% of the supervisory board members should be employees' representatives. Using the 
number of employees is unsuitable either as this has been used in past studies as a proxy 
for firm size. 
A dichotomous variable was used to measure State ownership (H6b 1 and H6b2), coded 
1 if State (Federal or Land) ownership exceeded 10% and was the largest block-holder, 
and 0 otherwise. The same criterion and dummy variables were used for family 
ownership (H6c1 and H6c2). Information on dispersed shareholdings and block-
holdings was taken from the Hoppenstedt Aktienfiihrer (see above). With the intention 
of investigating whether the institutional ownership of the state or not makes a 
difference in a firm adopting an ESOs, the study used a dummy variable. To measure 
the influence of these ownership variables on power dependencies, an alternative 
measure could have involved the representation of their respective ownership groups on 
the supervisory board (e.g. number of board members representing state, family, etc 
ownership. However, the categorical divisions of the supervisory board tends to be 
restricted to banks' and employees' representatives, usually in rigid proportions offering 
little variation in independent variables (Vitols, 2004; Buck and Shahrim, 2005; Conyon 
and Schwalbach, 2000b). 
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The logarithm of total assets (H7a and H7b) comprised a variable representing the 
prestige and abundance of resources available to a finn, with total assets for each year 
obtained from Datastream International, Thomson Financial and Deutsche Borse. A 
finn's assets is a representation of its value, hence an abundance of resources and 
capabilities. However, this measure has also been used in the literature to proxy for firm 
SIze. 
Regarding the extent of foreign links, (H8a and H8b) the ratio for foreign to total sales 
was obtained for each firm from the same sources. This ratio, commonly known as 
export intensity, has often been used as a measure of a finn's internationalisation (e.g. 
Filatotchev, Dyomina, Wright, and Buck, 2001). In the absence of more suitable 
measures, like Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) this measure suffices to proxy for how 
globally networked a finn is. Of course, the imports ratio could have been an alternative 
and at best a complement, but obtaining data on imports proved very difficult. Equally, 
a more direct measure of foreign links pertaining particularly to the phenomenon under 
observation (i.e. adoption of ESOs) could have been finn sales to the USA. However, 
data on foreign sales to the US is often presented at country and industry levels. 
Using an inter-library search, the Thomson Financial European Handbooks were located 
in a number of University libraries. From De Montfort University the 1997 Thomson 
Financial European Handbook was used; University of Leicester for the 2000 
handbook, Aston University for the 1998 and 1999 handbooks. Earlier editions of these 
handbooks (1991-1994) were located at the British Library in London. 
5.3.6 Control Variables 
Two control variables were used, namely finn age and debt-to-equity ratio. The 
rationale for controlling for age of the finn is that because older finns are more 
experienced they would be in a position to determine the future benefits of ESO 
adoption or the implications of non-adoption of a new management practice. 
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German firms have in the past relied heavily on banks to finance their projects. This 
situation has given greater control to banks on what goes on within firms. As banks are 
likely to be opposed to any form of change that may destabilise their power we control 
for debt-to-equity ratio. 
The Deutsche Borse website was useful in identifying the date on which firms were 
established, and firm ages were obtained for each year by subtracting the observation 
year by the firm's founding year. These estimates were cross-checked with data taken 
from Europe's 15,000 Largest Companies Handbook (1999). Debt-to-equity ratios were 
obtained from Datastream International, supplemented by Thomson Financial and 
Deutsche Borse. Finally, year dummies were introduced for each year after beginning 
from 1996. The first ESO adoption, in Germany, was in 1996, and in 1998 ESOs were 
fully legalized. The purpose of these year dummies is to pick up any effects of 
regulatory change and any other time-specific institutional changes. 
5.4 Methodology 
The context of this thesis is, as stated earlier, the adoption and diffusion of executive 
stock options in an institutional environment where such a form of compensation has 
been historically regarded as being antithetical to the dominant and taken-for-granted 
corporate governance logic (Vitols, 2004). As recently as less than ten years ago, 
almost no German firms offered stock-based pay to top executives; by the end of 2001, 
almost 50% of the largest one-hundred firms (DAX 100) had done so. 
In following the traditional diffusion model, most previous studies have employed a 
binary dependent variable for adoption (e.g. Westphal and Zajac, 1994; Tuschke and 
Sanders, 2003), and this thesis follows the same approach. Thus, the key data for the 
dependent variable is knowledge of the existence or otherwise of a company's stock 
option plan. We used a dichotomous variable to designate whether a firm had adopted a 
stock-based incentive plan. 
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First, (in Models 1A and 1B) we looked at whether a finn adopted ESOs in any given 
year or not. For adopting finns, the dependent variable is an indicator dummy variable 
equal to one in the year in which the finn first adopts ESOs. The dependent variable is 
equal to zero for all finn-years prior to the adoption year, and finn-years subsequent to 
the adoption year are removed from the sample. For non-adopting finns, the dependent 
variable is set equal to zero for all years that the finn is in sample. This approach is 
similar to the one used by Kato, Lemmon, Luo and Schallheim (2003) and follows a 
popular methodology of event history analysis (see below). The first step yielded the 
first dependent variable (ESO-adopt) which simply considered the adoption or non-
adoption situation without specific timing considerations. 
Secondly (in Models 2 and 3), on the basis of adoption theory we expect that the factors 
explaining the adoption of innovations (ESOs) will not be stable over the diffusion 
process but will change as subsequent companies adopt stock options. 
Thus, to compare the effects of the independents on the likelihood of stock options 
adoption at two different points in time, (early/later adoption) we specified two logistic 
regression equations, one for each dichotomous dependent variable. The first equation 
(Model 2) refers to early adoption versus non-adoption, the second (Model 3) refers to 
later adoption versus non-adoption. ESO adoption is classified before and up to 1998 as 
early adoption since legislation allowing the "official" use of them was passed in 1998. 
Prior to 1998 finns had managed to use de facto ESOs. Thus, as the economic and 
corporate governance of Gennany has been changing, we divide the time periods of 
stock options adoption as shown in Table 5.1 
Three classifications of the dependent variable are considered. 
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Table 5.1: Defining the dependent variables 
Model Period Dependent variable Variable definition 
1 (A and B) 1992-2003 ESO-adopt 1 for adoption 0 otherwise 
2 1992-1998 Early-ESO- adopt 1 for adoption 0 otherwise 
3 1999 - 2003 Later-ESO- adopt 1 for adoption 0 otherwise 
Whereas the first step considers the adoption status of the firm, the second step goes 
beyond that by recognising the timing of stock options adoption, thus systematically 
investigating shifts in adoption stimulating factors that enable to better understand the 
processes and dynamics behind the adoption of executive stock options in Germany. To 
analyse the determinants of ESOs adoption, certain statistical techniques are used and 
this is the subject matter of the next sections. 
5.4.1 Event History Analysis 
An event history is a longitudinal record of when events happened to a sample of 
individuals or collectivities (Allison, 1984). Demographers, for example, study 
individual life events such as deaths, births, migrations, marriages, etc. In this study we 
look at the event of adopting ESOs by firms. 
Occurrence of an event assumes a preceding time interval that represents non-
occurrence. More specifically, a certain time period of duration must exist in order for 
an occurrence to be recognised as an event. Moreover, the occurrence should represent a 
change consisting of a relatively sharp disjunction between what precedes and what 
follows. In our case, German firms have up until 1995 not been using ESOs to pay their 
executives. Stock option adoption represents a new form of executive compensation. 
This makes the adoption of stock options by German firms an "event". 
130 
5. Data and Methodology 
To apply event history methods one needs event history data-a longitudinal record of 
when key events occurred for some individual or organization (Allison, 1984). For 
example from a sample of firms one could record the dates of when they adopted a 
management innovation like ESOs. These dates could be recorded on a daily, monthly 
or yearly basis. Where the event history data is a recorded at very close intervals e.g. 
hourly or even daily, continuous-time models can be estimated. On the other hand if the 
adoption of a practice or event is recorded on an annual basis, discrete-time models can 
be estimated. In this study it is the discrete-time model that is of relevance. 
5.4.2 Discrete-Time Models 
Discrete-time models assume that the event of interest occurs only at discrete time 
points. In this study, we focus on discrete-time, non-repeatable and one-way transition 
events. One-way transition events imply that firms which had not adopted stock-based 
compensation schemes do it for the first time and the reverse is not acceptable. Thus, we 
do not consider a situation where firms had ESOs and then decided to get rid of them at 
some stage. Non-repeatability refers a situation where firms adopt ESOs only once. 
Although firms often introduce stock options at irregular intervals after the initial 
adoption, that scenario is not relevant for this study. 
Two major alternatives exist for modelling discrete-time event history data: 
proportional hazards models and logit models. The most commonly used proportional 
hazard model is the Cox Regression and the logit model commonly used for event 
history data is logistic regression. 
For this study we use a discrete-time logit model: logistic regression model. Our choice 
of a logit model over a proportional hazard model like the Cox regression is based on 
two main reasons. Firstly, the timing of ESOs adoption in our study does not take the 
date and month into consideration, but simply the year of adoption. The use of discrete-
time logit is normal practice when measurement is based on discrete times of fairly 
large intervals (such as years) and when the event of interest sometimes occurs for a 
substantial number of organizations at the same time, as is the case in this study 
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(Yamaguchi, 1991). Thus, the main advantage of the discrete time model over the 
continuous model is that it does not require exact information on the timing of events 
and is thus well suited to handling the problem of "ties" on the dependent variable. 
Events are "tied" when two or more subjects in the sample have the event at the same 
time. The presence of many ties can lead to a serious bias in parameter estimates when 
using proportional hazard models like Cox's method (Yamaguchi, 1991). On the other 
hand, discrete-time models following logistic regression can handle ties without 
introducing bias in parameter estimates. Accelerated failure models such as exponential, 
Gomperz, and Wei bull model are not appropriate either since this study uses time-
varying covariates. 
Secondly, Cox regression uses the partial-likelihood (PL) method whereas logistic 
regression uses maximum-likelihood (ML) method, which not only handles ties well, but 
also permits direct analysis of time-dependent covariates (Yamaguchi, 1991). 
Thus, a practical advantage of the discrete-time logit model compared with the discrete-
time proportional hazards model is that we can use a logistic regression program for 
estimating parameters. Additionally, the interpretation of logistic regression output, 
very much like linear, non-logistic regression, is easy. 
The structure of the input data, however, differs between the conventional logistic 
regression analysis and the use of logistic regression for the analysis of discrete-time 
event history data. While the former uses one observation for each sample subject, the 
latter uses multiple observations for each. Accordingly, the input data for the logistic 
regression must be arranged in a specific way. 
For each sample subject, i.e. for each firm in the sample and for each discrete time point 
at which the firm is at risk for having the event, the firm-year record file contains 
information about the occurrence or non-occurrence of the event in question. The file 
also contains for each year the values of time-dependent and time-independent 
variables. This is one area of difference between not only the conventional logistic 
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regression analysis at data structure level, but also between event history analysis and 
linear regression. Further differences are discussed below. 
5.4.3 Event History Analysis and Censored Data 
The occurrence or non-occurrence of an event produces a dichotomous dependent 
variable. Linear regression is not suitable for dichotomous dependent variables. Apart 
from this problem, there are further complications with event history data (which further 
dismisses the use of linear regression) sometimes referred to as survival data: censoring 
and time-dependent covariates (called time-varying explanatory variables). 
Censoring exists when incomplete information is available about the duration of the risk 
of occurrence of an event because of a limited observation period. Censoring comes in 
many forms and occurs for many different reasons. The most basic distinction is 
between left censoring and right censoring. Technically, an observation on a variable T 
is right censored if all you know about T is that it is greater than some value c. In event 
history analysis, T is typically the time of occurrence for some event, and cases are right 
censored because observation is terminated before the event occurs. Thus if T is the 12th 
year of observation in a sample of companies (where adoption of stock options is the 
event) and we know that T>12, in which case, the company's adoption time is right 
censored at the 12th year. 
Symmetrically, left censoring occurs when all you know about an observation on a 
variable T is that it is less than some value, in this case T<l, where 1 is the first 
observation year. 
Thus, a major strength of event history analysis is its ability to handle censored data. 
5.4.4 Logistic Regression Model 
Logistic regression is a mathematical modelling approach that can be used to describe 
the relationship between several independent variables and a dichotomous dependent 
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variable (Long, 1997; Menard, 1995). Logistic regression applies maximum likelihood 
estimation after transforming the dependent into a logit variable as explained below. 
Thus, logistic regression estimates the probability of an event occurring. 
5.4.5 Logistic Regression and Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Compared. 
Logistic regression has many analogies to OLS regression: logit coefficients correspond 
to beta coefficients in OLS, the standardized logit coefficients correspond to beta 
weights, and a pseudo R square is available to summarize the strength of the 
relationship. Unlike OLS regression, however, logistic regression does not assume the 
linearity of any relationship between the independent variables and the dependent 
variable; does not require normally distributed variables, and does not assume 
homoscedasticity. In other words, it places less stringent requirements on the data. 
However, logistic regression requires that observations are independent and that the 
independent variables be linearly related to the logit of the dependent variable. 
5.4.6 Logistic function 
To explain the usefulness of logistic regression, we explain here the logistic function, 
which describes the mathematical form on which the logistic model is based. 
The logistic function is shown mathematically as: f ( z ) 1 [5.1] 
Plotting the values of this function as z varies from - 00 to + 00 , the function takes an 
asymptotic form between 0 and 1. 
When z = - 00, the logistic function f (z) equals O. On the right side, when z = + 00 , 
then f (z) equals 1. This situation can be demonstrated mathematically: 
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= 0 [5.2] 
[5.3] 
Thus, as the function describes, the range of fez) is between 0 and 1, regardless of the 
value of z. 
The fact that the logistic function f(z) ranges between 0 and 1 is the primary reason 
why the logistic model is suitable for a dichotomous dependent variable. The model is 
designed to describe a probability, which is always some number between 0 and 1. 
Another reason why the logistic model would be the most appropriate for this thesis 
derives from the shape of the logistic function. 
As shown in the Figure 5.1, if we start at: z = -00, and move to the right, then as z 
increases, the value of f (z) hovers close to 0 for a while, then starts to increase 
dramatically toward 1, and finally levels off around 1 as z increases toward + 00. The 
result is an elongated, S-shaped picture. 
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Figure 5.1: The logistic function: f ( z) - 1 
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This situation represents the view that many studies on adoption of innovations have 
shown (e.g. the diffusion across organizations of practices such as corporate 
acquisitions (Haunschild, 1993), poison pills (Davis, 1991), golden parachutes (Davis 
and Greve, 1997), technological innovations (Ahuja, 2000), total quality management 
techniques (Westphal, Gulati and Shortell, 1997), and the multidivisional fonn (palmer, 
Jennings and Zhou, 1993). 
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Thus, for this study, the starting point is when not a single finn has adopted stock 
options. Adoption starts in small numbers and, as predicted and discussed in the 
conceptual model (in Chapter 3), more finns join in greater numbers, only to slow down 
again towards the end of the adoption era. 
The logit fonn (see Appendix 5.1) is the basis on which we design the models to test 
hypotheses for this thesis. 
5.4.7 Logit Models for German ESOs Adoption 
As outlined above, we test three models with the dependent variables: adopt, early -
adopt and late - adopt. 
Thus, Allison (1984) is followed in using discrete time event history analysis to conduct 
a logistic regression: 
Log P(ESO t ) 
1- P(ESO t ) 
[5.4] 
where, P( ESO t) is the probability of a finn adopting an ESO at time t. The tenn 
a t implies that the hazard rate for adoption varies across time. To estimate at' a set of 
seven year dummies was entered (see Model IB below). ~ stands for the parameter 
estimates and X t represents the independent variable at time t. Estimates of parameter 
~ are obtained using maximum likelihood. This method as explained above treats the 
data as quasi-cross-sectional; if a finn adopts ESOs in the first year of observation, i.e. 
1992, it contributes one finn-year, and at year two, two finn years and so on. Non-
adopting finns contribute as many finn-years as there are in the sample. Thus each of 
the censored finns contributes a maximum of n finn-years, where n is the longest time 
interval. 
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The first model tests the overall adoption situation by German firms between 1992 and 
2003. This model does not consider specific timing of stock options adoption. The 
model to be tested relates to the entire observation period from 1992 through 2003. 
5.4.7.1 Adoption of ESOs: 1992-2003 
Specifically, we test the model: 
Logit (early-ESO-adopt) = a + fJ 1 USinvestors it + fJ 2 Foreign ownership it + fJ 3 
Profitability it + fJ 4 Peripherality it + fJ 5 Value commitment it + fJ 6 
Labour cost it + fJ 7 State ownership it + fJ 8 Family ownership it + fJ 9 Dispersed 
ownership it + fJ 10 Block ownership it + fJ 11 Bank ownership it + fJ 12 Firm size it + fJ 13 
Foreign sales it + Cit [5.5] 
Where; a is the unknown intercept and fJ is the unknown coefficient. 
To capture the effect of time on the adoption of ESOs, a second equation (Model IB) 
with the same dependent variable and independent variables as in the one above, plus 
year dummies is estimated. We also estimate early and late adoption of ESOs using the 
same specified model designated as Models 2 and 3 respectively. 
To fit these models and carry out subsequent analysis, Version 13 of SPSS was used. 
The next section discusses the evaluation of logistic regression models, particularly how 
to assess the model goodness-of-fit and interpretation of regression coefficients. 
5.5 Evaluation of the Logistic Regression Model 
Once the model has been built and predictions produced, it is necessary to determine 
how effective that model is at predicting the dependent variable. This is referred to as 
goodness-oj-fit. 
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The F ratio and R2 tests are commonly used to determine the significance (goodness-
of-fit) of the more familiar linear regression models. In some cases, random sampling 
variation in the data can produce an improvement in prediction by using the regression 
equation even when the independent variables are unrelated to the dependent variable. 
The multivariate F ratio test is used to ascertain whether a reduction in error of 
prediction is caused by these sampling variations, or whether there is truly a relationship 
between the independent variables and the dependent variable. The coefficient of 
determination, or R2 , measures the proportion by which use of the regression equation 
reduces the error of prediction. In other words, it determines whether the relationship is 
substantial enough to be significant. 
To analyze goodness-of-fit for the logistic regression models used in this study, close 
parallels to the F and R2 tests were used. In logistic regression the G M statistic is 
analogous to the F test in linear regression (Menard, 1995; Hosmer and Lemeshow, 
1989). 
To obtain the G M statistic the following process takes place using SPSS software. 
Before independent variables are entered into the logistic regression model, the -2£og 
Likelihood or -2LL (which approximates a chi-square distribution) for the model with 
only the intercept constant (a) is given. This intercept-only -2LL is designated Do 
(designated as Lo by Hosmer and Lemeshow, 1989) to indicate that none (zero) of the 
independent variables were included in the equation. In SPSS, this value is located at 
the beginning of the output and is labelled "Initial Log Likelihood Function". Do is 
analogous to the total sum of squares (SST) in linear regression analysis (Menard, 
1995). 
At each additional step in the logistic regression procedure a new -2LL value is 
determined. This -2LL statistic is produced using only those independent variables 
included at that step and the intercept. This statistic is referred to as D M n (n denoting 
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2 
the step number in the logistic regression procedure) or the deviation X for the full 
model. D M n is analogous to the error sum of squares (SSE) in linear regression 
analysis and indicates how poorly the model fits with the independent variables in the 
equation (Menard, 1995). 
Taking the difference between Do and D M' that is (Do - D M)' gives the model G M' In 
SPSS G M is labelled as "Model Chi-Square". G M is not only analogous to the 
multivariate F test, but also to the regression sum of squares (SSR) that is, SSR=SST-
SSE (Menard, 1995). Thus, G M provides a test of the null hypothesis that Pl= P2= ... 
Pk = a for the logistic regression model. If G M is statistically significant, then the null 
hypothesis can be rejected, and it can be concluded that the independent variables 
contribute to better predictions. 
Analogous to R2 or (SSR ) for linear regression IS the R2L statistic for logistic 
SST 
regression. R2L indicates how much the inclusion of the independent variables in the 
model reduces the badness-of-fit Do chi-square statistic. R2L varies between a 
(independent variables are useless in prediction of dependent variable) and 1 
(independent variables in model predict the dependent variable perfectly), and IS 
calculated by dividing the Model Chi-Square (G M) by the Initial Log Likelihood 
Function -2LL (D oJ thus: R2L = G M 
Do 
[5.9] 
Another goodness of fit test is the Hosmer and Lemeshow. The test divides subjects into 
deciles based on predicted probabilities, then computes a chi-square from observed and 
expected frequencies. Then a probability value is computed from the chi-square 
distribution with 8 degrees of freedom to test the fit of the logistic model. A good model 
should have a Hosmer and Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test statistic greater than 0.05 i.e. 
it must be insignificant. This is because the null hypothesis that there is no difference 
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between the predicted and observed values of the dependent variable must be accepted 
(Hosmer and Lemeshow, 1989). Such a situation means that the model's estimates fit 
the data at an acceptable level i.e. well-fitting models show nonsignificance on the 
Hosmer and Lemeshow goodness-of -fit test. 
Finally, the success of the logistic regressIon can be assessed by looking at the 
classification table showing correct and incorrect classifications of the dependent 
variable. SPSS produces these statistics. A large percentage of correct case 
classification is an indication of good model fit. 
5.5.1 Interpreting the Logistic Regression Coefficients 
Within the framework of inferential statistics, the null hypothesis states that ~ equals 
zero, or there is no linear relationship in the population. Rejecting such a null 
hypothesis implies that a linear relationship exists between the independent variable and 
the logit of the dependent variable. In linear regression, the slope ~ tells us the change in 
the dependent variable given a one unit change in the independent variable. In logistic 
regression, the logit transformation must be used and the slope coefficient "represents 
the change in the logit for a change in one unit in the independent variable" (Hosmer 
and Lemeshow, 1989: 39). In both linear and logistic regressions, ~ coefficients can be 
positive or negative. Thus, like other regression analyses, logistic regression still looks 
at the relationship between variables of interest as the core focus of analysis. A positive 
coefficient indicates that an increase in the corresponding variable is associated with a 
greater likelihood of an event taking place, e.g. the adoption of an ESO scheme. 
Conversely, a negative coefficient indicates that a decrease in the corresponding 
variable is associated with a greater likelihood of adopting an ESO scheme. 
Moreover, logistic regression effectively uses the concept of the odds ratio as its 
measure of association. Indeed, DeMaris (1986: 6) states that, " .. .in categorical and 
dichotomous data analysis, 'the effect' of one variable upon another is best expressed in 
terms of odds ratios". While odds are the ratio of events (e.g. adoption of ESOs) to non-
events, odds ratios can be considered as ratio of two odds (Morgan and Teachman, 
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1988) Odds ratios are obtained by "exponentiating" the coefficients or log-odds (i.e. 
taking their antilogs). That is, if ~ is the coefficient, computing exp(~), that is raising the 
number e (approximately 2.718) to the ~ power. The interpretation is then as follows: 
For each unit increase in an explanatory variable, the likelihood is multiplied by its 
"exponentiated" coefficient. Further, computing 100[exp(~)-1] gives the percentage 
change in the probability with each one unit change in the explanatory variable. 
Put simply, the odds ratio approximates how much more likely (or unlikely) it is for the 
outcome to be present among firms with certain characteristics than among those 
without the same characteristics (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 1989). For example, if the 
odds ratio exp(~) of ESO adoption is 2 for firms with American Depositary Receipts, we 
could say that finns with ADRs are twice as likely to adopt ESOs than those without 
other variables held constant. 
Additionally, the interpretation of 100[exp(~)-1] ,which gives the percentage change in 
the probability with each one unit change in the explanatory variable is also very useful. 
For example, if the regression coefficient for the variable foreign ownership is 0.022, 
then 100[exp(0.022)-1] would equal 2.3. The interpretation of this result would be: a 
percentage point increase in foreign ownership increases the probability of adopting 
ESOs by 2.3%. 
It is important, however, to note that the odds ratio [i.e. exp(~)] is not a separate 
measure of the relationship between the dependent variable and the independent 
variables. It contains the same information as the logistic regression coefficient. All that 
is different is the way in which the information is presented. In particular, the odds ratio 
cannot take the place of a standardized logistic regression coefficient for evaluating the 
strength of the influences of the independent variables on the dependent variable. 
It is also important to note that odds ratio do not place a figure on the probability of an 
event taking place, rather it is a measure of association between the event and the non-
event (e.g. adoption versus non-adoption of ESOs). For this study, it is not the absolute 
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value of the probability of adoption that is important. The study seeks to show the 
behaviour of adopting firms vis-a-vis non-adopting ones. For that reason the 
interpretation of odds ratios (which is a measure of association between the event and 
non-event) is the most appropriate. 
However, absolute probability values, though not important in this study (and not 
shown in SPSS) can be easily calculated by using odds values through the following 
ratio: ODDS 
1+ ODDS 
Finally, the statistical significance of individual regression coefficients (i.e., ~s) is tested 
using the Wald chi-square statistic, in the same way the t-statistic is used in OLS. 
5.6 Summary 
This chapter has discussed data collection and the methodology pursued in both the 
collection and analysis. It started by discussing the philosophical approach of this study, 
which is positivism following the quantitative method of data collection and analysis. 
However, data collection in Germany is not an easy task although the situation seems to 
be improving as more and more German firms are moving towards a culture of financial 
transparency. Data for this thesis pertains to large German firms, all listed and with at 
least eight years data for the period 1992-2003. The choice of this sample not only 
allows easy access to data via databases and annual reports, but is also the most suitable 
given that ESOs, by definition, would not be an issue for small, unquoted firms of the 
Mittelstand. 
Data for the defined sample was collected from a number of sources including 
Datastream, annual reports, investor-relations departments, companies' websites, 
Securities Exchange Commission filings, American Stock Exchanges and the Deutsche 
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Borse websites. The rationale of using this data collection strategy over interviews was 
gIVen. 
Given that the dependent variable is taken as whether an ESO was adopted or not in a 
given year, discrete time event history analysis is followed. This approach uses logistic 
regression. The choice of event history analysis of logistic regression over other 
methods like proportional hazard models (e.g. Cox regression) is determined by the 
time-varying covariates used in this study. 
Three models are tested, with the first one referring to the determinants of adoption or 
non-adoption of ESOs and the other two testing timing effects: early/late adoption of 
ESOs. 
Finally, a brief discussion of how calculations in SPSS are evaluated and interpreted in 
logistic regression models, especially the goodness-of-fit and regression coefficients 
was provided. Having, thus, considered the data and methodology used in this thesis, 
the next chapter is devoted to the discussion of results. 
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Results 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter dealt with data and methodology. It explained that logistic 
regression is the preferred statistical method for this study, given the dichotomous 
nature of the dependent variable. Using SPSS, logistic regression tests were run and 
Chapter 6 discusses the findings of these tests. 
The aim of this study, as explained earlier, is twofold. The first aim is to determine the 
characteristics of firms that adopt or do not adopt ESOs, and the second is to determine 
factors that lead to early or late adoption of ESOs. In reporting the results in relation to 
these aims, the first part focuses on models that test for adoption or non-adoption of 
ESOs. These tests extend to general tests of whether the adoption of ESOs is time-
dependent, but without actually testing for the characteristics of early or late adopters. 
This is the concern of the second part of the analysis. 
As explained in Chapter 5, the first part is presented in two sections. The first section is 
truncated i.e. it excludes the year dummies and the second section includes them. 
The chapter starts by describing the data set, including descriptive statistics (means, 
standard deviations, etc), and multicollinearity tests such as variance inflation factors 
(VIFs), tolerance ratios and correlation coefficients. 
For each model fitted, overall model fit is discussed, followed by the interpretation and 
analysis of coefficients. 
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After fitting a model, the emphasis shifts from the computation and assessment of the 
significance of the estimated coefficients to the interpretation of their values. The 
interpretation of any fitted model requires the drawing of practical inferences from the 
estimated coefficients. The question addressed is: What do the estimated coefficients in 
the model tell us about the research questions that motivated the study i.e. the adoption 
or non-adoption of ESOs in Germany? For most models this involves the estimated 
coefficients on the independent variables in the model. The estimated coefficients for 
the independent variables represent the slope or rate of change of a function of the 
dependent variable per unit of change in the independent variable. Thus, interpretation 
involves two issues: (i) determining the functional relationship between the dependent 
variable and the independent variable, and (ii) appropriately defining the unit of change 
for the independent variable. The final part of the chapter provides a summary and 
conclusions. 
6.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 6.1 shows sample information under two main headings, namely adopting and 
non-adopting firms. The number of firms that adopted ESOs over this period in this 
sample is 65 and the figure for non-adopting firms is 55. 
All the 16 firms with ADRs adopted an ESO scheme and none of the non-adopting 
firms had ADRs. 
The average of foreign ownership by adopting firms is higher than that of non-adopting 
firms, (14.6% and 5.15% respectively). This shows that although non-adopting firms are 
not listed on American Stock Exchanges, they have still managed to attract foreign 
investors, albeit at a lower level. 
The profitability means for adopting and non-adopting firms are 6.1% and 4.4% 
respectively. 
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Table 6.1: Sample Statistics 
Adopting Firms Non-Adopting Firms 
1. Number of firms 65 55 
2. US Investors 16 finns 0 
3. Foreign ownership 14.6% 5.15% 
4. Profitability (ROA) 6.1% 4.4% 
5. Peripherality 44 finns 56 finns 
6. Value Commitment (lAS) 44 finns 24 finns 
7. Labour power (cost) 19.6% 23.5% 
8. State ownership 9 finns 5 finns 
9. Family ownership 17 finns 21 finns 
10. Dispersed ownership 49.6% 36.5% 
11. Block ownership 62 finns 53 finns 
12. Bank ownership 6.4% 7.2% 
13. Firm size (log assets) 6.6 6.1 
14. Foreign sales 41.9% 41.4% 
15. Firm age 90.8 years 81.8 years 
16. Leverage 227.5% 245.6% 
Notes: Percentages, number of years and logarithm of assets are averages 
From the sample, that spans from 1992 to 2003 adopting finns outside the DAX 30 
(considered in this study as being "peripheral") total 44, and non-adopters (finns not in 
the DAX 30 total 56. 
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From the sample of 65 that adopted ESOs, 44 reported that they had adopted 
internationally accepted accounting standards, i.e. US GAAP or lAS. This shows that 
21 firms adopted ESOs, but continued to use German (HGB) accounting standards. 
From the non-adopting firms, 24 were using US GAAP or lAS with the remaining 31 
using HGB accounting standards. 
Labour cost as a percentage of sales is lower among adopting firms (19.6%), and stands 
at 23.5% among non-adopting firms. 
From the sample, 9 State-owned firms adopted ESOs and 5 did not. The number of 
State-owned firms in the sample is therefore low, however, representing a possible 
maximum of 168 firm-years. Similarly, 17 family-owned firms adopted ESOs over the 
12 years of study while 21 did not. Dispersed ownership averages 49.6% among 
adopting firms and is much lower among non-adopting firms at 36.5%. 
A total of 115 firms are classified as having a block-owner, where block ownership is 
defined as having an ownership stake of at least 10% by a single owner or group. This 
situation may suggest why dispersed ownership is very low particularly among non-
adopting firms. Of the 115 firms, 62 adopted ESOs and 53 did not. 
The mean of bank ownership is 6.4% among adopting firms and 7.2% among non-
adopting firms. 
Firm size, measured here, as the logarithm of total assets is 6.6 for adopting firms and 
6.1 for non-adopting ones. 
There is a small difference between the means of foreign sales for both adopting and 
non-adopting firms, 41.9% and 41.4% respectively. 
On average, adopting firms are older than non-adopting firms. The average age for 
adopting firms is about 90.8 years and it is 81.8 years for non-adopting ones. 
Finally, debt-to-equity ratios are 227.5% and 245.6% for adopting and non-adopting 
firms respectively. These ratios are very high in international terms, and this may 
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suggest an over-reliance on bank finance by firms, and the indirect control that banks 
still have over German firms. 
Table 6.2 presents the number and cumulative rate of ESOs adoption during the period 
1995-2003. The number of ESO adoptions over this period defines an inverted, U-
shaped distribution which peaks in 1999. Cumulatively, 65 firms adopted ESOs over 
this period. The Table shows that there were no ESO schemes in 1995 and only one 
firm adopted an ESO scheme in 2003. The majority of the firms adopted ESOs in 1999 
followed by 2000, when 10 firms adopted this executive pay element. It is worth noting 
that German ESOs were first legalised in 1998, hence the high adoption rate in 1999. 
Table 6. 2 ClassifICation of Firms' Adoption of ESOs by Year 
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Adopting firm~ 0 5 3 7 28 10 8 3 1 
Cumulative 0 5 8 15 43 53 61 64 65 
6.2.1. Means, Standard Deviations and Correlations 
Table 6.3 shows means, standard deviations and zero-order correlation coefficients and 
Table 6.4 shows tolerance and VIPs. 
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VARIABLE Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
I.US Investors .04 .20 1 
2. Foreign ownership 9.77 18.88 .18 1 
3. Profitability 4.88 8.68 .03 .04 1 
4. Peripherality .86 .35 -.34 -.21 .04 1 
5. Value Commitment .15 .34 .18 .20 .05 -.12 1 
6. Labour power 22.03 11.66 -.09 -.13 -.05 .06 -.07 1 
7. State ownership .17 .27 .07 -.05 -.11 -.08 -.01 -.15 1 
8. Family ownership .37 .42 -.10 -.16 .15 .11 -.09 .18 -.26 1 
9. Dispersed ownership 42.47 27.71 .19 .10 -.02 -.34 .06 -.02 -.03 -.23 1 
10. Block ownership .90 .29 -.14 .01 -.03 .17 -.07 -.11 .10 .16 -.55 1 
11. Bank ownership 5.86 11.63 -.06 -.05 -.15 .01 -.06 -.18 -.09 -.21 .00 .15 1 
12. Firm size 6.34 .90 .25 .26 -.17 -.46 .15 -.34 .34 -.32 .18 -.05 .08 1 
13. Foreign sales 40.12 25.71 -.01 .04 .04 -.12 .11 .07 -.22 .01 .11 -.15 -.09 -.01 1 
14. Finn age 87.82 57.24 -.06 .17 -.10 -.02 .10 .08 -.08 -.11 .06 .01 .04 .17 .17 1 
15. Leverage 243.23 237.39 .06 -.02 -.09 -.00 -.02 -.14 .09 -.10 -.02 -.00 .07 .25 -.04 -.07 1 
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6.2.2. Multicollinearity Tests 
The presence of high correlations among independent variables in a regression model is 
known as multicollinearity, a condition that suggests that two or more variables may be 
measuring similar factors. Although this is not a violation of the assumptions underlying 
a regression analysis (multicollinearity does not affect the overall fit of the model), it 
often impairs the usefulness of a regression analysis, particularly with respect to the 
interpretation of regression coefficients. Two frequently used tools in measuring levels 
of multicollinearity are correlation coefficient tables and the VIPs. 
Thus to assess the extent of multicollinearity, we calculate correlations between the 
independent variables and VIPs. The highest correlation coefficient is -.55 and relates to 
the correlation between block-holdership and dispersed ownership, and the tolerance 
levels are all above 0.4, with the highest VIP at 2.008. According to Menard (1995: 66), 
a tolerance score of 0.2 or below is a sign of concern. Since all tolerance scores are 
above 0.4 for all variables in the model, we conclude that multicollinearity is not a 
concern. 
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Table 6.4: Collinearity Diagnostic Tests 
IndeDendent Variable Tolerance VIF 
US Investors .835 1.198 
Foreign ownership .834 1.199 
Profitability .915 1.093 
Peripherality .628 1.592 
Value commitment .918 1.089 
Labour power .786 1.272 
State ownership .767 1.303 
Family ownership .764 1.309 
Dispersed ownership .580 1.725 
Block ownership .630 1.588 
Bank ownership .815 1.227 
Firm size .498 2.008 
Foreign sales .880 1.137 
Firm age .850 1.177 
Leverage .896 1.116 
6.3 Interpretation of Results for Model lA 
Results from Model lA, estimating equation 5.13 with ESO adoption as the dependent 
variable for the period 1992-2003 are discussed in this section. Section 6.3.1 discusses 
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the overall model fit statistics and section 6.3.2 discusses the coefficients of the 
variables with their respective odds ratios. 
6.3.1. Overall Model Fit: Model lA 
In assessing model fit, several measures are used here (see Table 6.5). First, a chi-
square test for the change in the -2 Loglikelihood (-2LL) value from the base model is 
compared to the overall F test in multiple regression. In this model, the reduction was 
statistically significant at the .000 level, yielding a Chi-square of 149.96 with 15 
degrees of freedom (df) and predicts ESO adoption accurately in 95% of the cases. As a 
general rule, smaller values of the -2LL measure indicate better model fit. The 
goodness-of-fit measure compares the predicted probabilities to the observed 
probabilities, with higher values indicating better fit. However, there is no upper or 
lower limit for this value (Hair, Underson, Tatham and Black, 1998). 
Additionally, three measures comparable to the R2 measure in multiple regressions are 
used. The Cox and Snell R2 measure operates in the same manner, with higher levels 
indicating greater model fit. However, this measure is limited in that it cannot reach the 
maximum value of 1, so Nagelkerke proposed a modification that had the range of 0 to 
1. In this study, the Cox and Snell value is .13 and the Nagelkerke value is .37, implying 
that the model accounts for about 37% in predicting ESO adoption in Germany. The 
third measure is the "pseudo" R2 measure based on the improvement in the -2LL value. 
The "pseudo" R2 for this study is 32% calculated as: 
R2 logit 
2LLnull - (-2LLmodel) 
= ------------------
- 2LLnull 
468.155 -318.193 
-
468.155 
149.962 
=------
468.155 
= .32 or 32% 
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The final inferential goodness-of-fit test is the Hosmer and Lemeshow test, which 
measures the correspondence of the actual and predicted values of the dependent 
variable. In this case, better model fit is indicated by a smaller difference in the 
observed and predicted classification i.e. the difference should not be significant. A 
good model fit is, therefore, indicated by a non-significant chi-square value in the 
Hosmer and Lemeshow test. Results show that the Hosmer and Lemeshow measure 
indicates that there is no statistically significant difference between the observed and 
predicted classifications, i.e. it is non-significant (6.54 with 8df and p >0.1). 
Table 6.5: Model Fit Statistics for Adoption of ESOs (ModellA) 
Goodness of Fit Value 
-2 log likelihood (-2LL) 318.19 
Chi -Square X 2 (15 df) 149.96*** 
Cox and Snell R2 .13 
Nagelkerke R2 .37 
"Pseudo" R2 .32 
Chi-square df Significance 
Hosmer and Lemeshow 6.54 8 .57 
Correct case classification 95% 
Firm years 1220 
*** Significant level p< 0.01; Initial -2LL = 468.155 
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6.3.2 Interpretation of Coefficients for Adoption of ESOs (Model lA) 
The preceding section has shown that Model lA is suitable for the data; thus, at least 
one of the variables significantly helps to explain the adoption or non-adoption of 
ESOs. These results provided support for the selection of the explanatory variables. 
This section is, therefore, devoted to the interpretation of coefficients on explanatory 
variables. Table 6.6 shows the b-parameters, standard errors and significance levels for 
each of the variables. Significant effects (*p<O.lO, **p<O.05, ***p<O.Ol) are shown in 
bold. 
Four equations with explanatory variables entered at different stages and in different 
combinations were fitted. As there are insignificant differences between results 
(coefficients and their respective significance levels) for these equations and the full 
model, we therefore comment on the results of the full model, as shown in Table 6.6. 
The test of the intercept (i.e. the constant) merely suggests whether an intercept should 
be included in the model. For the present data set, the test result (p<.Ol) suggests that 
the model should include the intercept. 
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Il S.E. Wald Sill. Exp(B) 
Variables 
Constant -8.37*** 2.143 15.275 .000 .000 
H1a US Investors 1.186** .511 5.393 .020 3.274 
H2a Foreign ownership .022*** .006 11.970 .001 1.023 
H3a Profitability .023* .014 2.655 .100 1.023 
H4a Peripherality -.604 .421 2.055 .152 .547 
HSa Value commitment 2.526*** .331 58.237 .000 12.501 
H6a1 Labour power -.022 .017 1.804 .179 .978 
H6b1 State ownership -.230 .736 .097 .755 .795 
H6c1 Family ownership .110 .496 .049 .824 1.117 
H6d1 Dispersed ownership .018** .008 5.624 .018 1.018 
H6e1 Block ownership 1.952*** .677 8.312 .004 7.041 
H6f1 Bank ownership -.001 .018 .005 .943 .999 
H7a Firm size .246 .240 1.051 .305 1.279 
H8a Foreign sales .006 .007 .770 .380 1.006 
Control Variables 
Firm age .003 .003 1.098 .295 1.003 
Leverage .000 .000 .134 .714 1.000 
Notes: Significant levels: *p<O.lO, **p<O.OS, ***p<O.Ol 
Moving on to the individual regression coefficients (i.e. fJs), the results support Hla: 
ESO adoption is significantly and positively associated with the extent of a German 
firm's dependence on American investors. The odds ratio for US investors indicates that 
when holding all other variables constant, firms with ADRs are 3.274 times more likely 
to adopt ESOs than firms that do not have Level II and/or III ADRs. 
H2a is supported (f3=0.022; p<0.01) by a significant, positive coefficient on foreign 
share ownership. A 1 % increase in foreign ownership increases the probability of 
adopting ESOs by lOO[exp(O.022)-I], which is equal to 2.3%. 
Results show that poor profitability is not associated with ESO adoption. Thus, for H3a, 
a negative relation was hypothesized, and it seems that high profits should be regarded 
as a resource that enables change, rather than low profits representing a performance 
crisis that stimulates ESO adoption. However, the significance of this variable (p<O.l) 
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is very weak. Results on the odds ratio also show that a 1 % increase in a firm's profits 
has the effect of increasing the likelihood or probability of the firm adopting ESOs by 
2.3%. 
There is no support for the peripherality variable (H4a), in terms of its significance and 
direction, i.e. the expected sign on the beta value is positive. 
Another insignificant result occurs for firm size (H7a), suggesting that ESO adoption is 
unaffected by firms being small or large. 
On the other hand, public declarations of commitment to shareholder value are 
significant and consistent with H5a. The odds ratio for value commitment indicates that 
when holding all other variables constant, a firm that has shown a high level of value 
commitment by using US GAAP or lAS is 12.5 times more likely to adopt ESOs than 
one using HGB (local accounting standards). 
Results for H6a1, predicting that employees will resist firm adoption of ESOs, are 
insignificant. It is worth noting, however, that the coefficient is negative as expected. 
The fact that State ownership represents no support for the adoption of ESOs is not 
supported by a significant result, although the direction of the negative sign of the 
coefficient is as hypothesized. 
Family ownership does not play a significant role in either the adoption or non-
adoption of ESOs and, contrary to the negative association expected, the coefficient 
sign is positive. 
The outcome of tests on dispersed ownership (H6d1) and block-holder presence (H6e1) 
appear to be contradictory at first sight, with both being positive and significant. Each is 
associated with ESO adoption. Further consideration suggests that no contradiction need 
be involved, however. Both dispersed shareholdings (through shareholder exit and share 
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price) and block-holder presence (through internal voice) may have the same influence 
on firm decisions and ESO adoption. A 1 % increase in free float increases the 
likelihood or probability of ESO adoption by 1.8% and firms with significant block-
holders are 7 times more likely to adopt ESOs than those without. 
There is no support for H8a (foreign sales) or for the two control variables, (firm age 
and debt-to-equity ratios) which are not significantly associated with the adoption or 
non-adoption of ESOs. 
The next section discusses results from Model 1B, estimating equation 5.14 with ESO 
adoption as the dependent variable for the period 1992-2003. The only difference 
between this model and the one discussed previously is that the latter includes year 
dummies to capture the effect of time. Section 6.3.3 discusses the overall model fit 
statistics and section 6.3.4 discusses the coefficients of the variables with their 
respective odds ratios. 
6.3.3 Overall Model Fit: ModellB 
Model 1B differs from Model 1A in that year dummies have been included to capture 
possible time-dependence of the adoption of ESOs in Germany. The first discussion of 
Model1B centres on goodness-of-fit (see Table 6.7 below), and will be followed by the 
interpretation of coefficients. 
With respect to ESO adoption, Model 1B is significant (Chi-square 203.68 with 22 dt 
renders a significance level of 0.00), and predicts ESO adoption accurately in 95.5% of 
cases. Cox and Snell R2 and Nagelkerke R2 are .166 and .487 respectively. These 
statistics represent an improvement of Model 1B over Model 1A in terms of model 
overall fit. For example the "Pseudo" R2 shows an improvement of 13 % (from 32% in 
Model 1A to 45% in Model 1B). As in Model lA, the Hosmer and Lemeshow figure 
(7.905 with 8 df) is insignificant, a condition that implies the appropriateness of the 
model in fitting the data. In other words, the null hypothesis of a good model fit to data 
was tenable. The number of observations, similar to Model lA, stands at 1220 firm-
years. 
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Finally, the -2Loglikelihood for Model lB is 264.476. 
Table 6.7 Model Fit Statistics/or ModellB (with year dummies) 
Goodness of Fit Value Change in -2LL 
(-2LL) 264.48 Value Significance 
Chi-Square X2 (22 df) 203.68*** From base model 53.72 .000 
Cox and Snell R2 .17 
Nagelkerke R2 .49 
"Pseudo" R2 .45 
Chi-square df Significance 
Hosmer and Lemeshow 7.91 8 .44 
Correct case classification 95.5% 
Firm years 1220 
*** Significant level p< 0.01; Initial -2LL = 468.16 
Model lB focuses on the same independent and control variables as Model lA, with the 
addition of the time dummies. Adding time variables contributes significantly to the 
amount of explained variation and demonstrates the overall robustness of the findings. 
6.3.4. Interpretation of Coefficients: ModellB (with year dummies) 
The same independent variables significant in Model lA i.e. without year dummies are 
also significant in the Model IB that includes year dummies. 
Thus, from Model lB, which includes year dummies, firms with ADRs are still 3 times 
more likely to adopt ESOs than those without. The sensitivity of foreign ownership is 
1.9%, having gone down from 2.3% in Model lA. An increase in profits of 1 % has the 
effect of increasing the probability of adopting ESOs by 2.5%. 
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Table 6.8: Logistic Regression Results for Adoption of ESOs (Model IB) 
B S.E. Wald Sil!. Exp(B) 
Variables 
Constant -9.62*** 2.806 11.759 .001 .000 
Hla US Investors 1.311 ** .605 4.695 .030 3.711 
H2a Foreign ownership .019*** .007 6.982 .008 1.019 
H3a Profitability .025* .015 2.771 .096 1.025 
H4a Peripherality -.428 .508 .710 .399 .652 
H5a Value commitment 1.994*** .385 26.784 .000 7.346 
H6al Labour power -.021 .019 1.299 .254 .979 
H6bl State ownership .065 .775 .007 .934 1.067 
H6cl Family ownership .151 .517 .086 .770 1.163 
H6dl Dispersed ownership .025*** .009 8.075 .004 1.025 
H6el Block ownership 1.840 .780 5.567 .018 6.297 
H6fl Bank ownership .009 .020 .202 .653 1.009 
H7a Finn size .231 .314 .543 .461 1.260 
H8a Foreign sales .005 .007 .532 .466 1.005 
Control Variables 
Finn age .002 .003 .390 .532 1.002 
Leverage .000 .000 .172 .678 1.000 
Year Dummies 32.316 .000 
1996 .620 1.257 .243 .622 1.858 
1997 .225 1.258 .032 .858 1.253 
1998 .901 1.167 .597 .440 2.463 
1999 2.813*** 1.096 6.593 .010 16.663 
2000 2.201 ** 1.117 3.878 .049 9.030 
2001 2.373** 1.128 4.423 .035 10.724 
2002 1.173 1.211 .938 .333 3.231 
Notes: Significant levels: *p<O.lO, **p<O.05, ***p<O.Ol 
The odds ratio for US investors indicates that when holding all other variables constant, 
firms with higher value commitment are more than 7 times likely to adopt ESOs than 
those with low value commitment (i.e. those not using US GAAP or lAS). This 
represents a big reduction in value from 12.501 (from Model lA). Thus, when time is 
considered, the association of value commitment with ESO adoption, although still very 
strong, is somewhat reduced. 
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Results for dispersed ownership show that a 1 % increase in free float results in an 
increase in the likelihood or probability of ESO adoption by 2.5%, an increase over 
Model 1A by 0.7%. On the other hand, firms with high block-holdership are 6.3 times 
more likely to adopt ESOs than those without, other variables held constant. 
In addition, the time dummies for 1999, 2000 and 2001 are positive and significant, 
drawing attention to the fact that ESO adoption was concentrated into this period. Thus, 
the years 1999-2001 evoke the impression of a bandwagon, in which numerous German 
firms are mimicking their trend setters in a process of mimetic voluntarism; paying 
executives with stock options may be another manifestation of "institutional 
isomorphism" (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
Thus, the comparison between Model 1A and Model 1B shows the hazard rate (i.e. the 
likelihood of ESO adoption) to be time dependent. Comparing the models, with and 
without the six year dummies, shows an improvement of Model 1B over Model 1A (a 
significant (p=O.OO) chi-square difference of the -2 Log-Likelihood at 53.7). 
Additionally, the differences on odd ratios between the two models reflect the 
importance of time in this study. 
Table 6.9 below is a summary of the results for the first part of the study, estimated in 
Models 1A and 1B, however, without the year dummies. The test outcome in terms of 
coefficient sign and significance levels are the same for the two models. 
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Table 6.9: Summary of Results for Models lA and IB 
Hypothesis (Variable) Predicted Test Outcome Outcome 
Sign Significance uvel o/Test 
HIa: US investors + +** :J 
H2a: Foreign ownership + +*** ~ 
H3a: Profitability +* X 
H4a: Peri pherali ty + 
H5a: Value commitment + +*** 
H6aI: Labour power 
H6b I: State ownership + 
H6cI: Family ownership + 
H6d I: Dispersed ownership + +*** ~ 
H6e I: Block ownership + +** ~ 
H6f1: Bank ownership 
H7 a: Firm size (assets) + + 
H8a: Foreign sales + + 
Notes: Significant levels: *p<O.lO, **p<O.05, ***p<O.Ol 
6.4 Early Adoption of ESOs 
Model IB shown in Table 6.8 demonstrates that the adoption of ESOs is time -
dependent with significant results for adoption in the years 1999, 2000 and 2001. As 
explained in Chapter 5, adoption of ESOs before and including 1998 is classified as 
early adoption and from 1999 to 2003 as late adoption. 
This section discusses the results of models testing for the early or late adoption of 
ESOs. The first part of the section is devoted to analysing the characteristic of early 
adoption, while the second part discusses late adoption. Goodness-of-fit statistics are 
dealt with first, and as before, the interpretation of regression coefficients then follows. 
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6.4.1. Model Fit Statistics for Model 2: Early Adoption of ESOs 
Table 6.7 shows goodness-of-fit statistics for Model 2, which as explained above 
addresses the early adoption of ESOs. With respect to the early-adoption of ESOs, 
Model 2 is successful (Chi-square 37.34 with 15 dfrenders a significance level of 0.00), 
and predicts ESO adoption accurately in 98.3% of the cases. Cox and Snell R2 and 
Nagelkerke R2 are .05 and .29 respectively. The "Pseudo" R2 is 28%, and very close to 
the Nagelkerke value. This suggests that the model accounts for 28%-29% of the 
variance in the dependent variable, i.e. in answering the question on the characteristics 
associated with the early adoption of ESOs by large German firms. However, the 
Hosmer and Lemeshow figure (16.68 with 8 dj) is significant, a condition that may 
suggest the inappropriateness of the model in fitting the data. Nevertheless, given the 
fact that the rest of the tests of model fit are good (Chi-square, case classification, 
Nagelkerke and "Pseudo" probabilities), there is good reason to assume the validity of 
this model, and to thus go on to interpret the results of coefficients. The number of 
observations, which only take into account years 1992 to 1998 is 847 firm-years. 
Table 6.10: Model Fit Statistics for Early Adoption 
Goodness of Fit Value 
-2 log likelihood (-2LL) 102.53 
Chi-Square X2 ( 15 dt) 37.34*** 
Cox and Snell R 2 .05 
Nagelkerke R2 .29 
"Pseudo" R2 .28 
Chi-square df Significance 
Hosmer and Lemeshow 16.68 8 .03 
Correct case classification 98.3 
Firm years 847 
*** Significant level p< 0.01; Initial-2LL =139.876 
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6.4.2 Interpretation of Coefficients: Early Adoption 
The coefficients presented in Table 6.11 below are used to approximate the size and 
direction of the association that each independent variable has with the dichotomous 
dependent variable in the early period of ESOs adoption in Germany. The intercept is 
significant and thus can be included in the model. Associations with each independent 
variable are discussed in tum. 
In the early part of ESO diffusion process, the presence of US investors through the use 
of ADRs is not correlated with ESO adoption. The study can only speculate that there 
were probably few firms with ADRs or that the requirements by American stock 
markets were not so strong, or possibly that imitation by German firms was still weak. 
Table 6.11: Logistic Regression Results for Early Adoption of ESOs 
Variables 6 S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
Constant -10.776*** 3.081 12.234 .000 .000 
Hlb US Investors .575 1.042 .304 .581 1.776 
H2b Foreign ownership .028* .015 3.623 .057 1.028 
H3b Profitability -.007 .044 .023 .881 .993 
H4b Peripherality .564 .743 .575 .448 1.757 
H5b Value commitment 2.849*** .708 16.204 .000 17.272 
H6a2 Labour power -.058* .032 3.199 .074 .944 
H6b2 State ownership .178 1.529 .014 .907 1.195 
H6c2 Family ownership 1.174 1.026 1.310 .252 3.236 
H6d2 Dispersed ownership .016 .015 1.166 .280 1.016 
H6e2 Block ownership 1.553 1.259 1.521 .218 4.726 
H6f2 Bank ownership .002 .033 .006 .941 1.002 
H7b Firm size .405 .306 1.755 .185 1.499 
H8b Foreign sales .020 .015 1.792 .181 1.020 
Control Variables 
Firm age .000 .006 .000 .993 1.000 
Leverage .000 .000 .182 .670 1.000 
Notes: Significant levels: *p<O.lO, **p<O.05, ***p<O.Ol 
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Foreign ownership, a variable that is not only limited to ADRs but includes all foreign 
shareholders, US-based and non-US alike, is positively associated with the early 
adoption of ESOs. A 1% increase in foreign ownership is associated with the finn's 
probability of adopting an ESO scheme increasing by 2.8%. 
In the early stages of ESO adoption, profitability is not associated with the adoption nor 
the non-adoption of ESOs i.e. the result is insignificant. However, the beta value is 
negative (-.007). 
The hypothesis that peripherality IS a condition to early adoption of ESOs IS not 
supported by results. 
Value commitment, represented here by the company use of internationally recognised 
accounting standards (US GAAP or lAS) is positively and significantly associated with 
ESO adoption in the early years of ESO diffusion. At 2.849, p<O.OOl this result 
demonstrates the association with financial transparency and commitment consistent 
with shareholder value maximization. Indeed, value-committed finns are not only 
highly inclined to adopt ESOs as shown in Models lA and IB above, but are 17 times 
more likely to be early adopters, compared with finns with low commitment to 
shareholder value maximization. 
Employee power dependencies expected to exert pressures of resistance are not 
completely associated with the dependent variable during the early part of ESO 
adoption, as the variable coefficient is negative, but the significance level is weak. An 
increase in labour costs by 1 % is associated with a reduction in the likelihood of a finn 
adopting an ESO scheme by 0.056%. This sensitivity ratio is very weak. 
The rest of the power dependency variables namely, State ownership, family ownership, 
dispersed ownership and bank ownership are not significant. 
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Firm size does not make a difference in terms of the decision to ESOs in the early part 
of the diffusion process, nor does the fact that firms are globally networked through 
foreign sales. 
6.5 Late Adoption of ESOs 
Results for Model 3, estimating equation 5.16 with late-ESO adoption as the dependent 
variable (for the period 1999-2003) are discussed in this section. Section 6.5.1 discusses 
the overall model fit statistics and section 6.5.2 discusses the coefficients of the 
variables with their respective odds ratios. 
6.5.1. Model Fit for Late Adoption of ESOs 
With respect to late-adoption of ESOs, Model 3 is also successful (Chi-square 111.87 
with 15 dfrenders a significance level of 0.00), and predicts ESO adoption accurately in 
87% of the cases. Cox and Snell R2 and Nagelkerke R2 are .27 and .50 respectively. 
The "Pseudo" R2 is 41 % suggesting that the model accounts for 41 % of the variance in 
relation to the characteristics of early, large firm adopters of ESOs in Germany. The 
Hosmer and Lemeshow figure (4.77 with 8 dj) is insignificant, a condition that suggest 
the appropriateness of the model in fitting the data. The number of observations, which 
only take into account years 1999 to 2003, is 373 firm-years. 
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Table 6.12: Model Fit Statistics for Late Adoption of ESOs. 
Goodness of Fit 
-2 log likelihood (-2LL) 
Chi -Square X 2 (15 dt) 
Cox and Snell R2 
Nagelkerke R2 
"Pseudo" R2 
Hosmer and Lemeshow 
Correct case classification 
Firm years 
Value 
161.61 
111.87 *** 
.27 
.50 
.41 
Chi-square 
87% 
373 
4.77 
*** Significant level p< 0.01; Initial -2LL = 273.486 
df 
8 
6.5.2 Interpretation of Coefficients for Late Adoption of ESOs 
Significance 
.781 
The coefficients presented in Table 6.12 below are used to approximate the strength of 
the association of each independent variable with the dichotomous dependent variable 
in the late part of ESOs adoption in Germany. The intercept is significant and thus can 
be included in the model. Associations with each independent variable are now 
discussed in tum. 
In the late part of the ESO diffusion process, the presence of US investors through the 
use of ADRs is positively associated with ESO adoption (at p<O.l). Compared with the 
results with early adoption, having ADRs has a weaker association, with the odds ratio 
suggesting that firms with ADRs are only 1.107 times more likely to adopt ESOs. 
There is no support for the foreign ownership variable. 
Results show that the more profitable a firm is, the more likely it is that it will adopt an 
ESO scheme in the late part of the diffusion period. The result shows a highly 
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significant coefficient (0.091 at p<D.D1) although the size of the coefficient is not large. 
This is a direct contradiction of the expected result, predicted to be negative, following 
the argument that poorly performing firms do have the incentive to change their 
governance templates in anticipation of better performance. The odds ratio shows that a 
1 % increase in profits is associated with an increase in the probability of ESO adoption 
by 9.6%. 
Table 6.13: Logistic Regression Results for Late Adoption of ESOs (Model 3) 
B S.E. Wald Sil!. Exp(B) 
Constant 
-7.299* 4.055 3.240 .072 .001 
Hlb US Investors 4.701 * 2.657 3.132 .077 1.107 
H2b Foreign ownership .015 .009 2.457 .117 1.015 
H3b Profitability .091 *** .035 6.771 .009 1.096 
H4b Peripherality -1.453* .773 3.534 .060 .234 
H5b Value commitment 1.703*** .478 12.695 .000 5.492 
H6a2 Labour power -.017 .024 .464 .496 .984 
H6b2 State ownership .405 .966 .175 .675 1.499 
H6c2 Family ownership -.104 .619 .028 .866 .901 
H6d2 Dispersed ownership .024** .011 4.401 .036 1.024 
H6e2 Block ownership 1.340 1.114 1.447 .229 3.820 
H6f2 Bank ownership .005 .030 .030 .862 1.005 
H7b Firm size .365 .460 .628 .428 1.440 
H8b Foreign sales -.002 .008 .065 .799 .998 
Control Variables 
Firm age .005 .004 1.754 .185 1.005 
Leverage .000 .001 .090 .764 1.000 
Significant levels: *p<O.lO, **p<O.05, ***p<O.Ol 
The hypothesis that peripheral firms would adopt ESOs because they are not highly 
embedded in the current template is dismissed, as results show a significant negative 
coefficient on peripheraity (-1.453 at p <D.1). In fact, by not being in the DAX 30, a 
firm's chance or probability of adopting an ESO scheme is associated with a reduction 
of 76.6%. 
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Early adoption results on value commitment are highly and positively significant 
(1.703 at p<O.Ol), consistent with the possibility that value commitment by top 
management counts a lot when it comes to the decision on ESO adoption. However, it 
may count relatively less during the late adoption window, as firms using US GAAP or 
lAS are 5.5 times likely to be late adopters compared with 17 times for early adopters. 
Resistance to the adoption of ESOs by employees is insignificant when considered in 
the late part of the hazard period. Employees do not support a change in the status quo. 
For employees, a change to them might represent subsequent downsizing. Thus, we see 
employees resisting adoption of ESOs over the period 1992-1998 i.e. during the early 
part. This resistance fades with time as the results of the later period show. 
Other insignificant results are found in relation to power dependency variables, such as 
State ownership, block and bank ownership. 
Results show that dispersed ownership is positively correlated (0.024 at p<O.05) to ESO 
adoption in the late part of the study period. A 1 % increase in a firm's free float is likely 
to increase the probability of adopting an ESO scheme by 2.4%. 
Finally, firm size and foreign sales and the two control variables (firm age and leverage) 
are not significantly correlated to ESO adoption. 
6.6 Summary 
To determine the characteristics of firms that: (1) adopt or do not adopt ESOs, (2) are 
early adopters, and (3) are late adopters of ESOs, a number of models were tested. The 
first part of the analysis shows that firms with ADRs, with greater foreign ownership 
and that have high dispersed ownership are more likely to adopt ESOs. Block 
ownership is also seen to be positively associated with ESO adoption. Additionally, 
firms with greater value commitment, measured here through the use of US GAAP or 
lAS accounting standards, are more likely to adopt ESOs. Results of the associations 
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with profitability, although positive and significant, show the opposite of the predicted 
outcome. A summary of these results, together with results for the characteristics of 
early and late adopters are shown in Table 6.14 below. 
Table 6.14: Summary of Results for All Tested Models 
Adopt/Non-Adopt Early Adoption Late Adoption 
Variables Outcome Predicted Outcome Predicted Outcome Predicted 
Sign Sign Sign 
US investors +** -V +* -V 
Foreign ownership +*** -V +* ~ 
Profitability +* X +*** X 
Peripherality 
-*** X 
Value commitment +*** ~ +*** -V +*** 
Labour power 
-* -V 
State ownership 
Family ownership 
Dispersed ownership +*** ~ +** 
Block ownership +** ~ 
Bank ownership 
Firm size 
Foreign sales 
Only three factors explain the possibility of early-ESO adoption among large German 
firms. Firms with higher proportions of foreign ownership and that are value-
committed, are more likely to be early adopters of ESOs. On the other hand, the power 
of employees is negatively associated with the adoption of ESOs by firms during the 
early years. 
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Late adoption is explained by a plethora of factors. The presence of US investors, 
through the finn's ownership of ADRs, is associated, though not strongly, with the 
adoption of ESOs in the late period. Again, contrary to the expected result, profitability 
has a positive association with the late adoption of ESOs. Finns that are peripheral (i.e. 
not in the DAX 30) are less likely to adopt ESOs in the later period. This result is 
interesting, as one would have thought that the bandwagon effect would take place as 
finns adopt ESOs not for efficiency's sake but to gain legitimacy. Value commitment is 
still associated with ESO adoption, even in the later part of the adoption period. This 
underlines the importance of prior commitment to shareholder value maximization, in 
this case, through the adoption of a more transparent accounting system. Dispersed 
ownership partly explains the adoption of ESOs in later years. 
Finally, state ownership, family ownership, bank ownership, finn size and foreign sales 
are not important as correlates of ESO adoption in this study. However, apart from these 
factors being insignificant, the signs on the beta values are as predicted. 
171 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
Conclusions 
7.1 Introduction 
Chapter 1 stated that the aim and challenge of this research was to determine the factors 
that encourage the changing of a governance template; in particular the adoption of an 
American executive pay practice by German firms. The thesis proceeded to use neo-
institutional theory as a framework for the analysis of one particular governance 
innovation (the ESO) in a single country, Germany, whose governance system seems 
capable of divergence from, or convergence on, the American model. Chapter 6 
presented the results of the study. In the present chapter, the results of the formal 
empirical tests are summarised and discussed from the perspective of their theoretical 
and practical implications, possible limitations and future extensions. 
This concluding chapter is organised as follows. Section 7.2 reviews key findings. 
Section 7.3 summarises the key findings in the context of exogenous and endogenous 
dynamics. Section 7.4 considers the possible contribution that the research may make to 
the academic debate, any implications it might have for policy, and for the actual 
remuneration practices in firms. Section 7.5 discusses the limitations of the research and 
Section 7.6 highlights suggestions for future research. 
7.2 Discussion of Key Findings 
In general, this research has focussed on the following questions: (1) Which German 
firms may be predicted to adopt institutional change? and (2) What factors determine 
the early or later adoption of ESOs in German's largest corporations? 
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In the sections that follow, the two issues are discussed in tenns of existing knowledge 
and the contribution of this study's results in furthering understanding in this area of 
corporate governance change. 
7.2.1 Determinants of Institutional Change 
Leaving aside until 7.2.2 the timing of ESO adoption, some of the coefficients on the 
independent variables suggested by neo-institutional theory proved to be insignificant in 
predicting the probability of a finn having an ESO. 
For example, "peripheral" finns, together with employee, State and family power 
dependencies, were all insignificant together with access to resources and infonnation 
variables involving asset values and foreign sales. 
Many variables were significant, however, and advocates of the notion of the 
"Americanization" of Gennan corporate governance may gain strength from this study 
of ESO adoption. In tenns of exogenous dynamics (US investors and foreign 
ownership), value commitment (demonstrable shareholder value orientation) and power 
dependencies (dispersed shareholdings and strategic block-holdings), the presence of 
these elements of Anglo-American governance in Gennan finns was associated with the 
adoption of ESOs. These results support and extend those of Ahmadjian and Robbins 
(2005), who found that American-style downsizing strategies were limited to those 
finns not deeply embedded in the Japanese version of relational governance or Welfare 
State Capitalism. These significant results will be discussed in detail in the following 
paragraphs. 
7.2.1 (a) Firms withADRs (i.e. US investors) are more likely to adopt ESOs 
The fact that finns with ADRs are more likely to adopt ESOs could possibly suggest 
that the external market plays an important role in the adoption process. These market 
pressures coercively push finns that are exposed to American markets to adopt 
shareholder value principles, and ESOs are certainly a cornerstone of US-style 
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corporate governance. It could be argued that this behaviour is better explained by 
resource dependency theory, but from an institutional perspective, the need to comply in 
order to appear legitimate, facilitating access to resources is well documented 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). In addition to such voluntary imitation and legitimacy 
seeking, American Stock Exchanges have certain regulations that firms have to adhere 
to if they wish to stay listed. These regulative measures could very well be interpreted 
as being coercive. 
Another possible interpretation pertains to mimetic isomorphism; the notion that 
German firms with ADRs are certainly in a shareholder-value environment, mixing with 
American firms with a culture of ESOs. This scenario leads to the diffusion of practices 
through mimicking best practices. 
These arguments lend support to the continued suitability of neo-institutional theory as 
a lens through which to study corporate governance changes. 
7.2.1 (b) Firms with higher proportions of foreign ownership are more likely to adopt 
ESOs 
An extension of the argument given above, explaining the role of ADRs in the adoption 
of ESOs, is relevant here, where firms with higher proportions of foreign ownership are 
more likely to adopt ESOs. This result gives hope to proponents of corporate 
governance convergence, with the potentially active role taken by foreign institutional 
investors such as CALPERS. Indeed, large institutional investors have some capacity to 
make their voices heard by maintaining active relationships with firms (Seki, 2005). 
Firms with higher foreign ownership are more likely to implement a variety of corporate 
governance reforms through the pressure exerted on corporate behaviour (Ahmadjian, 
2005). In particular, foreign ownership may have a positive impact on employment 
adjustment, specifically on the likelihood of reducing employment levels or reducing 
seniority-related pay (Ahmadjian and Robinson, 2001; Jackson, 2005). The existence of 
a positive, general association between foreign ownership and the degree of corporate 
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restructuring and strategy is further supported by specific findings in relation to the 
adoption of ESOs in this study. 
7.2.1 ( c) More profitable firms are more likely to adopt ESOs 
The hypothesized view derived from neo-institutional theory was that poor performance 
could promote change, e.g. the adoption of ESOs. On the contrary, however, more 
profitable firms are found to be more likely to adopt ESOs. This may be because 
profitable firms have the resources to experiment with new innovations. However, in a 
study of the diffusion of human resources practices of law firms, Sherer and Lee (2002) 
investigate the relative contributions of institutional (legitimacy) and of technical 
(resource scarcity) pressures to institutional diffusion. They argue that legitimacy 
enables institutional change, while resource scarcity drives it. They find that prestigious 
firms innovate first because they can get away with deviance due to greater legitimacy, 
and that less prestigious firms adopt the innovative practices only after these practices 
have been legitimated. The findings in this study could be taken to confirm that 
prestigious firms adopt ESOs, assuming that profitable firms are more likely to be 
prestigious. 
On the other hand, the findings of this study refute the idea that resource scarcity 
(Sherer and Lee, 2002) could alone determine change. Indeed, Schumpeter (1970) and 
Galbraith (1956) have argued that larger firms have the resources necessary to engage in 
research and development, and thus for the adoption of innovations. Various adoption 
studies confirm a positive relationship between absolute firm size and resources and the 
speed of adoption of innovations (Dewan et al., 1998; Frambach et al., 1998; Kennedy, 
1983; Kimberly and Evanisko, 1981; Thong, 1999). Adopters in particular, run a higher 
risk by adopting an innovation, since the new "product" has not yet proved its value on 
the market. Webster (1969) claims that adopters of an innovation are generally those 
firms that can best bear the risk involved in adoption, where the ability to bear risk is a 
function of the size and the financial strength of a company. However, as the risk of 
adopting stock options diminishes over the life cycle of the firm, the effect of size can 
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be expected to diminish (Levin et aI., 1987). Thus, differences in size or ownership of 
superior resources play an important role in the adoption of ESOs. 
7.2.1 (d) Firms with higher levels of value commitment (i.e. use of us GAAP or lAS) 
are more likely to adopt ESOs. 
The literature on German corporate governance has shown two ways in which 
shareholder value commitment by top management is measured. One way, used by 
Bradley and Sundaram (2004), considers how many times the words "shareholder 
value" appears in the CEO's annual speech at AGMs. The other approach, used by Fiss 
and Zajac (2004) and followed in this study, considers the prior adoption of shareholder 
value-oriented behaviour, such as the use of lAS or US GAAP, as a signal of 
commitment by top management to adopt other US-style innovations such as the ESO. 
In this study, value commitment by management, through the earlier adoption of US 
GAAP or lAS accounting standards, is associated with the adoption of ESOs. This 
finding adds support to earlier studies by Tuschke and Sanders (2003) who found that 
earlier adoption of Anglo-American innovations do make it easier to adopt further 
related elements. 
7.2.1 (e) Firms with higher levels of dispersed ownership are more likely to adopt ESOs 
Dispersed ownership is one of the tenets of shareholder value. Many studies have 
demonstrated the importance of dispersed ownership in achieving shareholder 
democracy leading to shareholder value maximization (LaPorta et al., 2000). On the 
other hand, some studies have associated dispersed ownership with free rider problems 
and the unwillingness of small, dispersed shareholders to invest in "voicing" their 
concerns. Rather, they may simply dispose of their shares. ESO adoption may be 
promoted by Boards that perceive that ESO announcements will discourage share exit 
among frustrated, small investors. 
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7.2.1 (f) Firms with higher levels of block ownership are more likely to adopt ESOs 
The fact that block ownership appears to support the adoption of ESOs apparently 
contradicts 7.2.1(e). Block ownership, it may be argued, facilitates direct control of 
management, thus reducing the need for ESOs which are normally used to align the 
interests of management with those of shareholders. However, this finding can be 
explained by the dynamics of German corporate ownership over the years. Bank 
ownership has been declining, reducing the active role of banks in corporate governance 
(see Appendix 7.1 on Deutsche Bank ownership). Bank exit has to some extent been 
compensated for by the appearance of new investors in the insurance and fund industry, 
representing a shift in corporate power dependencies, interests and value commitment. 
However, this situation has not reduced block-holdership but the type of block-holder. 
An analysis of the DAX 30 companies, around the beginning of 2005, shows that only 
two of the companies (Deutsche Bank and BASF) have no major block-holder (see 
Appendix 7.2). Insurance companies and funds have stepped into the gap left by the 
banks and have taken major stakes in DAX companies. Insurance companies are the 
largest block-holders in a total of eight DAX companies, and funds are the largest in 
two DAX companies. By comparison (insurance versus German banks), insurance 
companies with the intention of maximizing their investment would support the 
adoption of ESOs as the findings show in Models 1A and lB. Indeed, these new block-
holders have not exercised as much influence over management as banks previously 
did, but on the other hand they generally have been more active in corporate governance 
(Vitols, 2005). Moreover, many of these are foreign investors (see Appendix 7.2), such 
as AXA (France), Assicurazioni Generali (Italy), Atticus Capital L.L.C and Capital 
Group (USA). 
An important point here is that despite the withdrawal of banks from being the largest 
block-holders, German corporate governance is still far short of convergence to the 
Anglo-American system of dispersed shareholder capitalism. This, certainly, points to 
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the difficulties of transferring Anglo-American institutions to countries which have very 
different cultures, traditions and practices. 
These significant relationships support the use of neo-institutional theory in the specific 
context of ESOs and it may be extended usefully to other areas of international 
governance and strategy determination. 
However, one important caution must be entered: we have no way of telling, given the 
current state of German information disclosure, whether German ESOs are equivalent to 
their American template or not. It seems likely that they may have been "translated" in 
transit, to suit the German institutional context (Buck and Shahrim, 2005). For example, 
an ESO scheme focused on five senior executives in the US bank, JP Morgan Chase is a 
very different institution to one applying to 2,498 senior managers in Deutsche Bank. 
Finally, it seems clear from the significant coefficients of the year dummies in Model 
IB that some changes in political and legal institutions have not been captured by the 
independent variables used in hypotheses so far. Evidence of legislation as an external 
contingency, influencing endogenous forces, can be inferred from the passing of the 
German Stock Company Law (Aktiengesetz) in 1998. This legalized the use of ESOs as 
a compensation instrument. The effect of this legislation started to be felt in 1999, 
arguably reflected in the significance of the 1999 year dummy. In fact, out of the 65 
ESO adoptions reported in this study, 29 of them took place in 1999 alone, representing 
45% of the total. 
The precise effect of these changes in legal institutions in regressions remains as an 
outstanding challenge. Meanwhile, other institutional elements measuring the 
embeddedness of German firms in their German environment, and conversely their 
willingness to change, have been demonstrated as being important in the analysis of the 
adoption of an American pay innovation in Germany. 
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7.2.2 Early or Late Determinants of ESO Adoption 
The discussion above has centred on findings of ESO adoption without taking timing 
(i.e. early/late adoption) characteristics into consideration. This section discusses the 
significant findings of early or late adoption of ESOs. 
7.2.2 (a) Finns withADRs are more likely to be late adopters ofESOs 
In this study, the early adoption of ESOs is not influenced by a firm having ADRs. On 
the contrary, late adoption is more likely to be associated with having ADRs. One 
possible explanation of this situation is that there were very few firms with ADRs 
during the early-adoption period. The majority of the firms with ADRs adopted ESOs 
after 1998. The other reason possibly derives from the decline (in the later period) in the 
role played by banks in financing firms, hence the need for large German firms turning 
to US stock markets for their financial needs. Indeed, German firms have in the past 
relied heavily on local banks to finance their operations. However, as the globalisation 
of financial markets intensified, these firms realised that they could raise finance in a 
cheaper manner. Moreover, German banks changed their strategy with time, getting 
more and more involved in investment banking as opposed to their traditional role of 
lending. 
7.2.2 (b) Finns with higher proportions offoreign ownership are more likely to be early 
adopters of ESOs. 
Whereas the majority of firms with ADRs got them late in the observation period as 
discussed above, foreign ownership, not necessarily through listing on American stock 
markets, although not very significant, was present in Germany. Firms that have higher 
proportions of foreign ownership may bring a different philosophy to the AGM. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that such firms are more likely to quickly embrace a shareholder 
value orientation, hence the early adoption of ESOs. 
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7.2.2 (c) Employee power is likely to be negatively associated with the early adoption of 
ESOs 
Employees are unlikely to support any changes in the status quo that may be associated 
with downsizing. Thus, we see employees possibly resisting the adoption of ESQs over 
the period 1992-1998, arguably because they focus executives on share price rather than 
employment stability. However, it must be pointed out that any such resistance must be 
quite weak, as the results in Chapter 6 have shown. This weak resistance fades with 
time, as the results of the later period are not significant. This might suggest that 
employees have not been averse to the new arrangements, perceiving that a buoyant 
share price secures their jobs. In Germany's top firms, Hapner (2001) reports that share 
ownership has been made widely available to employees at all levels of the firm and 
that German works council members favour greater information disclosure and 
involvement of the supervisory board. This might at least partly explain the low degree 
of opposition from labour against the changes in corporate governance in general. In 
Japanese firms that are exposed to capital market pressure, strong employee 
participation via labour-management councils had no positive or negative influence on 
the adoption of stronger information disclosure and shareholder rights, and even had a 
positive effect on board reforms (Arikawa and Miyajima, 2005). 
7.2.2 ( c) Value commitment is associated with both early and late adoption of ESOs 
The adoption of an innovation demands the commitment of top management. Indeed, as 
the results of this study have shown, value commitment is likely to influence the 
adoption of ESQs both in the early and late stages of the adoption process. This 
underlines the fact that it is easier to adopt an innovation, such as the ESQ, where other 
shareholder value-friendly preconditions are already in place. Indeed, the use of 
International Accounting Standards (lAS) or US GAAP has been linked to shareholder 
value orientation (Tuschke and Sanders, 2003). 
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7.2.2 (d) Higher proportions of dispersed ownership are associated with the late 
adoption of ESOs 
During the early part of the ESO adoption process in Germany, dispersed ownership 
was not common. Even during the later part of this study, dispersed ownership was still 
very low, at least by Anglo-American standards. Thus, dispersed ownership is still not a 
general characteristic of German corporate governance, but where it exists, it has the 
power to influence the adoption of ESOs in the later part of the adoption window. With 
time, German stock markets became more developed, as banks sold their shareholdings 
and as state firms were privatised. 
In summary, three aspects that are likely to be considered by actors when making a 
decision to adopt an innovation early or late are the level of perceived risk (Rogers, 
1995), the quality of available information and related experience (Redmond, 2003). 
Early adopters are characterised by "venturesomeness", an ability to cope with 
uncertainty and a willingness to accept risk (Rogers, 1995). The fact that foreign 
shareholders are more likely to support early adoption of ESOs in Germany simply adds 
support to this argument. For instance, foreign shareholders may be less risk averse, 
judging by their earlier decisions to invest in German firms. They are more likely to 
have access to knowledge on the merits and demerits of ESOs from their global 
expenences. Besides, these foreign owners could be institutional investors (see 
Appendix 7.2) implying that they have the financial resources to conduct research on 
the suitability of ESOs in Germany. 
Indeed, the lack of association between early adoption and employee power echoes 
similar arguments, albeit from an opposite direction. For German employees, ESO 
adoption raises uncertainty regarding economic benefits. Accepting one form of 
shareholder value commitment could lead to further changes, some of which might 
mean loss of employment. Thus, the risk may be too high and employees may not have 
the experience or knowledge to evaluate reforms of this nature. 
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Finally, a lack of reliable information can possibly explain the association of dispersed 
shareholders with the late, but not early, adoption of ESOs. As large German 
corporations were, and are still, to an extent dominated by block-holders, dispersed 
shareholders are outsiders with little access to strategic information. At the early stages 
of the innovation diffusion process, they do not have enough information to evaluate the 
benefits of the innovation. 
7.3 Exogenous and Endogenous Dynamics in ESO Adoption 
As discussed in Chapter 3, intra-organisational dynamics can be divided into exogenous 
and endogenous elements. A summary of the discussion on findings is thus provided 
under these two headings. As discussed in Chapter 3, exogenous dynamics enable the 
analysis of the firm's interactions with the market and with its wider institutional 
environment, whereas endogenous dynamics help in understanding how organisations 
respond to internal institutional factors. 
7.3.1 Exogenous Dynamics 
The element of exogenous dynamics in neo-institutional theory comes close to resource 
dependency theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Pugh and Hickson, 1997). Firms 
lacking crucial resources have to respond to the demands of salient suppliers, because 
without these resources it would be difficult to survive. Indeed, German firms are listed 
on American stock markets for that very purpose, to seek financial resources. The 
demands exerted on these firms are twofold. First, there are laws and regulations they 
have to comply with, a situation that best describes coercive isomorphism. Secondly, as 
discussed earlier, indirect pressure is evident on this external institutional and market 
environment through imitation, as German firms emulate successful American firms. In 
this study, these exogenous dynamics have been seen to be associated with the overall 
adoption and in late adoption of ESO adoption. 
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Moreover, the behaviour of German firms after the legislation of ESOs in 1998 is a 
good indication of the effect of external pressures. Indeed, Tolbert and Zucker's (1983) 
work demonstrated how legal mandates work to rapidly facilitate institutional change. 
7.3.2 Endogenous Dynamics 
As discussed in Chapter 3, endogenous dynamics are classified under (a) interests and 
value commitment and (b) power dependencies and capacity for action. 
7.3.2 (a) Interest and value commitment 
There is evidence in this study that individual actors' interests playa part in the timing 
of decision to adopt ESOs. For instance, in firms that are prestigious and not on the 
periphery, actors' interests lead to the adoption of ESOs, possibly because of the 
financial strength that these firms enjoy. 
Value commitment by top management is purely an internal factor and the findings 
confirm the importance of prior management decisions that are meant to promote a 
strong shareholder value philosophy. In this case, it is the earlier adoption of 
internationally recognised accounting standards (lAS or US GAAP) that serve as a 
symbol of value commitment and are indeed prior shareholder value-oriented 
innovations. 
7.3.2 (b) Power dependencies and capacity for action 
The findings show the importance of the varying power geometries of organisational 
actors. Indeed, some actors are more influential than others, as shown in this study by 
the possible resistance shown by employees in adopting ESOs and by the possible 
support given by dispersed shareholders and block-holders to the adoption of ESOs. The 
power dependencies also manifest in the timing of the decision to adopt ESOs, e.g. the 
possible resistance by employees to early adoption of ESOs. 
183 
7. Conclusions 
7.4 Contribution 
This subsection describes the contribution of this study to knowledge and to policy 
makers. An analysis is therefore made of the relevance of the study to theoretical 
development, the debate on corporate governance convergence and its implications for 
national government policies and for the harmonisation policies of the European Union 
in relation to executive pay. 
7.4.1 Theoretical Development 
It is claimed that the contributions of this study are several. First, the main purpose of 
this study has been theoretical development, in the form of the extension of a theoretical 
approach to the context of governance change in general and to the adoption of the ESO 
as a specific governance innovation in particular. To date, neo-institutional theory has 
rarely been used in the study of corporate governance change, and in areas where it has 
been extensively used, empirical tests have not been performed. This study applies this 
analytical lens all the way to empirical testing in relation to corporate governance 
change in a country that lies along a clear fault-line between stock market and welfare 
state capitalism. 
The use of neo-institutional theory in this study has shown that a plethora of factors, 
including non-economic ones, can be used to understand the adoption of US-style 
ESOs. Indeed, the research has emphasised that the adoption of a governance element 
ultimately depends on the institutional influences affecting the actors making the 
decisions in organisations. This observation goes a long way towards understanding 
governance institutions and change, where theories like agency theory have made only a 
limited contribution, arguably because they are "undersocialized" (Aguilera and 
Jackson, 2003; Granovetter, 1985; Lubatkin et al., 2001; Bruce et al., 2005). The 
empirical results of this study suggest that further applications of neo-institutional 
theory may be fruitful in wider studies of governance institutions. 
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Furthermore, this observation may have important implications for all governance 
performance studies that fail to go beyond surface appearances. In particular, evident 
cases of innovation adoption in relation to business strategies such as ESO schemes, 
takeovers, human resource management strategies, etc should first be analysed in depth 
before their equivalence across countries and/or national cultures is assumed. 
Finally, this study contributes to the contemporary debate on corporate governance and 
convergence, characterised by wide disagreement. There is no study so far which has 
been able to provide evidence that there is an unambiguous direct link between 
corporate governance and economic performance, and markedly different governance 
structures in various countries have been associated with world-class firm performance. 
In other words, divergence may persist. The balance of opinion and evidence from 
literature appears to be tilted towards counter-convergence arguments where there are 
fundamental institutional reasons, as well as legal and political explanations, why 
convergence in corporate governance systems, especially on the Anglo-American 
pattern, is not likely. Indeed, the literature has documented that important features of the 
traditional German corporate system have persisted (Lane, 2003; Vitols, 2005), thus the 
German corporate governance system remains quite distinct from that of the UK and 
USA. 
Nonetheless, literature has shown that legal reforms and hostile takeovers are taking 
place in Germany. In this study, ESOs have been observed to have been widely 
introduced, thereby raising important convergence issues. However, this thesis has not 
proved whether convergence is happening or not. However, it has demonstrated the 
possible influences on the adoption of an innovation that is considered to be one of the 
signals of possible convergence. 
Emphasizing the role of institutions, the research reintroduces neo-institutional theory 
into the research framework for the study of institutional change. Thus, it is premature 
to say that convergence is taking place, though external forces such as market pressures 
or network positions have contributed to the understanding of the adoption of US-style 
185 
ESO schemes in Gennany. The research has shown that changing a governance 
template, or elements thereof, calls for more than agency theory, since the institutional, 
cultural and political influences affecting the actors in an organisation must be carefully 
considered. 
From the perspective of national corporate governance systems, current developments 
(e.g. the adoption of ESOs while maintaining old structures such as codetermination, 
etc) can be interpreted as a fonn of "hybridisation" (Jackson, 2003), translation (Buck 
and Shahrim, 2005) or "negotiated shareholder value" (Vitols, 2004). Indeed, structural 
elements of stakeholder-oriented models are being recombined with newer elements of 
shareholder-oriented models (e.g. transparency and disclosures, executive pay) so as to 
arguably produce a distinct "hybrid" combination of structures and perhaps unique set 
of governance practices. Convergence on a hybrid governance pattern may be occurring 
(Mishaupt, 1998). 
An important consequence of this "new order" is the growmg heterogeneity of 
corporate governance across finns, even within the same country (Aoki, Jackson and 
Miyajima, 2005). Corporations now choose their corporate governance practices within 
the boundaries of prevailing national and international constraints (Chizema and Buck, 
2006). While national models were never entirely homogeneous, the capacity to 
generate relatively isomorphic practices across companies and sectors within a 
particular country is declining. Inherent institutional tensions, such as those between 
public disclosure and relational behaviour, facilitate deviant patterns of corporate 
behaviour (Whitley, 1992) and greater finn-specific experimentation in combining 
elements of different models. Countries may retain distinctive patterns of corporate 
governance, but the range of internal variation may be growing (Chizema and Buck, 
2006), particularly between large internationalized corporations and more protected 
domestically-oriented or small to medium-sized finns. 
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Apart from having implications on theory, the research findings may also be significant 
in that they show the role of policy-makers in attempting to harmonise or reform 
governance systems or elements. 
Before 1998, German firms could essentially not blatantly use ESOs, but the 
significance of the reported year dummies, 1999-2002 in relation to ESO adoption 
arguably reflects the changes in German government policy at that time. From 1998 
onwards, after the Control and Transparency Act (KonTrag), Germany saw a series of 
reform measures affecting internal corporate governance. The acceleration of reform 
activities since the late 1990s shows that the trend to bring Germany more into line with 
Anglo-American norms and practices was deliberate and proceeded from the broader 
themes of modernizing the financial market and promoting the capital-market 
orientation of German firms. This work shows that the mere legal sanction of a practice 
can be sufficient to significantly increase adoption rates among practices that face 
considerable opposition elsewhere within the institutional environment. This finding 
may have wide ranging application to other practices contested in society beyond ESOs 
adoption. 
Thus, the observation made above has wider implications for governance reform 
programmes e.g. the adoption of national corporate governance codes which could 
either be mandatory or voluntary i.e. based on a spirit of "comply or explain". The 
results of this study are consistent with the power of national government, such as 
Germany, to promote or at least validate changes that amount to governance 
convergence. 
Beyond national borders, the study also has implications at a wider, regional level, e.g. 
for the proposed harmonisation of corporate governance practices in the European 
Union (EU). The High Level Group of Company Law Experts was set up by the 
187 
European Commission in September 2001 to make recommendations on a modem 
regulatory framework in the EU for company law. This group drew up a report in 
Brussels on the 4th of November 2002 to improve the EU framework for corporate 
governance, specifically through: 
• enhanced corporate governance disclosure requirements; 
• strengthening the role of independent non-executive and supervisory directors, 
particularly in three areas where executive directors have conflicts of interests, i.e. 
nomination and remuneration of directors and audit of the company's accounts; 
• an appropriate regime for directors' remuneration, requiring disclosure of the 
company's remuneration policy and individual director's remuneration, as well as prior 
shareholder approval of share and share option schemes in which directors participate, 
and accounting for the costs of those schemes to the company. 
Understanding the internal dynamics of corporate governance change at firm level 
within a given external environment shaped by country-level market and institutional 
factors, may help policymakers to improve the situation in relation to executive pay in 
the EU. For example, the resistance of employees to shareholder-orientated reforms 
should not be under-estimated in a society like Germany, with institutions founded on a 
national culture of high collectivism and uncertainty avoidance. 
7.4.3 Firms' Remuneration Strategies 
By rewarding executives with stock options, the expectation is that top management 
become motivated to maximise shareholder value. This strategy, according to agency 
theorists, should reduce self-serving behaviour by top management. However, as shown 
in this study, instead of attempting to provide real incentives for individual managers, 
ESOs may exist merely to appease international investors, since the announcements of 
executive stock option schemes has in general a positive influence on share price 
(Westphal and Zajac, 1998). The important implication of this is that the symbolic 
adoption of ESOs may mislead investors, because their introduction may be motivated 
by social legitimacy, not efficiency, considerations. 
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On the other hand, ESO adoption may have been supported by self-interested senior 
managers, anxious to add to the value of their total rewards without improving their 
efforts or performance. In other words, top management could possibly support ESO 
schemes without total commitment to their intended purpose. Such commitment may be 
secured only after other shareholder value-oriented innovations, such as financial 
transparency and full disclosure. 
Finally, whether a firm needs ESOs or not, and whether they prefer to design them in 
one form or another, has been found to be dependent on their needs and circumstances. 
In other words a one-size-fit all approach for firms in relation to executive pay is not 
practical, at both country and firm levels. 
7.5 Limitations 
The sample framework used in this study is the DAX 100. Although, this sample is 
observed for twelve years, it is only representative of large German firms. In order to 
gain a more complete picture of remuneration practices and policies and how well they 
reflect a philosophy of change across Germany, it would seem desirable to extend the 
data to small and medium firms. This approach could have been relevant, especially as 
variables like peripherality and profitability were used in the study. Indeed, small firms 
could automatically be considered peripheral, and are generally less profitable. 
However, it is acknowledged that ascertaining the relevant information from small firms 
is difficult, due to the problems associated with obtaining the relevant company data. In 
addition, the use of share price, and thus ESOs as a basis for executive compensation, is 
not common among small firms. 
Secondly, while the methodology used in data collection was effective, more could have 
been done to achieve triangulation. For example, interviews and questionnaires could 
have been used to complement data collected from annual reports and databases. 
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Thirdly, the use of one country in this study does not afford the luxury of making 
generalisations about the association between institutional forces and the adoption of a 
governance practice like the ESQ. 
Another limitation of the study concerns the cause-and-effect relationship between ESO 
adoption and neo-institutional variables. In this empirically-based study, the models 
used necessarily provide a lens for viewing the world that must simplify reality. In the 
complex real world of business, there are potentially other factors that could influence 
ESQ adoption. For example, different political parties may influence ESO adoption. Of 
course, a quasi cross-sectional study also cannot identify causal relationships. 
Additionally, while it is argued that the study advances neo-institutional theory and its 
application to reality, it has a number of weaknesses. Many of them are related to 
standards of disclosure on executive pay in Germany, and in this respect Germany 
certainly has not achieved the Stock Market Capitalism that convergence theorists have 
predicted. Executive pay disclosure in Germany, particularly in relation to ESOs, is still 
quite weak. Germany's public companies were given three years (dating from the 
recommendation of the Cromme Commission in 2002) to comply with the voluntary 
Corporate Governance Code recommending the full disclosure of individual directors' 
pay. By mid-2005, only 70% of the DAX 30 firms had announced that were intending 
to comply, forcing the German Federal Council in July 2005 to approve a law on the 
Disclosure of Management Board Remuneration (VorStog, see DSW, 2005). The 
expectation was that all annual reports for the financial year 2006 would for the first 
time disclose individual directors' remuneration. However, with the so called opt-out 
rule in the VorStog, shareholders may pass a resolution, with a three-quarters majority 
of the shares represented at the meeting, allowing the company to refrain from 
publishing individual board members' remuneration. For example, at the AGM of Sixt 
AG, 98% of the shares represented at the meeting voted against the disclosure of 
individual pay, a decision made easier by the fact that its founder Erich Sixt holds 57% 
of the company's shares. Thus, while ESQs may be adopted in German firms, how 
many are given to which directors often remains a mystery to outside shareholders. It is 
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for this reason that this study relies on dummy variables for ESO adoption, rather than 
sophisticated valuations of ESO awards, as in the USA and UK (Tosi, Werner, Katz, 
and Gomez-Mejia, 2000). 
7.6 Future Research 
The conclusions, as well as the limitations of this study, suggest some interesting 
possible avenues for future research. 
More work could be done with a larger sample that includes smaller firms, so long as 
they are listed. As an overall objective is to find whether German corporate governance 
is getting closer to the Anglo-American system, a dependent variable common to all 
German firms, small or large, could be used. Thus, future work could possibly 
investigate corporate downsizing in Germany. Firms could be downsizing because they 
need to reduce production costs, raising shareholder value, the main philosophy behind 
Anglo-American corporate governance. At the same time, institutional resistance could 
be expected from employees through work councils and supervisory boards. This would 
allow further use of the model developed in this study and most importantly this study 
would embrace small, medium and large firms, giving greater variation in independent 
variables like peripherality, firm performance and value commitment. 
It has been pointed out in the limitations section that the study is not in a good position 
to render generalisations in relation to how institutional factors affect corporate 
governance change due to the focus on a single country. Future work could take a multi-
country approach, drawing sample elements from the ED as a whole for example. In 
this approach, the same theoretical lens used in the current study could be employed. 
This approach could lead to better understanding of institutional change especially as 
more country-specific variables such as culture, political and economic environment 
could be also added to the model. 
Finally, further studies, employing the same theoretical lens as this study, could be 
applied to those transition economies which were formerly planned economies and are 
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now moving toward a market-oriented system. Indeed, transition is a shift from one 
institutional template to another (Johnson, Smith and Codling, 2000; Spicer, McDermott 
and Kogut, 2002) and corporate governance reform is on the agenda of many transition 
economies (e.g. China). 
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Avvendices 
Appendix 2.1 
Opposition to Stock-Based Incentives 1996-1998: 
Quotes from Representative German Constituents 
1996 
Person, Position Statement 
I Bernhard Wurl, "Share options may run counter to a trade union's interests because they change the company's 
Trade union official IG corporate objectives - and could mean job cuts". (Munchau, 1996: 23) 
Metall 
Klaus Zwickel, "Share options make the management focus too much on share price." (Munchau, 1996: 23) 
Trade union president 
Anonymous, [On the stock option plan of Daimler]: "[this is a] bonus for laying off employees." (Spegel and 
Trade union official Bierach, 1996: 92) 
Jiirgen Schrempp, [Noted that the discussion on shareholder wealth generally had lapsed into] "A phantom discussion 
CEO of Daimler Benz stamped by class struggle". (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 1996: 21) 
Martin Peltzer, "There is no clear parallelism between high profits from stock-based pay and top management's 
Prominent attorney efforts. Famous examples like Jack Welch and Robert Goiuzeta, who enriched themselves as well as 
their shareholders, are opposed by examples of less impressive top managers who just benefited from 
windfall profits."(Blick durch die Wirtschaft: 108: 9) 
Klaus Menichetti, "The stock-based incentives schemes that are currently introduced in German companies are designed 
Professor of in a way that is not appropriate for increasing shareholder wealth .... it will be utmost difficult to 
Management design stock-based pay in a way that helps to reduce agency costs."(Menichetti, 1996: 1692) 
Hubert Spegel and "Many people fear that top managers find ways and means to enrich themselves in times of rising 
Barbara stock prices and find excuses for negative [share price] developments .... All experiences with the 
Bierach, stock market point to the fact that some managers will try to blandish the company in order to 
-
193 
Journalists 
1997 
Robert Koehler, 
CEO of SGL Carbon 
Stefan Winter, 
Institut for Management, 
Humboldt University 
Jochen Klusman, 
Analyst, Bank Julius 
Baer 
Norbert Sturm, 
Journalist 
Hans Schneider, 
Professor of Personnel 
Management 
Appendices 
increase the stock price before they convert their option into cash." 
(Spegel and Bierach, 1996: 92) 
This [introduction of stock option pay] was revolutionary in a country where wage differentials 
between top management and assembly line workers are among the lowest in the world and there is a 
great deal of public skepticism about performance-related pay." (Financial Times, 1997) 
"Often, stock based incentives are designed badly, are open for manipulation, and don't contribute to 
the firm's profit." (Winter, 1997: K3) 
[on tying compensation to firm stock price] "It isn't a very logical way to encourage employees." 
(Rose and Marshall, 1998: 6) 
[On the stock option program of Volkswagen]: "The stock option program was initially designed to 
include only the top management team. But then the work's council started causing problems. It 
demanded that the program be offered to all employees, otherwise it would deny its approval. The top 
management team conceded, but only half-heartedly. The workforce can get a maximum of 10 stock 
options while managers can get 100. The top management team treats itself to 1000 options." (Sturm, 
1997:25) 
"Along with the discussion on "shareholder value" that focuses on increasing shareholders' wealth, 
the interests of workers are more and more pushed to the background." (Sueddeutsche Zeitung 1997) 
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I 
1998 
A senior manager of an "We don't mind {the competitor's] efforts to attract excellent managers with the help of a stock 
, automobile option program - {We're] just not interested in the type of managers that are attracted by stock-
manufacturing based pay." (Anonymous) 
company. 
Joerg Pluta, "It's the European mentality. The enrichment of an individual [through stock options] on the backs of 
Director for the German the workers is considered exploitation." (Steinmetz and White, 1998: Bl) 
Shareholder Protection 
Association 
Klaus Eilrich, "If employers tell workers they should relinquish wage increases, we are not ready for stock options." 
Spokesman for (Rose and Marshall, 1998:6) 
Germany's 
biggest trade union 
I 
Wolfgang Bernhardt, "Most often - and I think rightfully - it is pointed out that stock prices are not an appropriate 
Management consultant indicator for management's performance .... Normally, the design of stock-based pay provides rewards 
for a managerial performance that is below average."(Bernhardt, 1998:5) 
Ekkehard Wenger, [On stock-based pay of DaimlerChrysler's CEOs]: "The only ones who deserve such sums are 
Professor of entrepreneurs. No executive deserves that much money."( Steinmetz and White, 1998: Bl) 
Management 
Editorial, "If stock price development becomes the criterion for management's actions, no-one should be 
Siiddeutsche Zeitung surprised that managers prefer layoffs over hiring. Stock markets reward cost cutting. Therefore, 
stock-based incentives can give wrong signals."(Sueddeutsche Zeitung 1998: 4) 
----- -
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Appendix 5.1 
5. The Logistic Model 
The logistic model, derived from the logistic function (as shown in Figure 5.1), is the 
main focus of this section. 
To obtain the logistic model from the logistic function, we write z as the linear sum 
a plus /31 times Al plus /32 times A2 ' and so on to /3k times Ak : 
[App 5.1] 
Where: 
Al.A2 .. ·Ak ' are known independent variables. 
a , is an unknown constant 
/31, /32" ·/3k' are constant terms representing unknown parameters. 
Substituting the linear sum expression for z in the right-hand side of the formula for 
fez) we get: 
f (z) 1 
[App 5.2] 
Where: i =1, 2, 3 ... k. 
To view the expression above as a mathematical model, we place it in a stock option 
adoption context. In this case, the logistic model considers the independent variables 
such as block-holder ownership, size of firm etc, which we shall continue to refer to as: 
Al,A2 · .. A K ' on a group of companies, for which we have also determined stock options 
adoption status, as either 1 for having adopted or 0 for having not. 
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We use this infonnation to describe the probability that stock options will be adopted 
during a defined study period, say to to t1 . 
The probability modelled can be denoted by the conditional probability statement: 
P (adopt=l I %1,%2"'%k) 
The model is defined as logistic if the expression for the probability of adopting stock 
options, given%i (i.e. independent variables) is: 
1 
P (adopt=l I %1,%2' "%k) = 1 + e - (a + L fJ i Xi) [App 5.3] 
The tenns a and Pi in this model represent unknown parameters that we need to 
estimate based on data obtained from %i and on the dependent variable (adopt) for a 
group of companies. 
For notational convenience, we will denote the probability statement: 
P (adopt=l I Xl,%2'''%k) as simply P(X) where X is a shortcut notation for the 
collection of variables %1,%2 "'%k . 
Thus the logistic model may be written as: 
1 
P(X) = 1 + e - (a + L fJ i Xi) [App 5.4] 
5. 1 Logit Form of the Logistic Model 
Odds ratio is the primary parameter estimated when fitting a logistic regression model. 
In this section we explain how an odds ratio is derived and computed from the logistic 
model. 
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To begin the description of the odds ratio In logistic regression, we present an 
alternative way to write the logistic model, called the logit form of the model. To get 
the logit from the logistic model, we make a transformation of the model. The logit 
transformation, denoted as logit P(X), is denoted by the natural log (i.e. to the base e ) of 
the quantity P(X) divided by one minus P(X), where P(X) denotes the logistic model as 
previously defined. 
This transformation allows us to compute a number called logit P(X), for any company 
with independent variables given by X. This we do by; 
1. Computing P(X) and 
2. Computing 1- P(X) separately, then 
3. Dividing one by the other, and finally 
4. Taking the natural log of the ratio. 
For example, if P(X) is 0.110, then 
1- P(X) is 0.890 
The ratio of the two quantities is 0.123 and the log of the ratio is -2.096 
That is, the logit of 0.110 is -2.096 
This practical example can be demonstrated algebraically as shown in the next section. 
5. 3 Logit Function Formula 
Let us consider the formula for the logit function. We start with: 
1 
P(X) = 1 + 
Algebraically, we can write 1 - P(X) as: 
1 
1 - 1 + e -(a+"L[Ji%i) [App 5.5] 
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If we divide P(X) by 1 - P(X), we obtain: 
1 
P(X) 1 
I-P(X) 
[App 5.6] 
We then compute the natural log of the formula just derived to obtain: 
1 [ P (X) ] 
ne I-P(X) [App 5.7] 
For the sake of convenience, the logistic model is described or stated on its logit form 
rather than in its original form as P(X) thus; 
Logit P(X) = a + L fJ i % [App 5.8] 
1 
Where; P(X) = 1 + e -( a+ "£{JiAi ) as already defined above. 
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Appendix 7.1: Change in Deutsche Bank blockholdings 1995-2005: 
Company 1995 2005 
Aachner und Munchner Beteiligungs AG 5.0 >5 
Allianz 10.0 >5 
Continental 10.1 >5 
DaimlerChryster 24.4 10.4 
Fuchs Petrolub 10.0 >5 
Hapag-Lloyd 10.0 Acquired by TUI 
Heidelberger Zement 10.1 >5 
Philipp Holzmann 25.8 19.5 
Hutschenreuther 25.1 Acquired by BHS Tablecloth AG 
Karstadt 10.0 >5 
Klockner-Humboldt -Deutz 45.0 Acquired by MFC Industrial 
Leifheit 11.0 >5 
Leonische Drahtwerke 12.5 >5 
Linde 10.1 10.0 
Metallgesellschaft 16.6 >5 
Munchner Ruckversicherung 10.0 >5 
Nurnberger-Beteiligungs AG 25.9 2.5 
Phoenix 10.0 >5 
Salamander 10.7 Acquired by ENBW 
Schmalbach-Lubeca 10.0 Acquired by Ball Corp 
Sudzucker 12.8 >5 
Vereinigte Elektrizitatswerke 6.3 Acquired by RWE 
Verseidag 10.4 Acquired by Deutsche Gamma 
Vogele 10.0 Acquired by Wirtgen GmbH 
Vossloh 7.6 >5 
WMF Wurrtembergische 9.1 11.7 
Source: Deutsche Bank 1995 Annual Report, 'Wer gehort zu wem?', CD-ROM, 2005 
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Appendix 7.2: Largest blockholders in the DAX 30 companies in 2005 
Company Largest block-holder Size (%) Shareholder type 
Addidas-Salomon Barc1ays Global Investors UK 5.4 Fund 
Allianz AG MUnchener RUck 9.9 Insurance 
AltanaAG Klatten, Susanne 50.1 Founder/family 
BASFAG None nla nla 
Bay .Hypo-Vereinsbank MUnchener RUck 18.4 Insurance 
BMWAG Quandt Family 36.6 Insurance 
Bayer AG Capital Group (USA) 5.0 Fund 
Commerzbank AG Assicurazioni Generali (Italy) 9.1 Insurance 
Continental AG AXA (France) 11.8 Insurance 
DaimlerChrystler Deutsche Bank 10.4 Bank 
Deutsche Bank AG None nla nla 
Deutshe Boerse Atticus Capital L.L. C. 5.1 Fund 
Deutshe Post B undesrepublik 44.7 State 
Dt.Telekom B undesrepublik 42.8 State 
E.ON Freistaat Bayern 5.0 State 
Fresen. Med Care Fresenius AG 50.8 Company 
HenkelKGAA Henkel Family 57.8 Founder/family 
Infineon AG Wachovia Trust Co 18.2 Fund 
LindeAG Allianz AG 12.6 Insurance 
Luftansa AG Allianz AG 8.7 Insurance 
ManAG AXA (France) 7.3 Insurance 
MetroAG Haniel + Besheim Families 55.7 Founder/family 
MUnchener RUck Bay. Hypo-Vereisbank 10.0 Bank 
RWEAG RW Energie Beteiligung 10.0 State 
SAPAG Founders 34.7 Founder/Family 
Schering AG AllianzAG 11.8 Insurance 
Siemens AG Siemens Family 6.1 Founder/Family 
Thyssenkrupp AG Krupp Family 20.0 Founder/Family 
TUIAG Grupo de Empresas Matutes 7.3 Company 
Volkswagen AG Land Nierdersachsen 18.2 State 
Source: "Wer gehort zu wem ?", CD-ROM, 2005 version 
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